


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
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


M. F. Lenton
Bournemouth, Eng.
April, 1945.

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ASIATIC ASIA



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BY
S. K. DATTA

LONDON
FABER & FABER LIMITED
24 RUSSELL SQUARE

FIRST PUBLISHED IN MCMXXXII
BY FABER AND FABER LIMITED
24 RUSSELL SQUARE LONDON W.C.1
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
R. MACLEHOSE AND COMPANY LIMITED
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS GLASGOW
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PREFACE

A BOOK with a resounding title such as *Asiatic Asia* needs some explanation. Just about three years ago I found myself on a journey from India to parts of China (including Manchuria), Japan, and Korea. The main objective of this journey was the meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Kyoto in the autumn of 1929. Many profitable days were spent examining the material brought to the conference by the various delegations, as well as listening to the discussions which related mainly to the results accruing from the earlier and later imperialisms of Europe and Japan respectively, in their impact on China as exemplified by the status of the International Settlement of Shanghai and the problems of extra-territoriality on the one hand, and the status of the South Manchurian Railway held by Japan on the other. But as these discussions proceeded those who took part in them were constantly thrown back on the more fundamental problems of population, of the land (agriculture is still the greatest industry in both these countries), of industrialism itself, and the control of finance. The impact of the new on the old in these regions has resulted in the creation of a deep-seated unrest.

That India too is suffering in a similar way is obvious to anyone. Hence it seemed necessary to take the enquiry a little further and to lay bare the foundations of society as they were originally projected, and to examine the changes in structure which have taken

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place. This I have attempted to do in this book, but no one is more conscious than I am of the limitations of my equipment for the task.

Indian leaders within a comparatively short period of time will either accept, or have imposed on them, a constitution which it is already evident will make provision for the conferment of further political rights, but that any provision will be made to meet the economic needs of the masses seems improbable. A political structure built upon such feeble foundations cannot survive any length of time. Is it too late for those on whom the responsibility for reconstruction lies to pause for a moment to consider some of the experience which Japan and China have accumulated, the first as the result of its successful efforts to build a nation state and the latter in its failure?

In conclusion, an expression of appreciation and thanks is due to friends in China and Japan who have extended to the writer the stimulus of their friendship in so many places and on so many occasions. To Miss Alison Cairns for help in classifying material, for valuable literary and other criticism, as well as the preparation of the index, I am very greatly indebted.

GENEVA, *31st May, 1932.*

S. K. D.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THERE ARE two Asias: Asiatic Asia, and the Asia which seems to merge so imperceptibly into Europe that of the two great countries, Russia and Turkey, it is difficult to say whether they are indeed European or Asiatic. But Asia and Asiatic Asia are separated by mountain barriers which in height and difficulty of access are probably unparalleled in any other part of the world—Hindu-Kush, Himalaya, Altai, and Hingan are the names which are attached to this, the great wall of Asia. Thus it comes about that the best approaches to India and China are by sea rather than land, though their mountainous frontiers have been pierced through the valley of the Kabul River and the Indus, as also through the Gobi desert which leads into China along the Kansu corridor. Behind these barriers in each of these two countries there has existed an ancient civilization with highly developed arts, literature and religion, and a social order for age and stability unequalled elsewhere in the world. On the other side of the barrier from the Altai to the Atlantic, Hellenism, implemented by the Roman Empire and reinvigorated by the twin Semitic faiths of Christianity and Islam, created a civilization whose adventurous vigour was equalled only by its inner social discord.

China consists of a massif of uplands and highlands with fertile strips of lowland along the courses of its

rivers, opening up into great deltas where they reach the sea. This Chinese massif is the rising-ground of almost all great Asiatic rivers, the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irawaddy, Salween and Mekong, together with her own rivers, the Western River, the Yang-tse-kiang, the Yellow River, and the Sungari. Another series of rivers arises from her northern edge and flows through the steppes of Siberia into the Arctic Ocean. Finally the Oxus rises from the south-west corner, and finds its way into the Aral sea. Practically the whole of China's land frontier fits into the angle made by the northern boundary of India and the south-eastern edge of Asiatic Russia. The figures of China's population are generally accepted as 400,000,000. Whether this is even approximate or not is uncertain, but, given the accuracy of this estimate, one main fact emerges: two-thirds of the area of this country support thirty millions of people while the balance of the population is concentrated on the remaining one-third of the area.

A reference to China generally implies the eighteen provinces watered by the three rivers, the Western River, the Yang-tse-kiang and the Hoang-Ho. But China lays claim to other great regions, to those uplands to which we have already referred, Tibet, Sinkiang, once called Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia and Manchuria, even though they are to-day within the orbit of British, Russian and Japanese influences. Not in Nanking would the geographer find the best maps of Tibet and Turkestan, but in Calcutta; maps of Mongolia and Northern Turkestan he would find in Moscow, and of Manchuria in Tokyo. In the south and south-west China has completely lost the overlordship of the kingdoms of Indo-China, Siam and Burma, from which in the past she received tribute. Her history tells of war-

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like, nomadic peoples who have pushed their way through the desert corridors into her lowlands, and have founded, as in the case of the descendants of Genghis Khan, dynasties which ruled the country. Desiccation and the consequent formation of deserts compelled these tribes to undertake expeditions of conquest to the well-watered plains of China proper. It would appear that to-day, even though tribal movements have been arrested, the desert itself continues its invasion and constantly extends the zone of famine, that outstanding calamity to which north-west China is subject. Although these arid routes which lead from outer China to inner China have had a sinister history, yet along them the faith of Buddhism travelled from India to China and Christianity also found its way. In the fifth and seventh centuries Fa Hian and Hiuen Tsiang went on pilgrimage to India, and along the northern route still later two Chinese Nestorian ecclesiastics travelled to Baghdad; one of these became Patriarch of Edessa, and the other was charged by the great Khan with a mission to the Vatican and to that Christian prince the King of France.

With the pressure of increasing population Chinese navigators and traders adventured forth on their own account into Korea and Japan, to the Philippine Islands, to Java and to the other islands of the Southern Seas. Along the sea route around the south-eastern corner of the Asiatic mainland China once again met India. In Java, in Cambodia and in Siam the two civilizations lived on side by side. The islands of these seas—Socotra, Bombay and Ceylon, Mauritius, Singapore, Java, the Philippines, Macao, Hongkong, Formosa and Japan—have a fateful significance in the history of India and China. Arab navigators gave place to Portu-

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guese, Dutch and English. From one to another naval supremacy in these waters has passed in turn.

India repeats, though with profound differences in detail, many of those general physical features which characterize China: the great rivers with ample deltas on which the life of immense populations is dependent, the same drift of population from north-west to south-east, an open corridor through uplands which have admitted in the past nomadic and warlike tribes. The common enemies in the north-western area, famine and desiccation, happily in India now partially stayed by immense irrigation works, complete the parallel.

Not only do the mountain barriers shelter Asiatic Asia from approach by land, but their melting snows fill her rivers, and on them are precipitated the monsoons which periodically every year give rain to the lowlands and islands, and by inundation create in India, China and Japan a particular type of agriculture. Half the population of the world is concentrated within the boundaries of Asiatic Asia and yet it comprises less than one third of the land surface of the earth. What has made this possible is the rice cultivation which frequently yields two crops in the year, and sometimes even a third. On the economy of the small individual rice patch, subject to periodic inundation, an intense cultivation, and the generous warmth of the burning sun, were built up these very characteristic eastern civilizations. China and India, economically self-sufficient, have never been forced into wars of conquest and expansion, but have on the other hand themselves lain open to the menace of external enemies. In Asiatic Asia, Japan alone, where apparently this self-sufficiency proved inadequate, has shown the spirit of conquest on more than one occasion in her history.

CHAPTER II

THE BASES OF SOCIETY

IT is generally accepted that human institutions derive ultimately from the extra-rational instincts of peoples. This might lead one to expect some measure of similarity in the institutions of all highly developed peoples, since the fundamental human instincts are the same everywhere. But just as the regions of this great sub-area under consideration have their distinctive yet mutually comparable physical features, so have they also their very distinctive and mutually comparable conceptions and systems of government and of society itself. In India these conceptions found their expression in a priestly hierarchy and a territorial feudalism. In Japan the idea was embodied in the clan system which for one period at any rate, struggled successfully against a conception of ecclesiastical hierarchy imported with Indian Buddhism. It was, however, reserved for China to reject both territorial feudalism and the priestly hierarchy. She was thus able to establish a rational society, based on the strictest law and regulation, and, what was even more important, on ethical practice. The Chinese student, the product of the modern university, will insist in conversation with a foreigner that China can no longer tolerate an invasion of her national sovereignty. This expression is perfectly justified, and indeed, in view of the events of the last century, he could not be expected to hold any other opinion. But has

China, except in recent times, set such store by this comparatively modern conception of national sovereignty? Has not her concern through the ages been, and, for all that we may know to the contrary, may not the concern of the masses of her people still be, the integrity of the sovereignty of society? What then is Chinese society? Its roots lay in a passionate loyalty to the family and, in the second place, to the trade guild of which the individual was a member, although this guild never hardened as in India into an institution like caste.

(1) The Family. If a feudalism existed in China it was one in which the ancestor was supreme. In him resided the totality of all virtue and knowledge. This fact gave to Chinese society that anchorage which has been its supreme strength; to the foreigner, even though he can but see its external symptoms, they are impressive enough. The ancestral tablet in the home is the expression of this loyalty, and, as each generation passes, it finds a place in the hierarchy of the departed. The magnificence of funeral ceremonies, the immense expenditure involved, are expressions of honour to the dead. The Shanghai incident of 30th May 1925 cost the Shanghai Municipal Council approximately \$900 Mexican for the funeral service of each person who was killed. The custom of retaining coffined bodies, which lie around in the fields (so common a sight from the railway-carriage window) and are preserved until they can be removed to the ancestral place, makes the stranger realize the hold the family has upon individual Chinese. The Jesuits who were admitted to China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, referred, it is recorded, to the Vatican the question of ancestor worship, with their recommendation that the practice should be

permitted in the Chinese Church. Rome, so distant from Peking, failed to recognize the supreme importance of the issue at stake, and refused to compromise, with the result that the Jesuits were finally expelled from China by Imperial decree. This fact is mentioned, not necessarily to suggest that the Vatican was at fault in its desire to preserve Christianity from Asiatic doctrines, but to record that probably the Jesuits with their customary astounding acumen realized that the belief and practice of ancestor worship was the keystone to the edifice of Chinese society, and that if this were removed the whole structure would inevitably collapse.

(2) The Functional Guilds of China have had in the past, and even to-day exercise, an immense influence. Through them public opinion was expressed, and their members looked to them for guidance and direction. This ancient spirit of guild loyalty still exists, and sometimes comes into conflict with the newer conceptions of loyalty to the State.

Thus a few years ago a case arose in the Shanghai Courts as to the liability of partners in a concern which had not been registered as a limited liability company. The plaintiffs were a British company who asserted that the Chinese Supreme Court had held that the liability in such cases was unlimited. The Chinese partners claimed that according to Chinese custom they were liable only up to the amount of their shares. The following excerpt¹ will show how the ancient voice of the nation-wide society still has an authority which China has not yet learned to recognize in the voice of the nation-state:

‘Mr. Yee Vee-Chang, Director of the Rice Merchants’ Guild, gave evidence, and the following dialogue took

¹Kotenev: *Shanghai: its Municipality and the Chinese*, p. 230, footnote.

place between the counsel for one of the parties and a witness:

Counsel: But do you respect your own Chinese Courts, or do you not?

Witness: Of course, having a Chinese organization we must respect it, but suppose any decision passed by the Supreme Court is not good, then we merchants have no capability of modifying it.

Counsel: But are you going to suggest that you are in a better position to decide whether a judgment of the Supreme Court, composed of some of the ablest men of China, is right or wrong?

Witness: That is not so. We merchants usually do as adopted by all the merchants.

Counsel: Do you obey the judgment of your own Supreme Court or do you not?

Witness: If it is reasonable I will obey. If it is not I will not obey.'

Perhaps the most outstanding institution in China was the corps of scholars, educated in the principles of Confucius, that philosopher and prophet of Chinese society. To them was committed the interpretation of the laws of society, whether they affected either domestic or administrative concerns. Other peoples, less subtle in their methods perhaps than the Chinese, depended on military or police force, in other words on organs of coercion for the preservation of their unity, but somehow these latter sanctions had singularly little effect on the Chinese. The scholars were a priesthood who gave authoritative decisions on conduct and the regulation of duties. General acceptance made enforcement unnecessary.

Superficially at least the Chinese conceptions of society resemble those of India. The caste system would

suggest a society rigidly constituted by laws and regulations which had obtained universal consent. While it is true that for the ordinary man the regulations of caste were final and that against them there could be no appeal, yet, as a matter of fact, caste even in this life could be superseded, for above caste was the holy life to which any individual might attain. In Indian history many a man of no social distinction whatever has attained to a spiritual authority. A religious leader was not necessarily a Brahmin or a priest: Buddha himself was not of priestly caste. The caste system was based on the economic demands of the time, and social morality was in its turn subordinated to that system, but the discovery of truth constituted the highest moral duty. Social morality was linked on to, and derived its sanctions from, the ultimate metaphysical goal by the assumption that the position and status of each individual within society was dependent on his success or failure in a previous existence to recognize the nature of the universe. The system, it is true, imposes social inequality (in contrast to the Chinese view that birth confers no particular dignity), yet since the fundamental assumption is that the caste of an individual is merely a transitory apprenticeship, it is possible for him to readjust the balance in his own favour, though in another existence. For the Indian, society has no ultimate basis in this world; this is, of course, in line with Hindu thought which declares that objective facts are but illusion. Here lies the fundamental distinction between the Chinese conception of society and the Indian, for while Chinese society was, as it were, a closed system, deriving all its sanctions from the notion of its own sovereignty, the ultimate sovereignty which India recognized was that of the other world.

Japanese social morality has been based upon loyalty to the sovereignty of the chieftain and clan. This most powerful factor in Japanese history still persists and, though modified, continues, many believe, to be the spring of social action. The lore of the Japanese people is a record of the achievements of heroic feudal chieftains and the passionate loyalty of their followers. In every Japanese film house the programme almost invariably includes some pictorial presentation of the ancient stories of heroism and loyalty to the chief. The conception finds a place in the constitution itself, which states that the Emperor 'is sacred and inviolable'. Modern Japan, when she came into being, might have gone the way of India and China, whose leaders to-day envisage a secular state, but the leaders of Japan found that the strongest bond of unity lay in the recognition of 'a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal'. That these were not mere constitutional platitudes in archaic form is demonstrated by the existence of an ecclesiastical establishment. The Japanese government supports no less than 150,000 Shinto shrines, whose priesthood (15,000 in number) is controlled by a special bureau in the Department of the Interior. The shrines are graded, and correspond to the administrative divisions of the civil government. The priests hold rank in grades parallel to those of the official hierarchy. At the very apex stands the shrine of Ise, over which the Emperor's cousin himself presides. Officials, on special occasions, are obliged to make their obeisance at these shrines, which represent the spirit of the Japanese race in its devotion to the Emperor, himself of heavenly lineage. Never has so bold an attempt been made to carry into a modern age the conceptions of other times. In a country so highly industrialized as Japan and with an industrial prole-

tariat, it is astonishing that the relationship of the employer to his workmen is conceived in the terms of a chieftain and his tribesmen. Quite recently, during the threatened strike of the Kanagofuchi cotton mills, the managing director stated in an interview that during the previous year he had endeavoured to convince M. Albert Thomas, the late Director of the International Labour Office in Geneva, that the relationship of worker to employer was fundamentally different from that in Europe and the United States. M. Thomas apparently was frankly incredulous. The Japanese industrialist ventured an opinion that events would shortly decide whether the Japanese employer or the Director of the International Labour Office was right. In the meantime, if the newspaper report is accurate, the management was circulating notices among the mill-workers to the effect that loyalty to the concern was the first requisite in a working man.

The social genius of these peoples expressed itself in manifestly different ways, which have already been described imperfectly in the phrases: the sovereignty of the other world, the sovereignty of society, and the sovereignty of the clan. On the other hand Buddha, whose humanity in the end proved stronger even than his anti-social doctrine, has imposed a spiritual unity on Asiatic Asia, a unity which once again differentiates it from the Asia that lies west of the mountain barriers.

To the writer, as an Indian, the nexus which binds these peoples is the life of the Buddha, as it emerges in art, literature, religion and probably in music and song. Wherever the traveller wanders, the expression of that great influence is vivid, whether in rationalistic Canton, in the great temples which preserve the colossal images of Buddha and his two companions still in Indian dress,

in Hangchow with its Lamite ridge (called the Indian Mountain and said to have been supernaturally conveyed from that Holy Country), in Peking with its perishing glories of the last dynasty, or across the Straits in Japan where Nara and the mountain temples outside Kyoto contain the imperishable records of the Buddhist faith, and the legends of Indian scholars and saints.

But it is this ancient theocratic order which is changing and has changed so profoundly in all these countries. The Western world has burst upon it: Christianity first, later the teachings of Huxley, Spencer and Mill, the economic doctrines of Adam Smith, and more recently still the social and philosophical ideas of revolutionary Russia have dissolved the cement which held the old edifice together. Perhaps the edifice still stands, but any explosion, invasion from without, rebellion within, widespread famine or acute economic stringency might speedily overthrow it. In the meantime the leaders of each of these countries are faced with the problem of discovering some adequate basis of unity which will hold their peoples together as nations. The consideration of this problem will be deferred to a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE BREAK-UP OF THE OLD ORDER

IT HAS already been suggested that it was from the sea that Asiatic Asia proved most vulnerable. Apart from the Arabs, who founded colonies by intermarriage and the infiltration of Islamic ideas, four European sea powers, *i.e.*, Portugal, Holland, Britain, and France, have had primacy in the affairs of eastern Asia. The Portuguese method of approach might almost be said to have been ecclesiastical. Political domination and trade were carried out under the protection of the Church. Camoens, the Portuguese poet, in his *Lusiad* constantly refers to the glories of the Christian Church whose lustre was heightened by the buccaneering exploits of Portuguese adventurers. The motives of the Dutch who followed them were perhaps more unvarnished. Their methods may be characterized by the fact that they were founders and indeed, even to-day, are the best exponents of the plantation system, which was based originally on a form of peonage scarcely distinguishable from slavery. The French, of course, had commercial expansion as an ultimate aim, yet their immediate concern was to establish the political prestige of their country; they reduced almost to a science the art of diplomacy in the setting up or overthrowing of native rulers, by intervening on behalf of one particular rival or another to a vacant throne. But of all European powers it was Great Britain that surpassed the others both in influence and

in her control over her possessions. Wherever she went she set standards which ultimately were accepted by her rivals. Her main and immediate concern was trade, the standard of success was set not in the glory of her Church, or even of her national prestige, but in terms of revenue, whether commercial or territorial. The American, who was far behind the others throughout the nineteenth century, has only during the last fifty years become a power in the Far East.

Thus may be characterized the methods of approach of the various western peoples who have forced their contacts upon Asiatic Asia. The new relationship was, of course, based simply upon their desire for increased trade and commerce, but the narrow and in a sense irresponsible activities of these early traders and buccaneers have had consequences whose magnitude, range and variety would have astonished no one more than themselves.

The first intimations that the western world received of the profound disturbances which resulted from its contacts with Asiatic Asia, were the armed revolts which have broken out from time to time in India, China and Japan. Wherever a western nation has touched the life of an Asiatic people and attempted to dominate it, politically and economically, the most immediate result has been a reaction, in large part instinctive, finding its expression in an armed rebellion led by the conservative forces of the country. At a later stage maladjustment is indicated by certain economic manifestations, whether agrarian or industrial. With these latter and with the political expression of the revolutionary spirit we shall deal at a later stage. The facts of the early and most spectacular reactions of Asiatic Asia to western civilization and attempts at domination are well known and may briefly be summarized here.

The Indian Mutiny furnishes the classical example of the reaction of conservatism transforming itself into an armed rebellion. The causes of the Mutiny are not far to seek. Subsequent to the passage of the Charter Act of 1833 the East India Company's agents in India directed their efforts to modernizing the administration. Changes took place in various spheres. In the first place the creation of a modern judiciary resulted in the elimination of those legal officers whom the Company's courts had inherited from the Mogul Empire. At a stroke of the pen these persons were dispossessed of their offices. In the second place, the army itself underwent changes; its commissioned ranks were progressively closed to the old families whose sons had found service there, and recruitment for these ranks was now made exclusively in Great Britain. In the third place, the disappearance of the old dynasties of feudal princes caused widespread popular apprehension. Fourthly, the old religious and social conservatism had been frontally attacked by the new system of education. One of the most interesting results of this system was the unity of purpose and outlook (unhappily shortlived since it was unique in the history of Anglo-Indian relationships) between the administration and the English-educated Indian, the product of the post-Macaulayan schools and colleges. It was against this Liberalism that the old conservatism of India reacted. The Indian Mutiny represented this opposition carried out on an extensive scale with the revolutionary purpose of overthrowing the administration which had brought such disasters to the old leadership of the country.

In China there have been two such armed reactions of outstanding importance, the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Rising. The first of these lasted from 1850 to 1864. This rebellion at the first glance would seem to be

an astonishing episode, the more so when we reflect upon its success as compared with the fate of uprisings in other countries. Unfortunately we are not in a position yet wholly to discover the real historical significance of the rebellion. No Chinese of modern historical training seems yet to have investigated the motives behind it. One of the reasons, it would appear, for this attempt at the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was that it had failed to protect the country against the foreigner, and yet this was not at first explicit, for at the beginning the foreigner was in sympathy with the movement. The chief actor was a visionary of rather scanty education, at one time a pupil in a Canton mission school. At first the movement he founded attacked temples, destroyed idols, and then turned its enmity against the Manchus: thus, on entering Nanking, the Taiping army is reported to have slain all but 100 of the 20,000 in the Manchu colony. Ultimately it was a foreign-trained Chinese army (raised under the benevolent eye of the British, American and French legations) that defeated the rebellion. The loss of life caused by the rebellion has been variously estimated at from 10,000,000 to 20,000,000.¹

Even a more marked example of a revolution of reaction was the Boxer Rising. The defeat of China by the Japanese during the war of 1894-95 impressed upon the more far-seeing of China's leaders the necessity of reform and the creation of a modern state with modern instruments of administration and national reconstruction. It was not that the foreigner had taken political control, it was an inward necessity that made persons like Kang Yu-Wei, sometimes known as 'the modern sage of China', lay before the Emperor the need for reforms, including changes such as the creation of a modern

¹ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 156.

civil service and the abolition of ancient customs which retarded progress. The reactionary elements made an appeal to the dowager Empress, who dethroned her nephew, proclaimed herself as regent and gave her moral authority to the forces of conservatism. The Boxer Rising was responsible for an enormous amount of damage both moral and physical. It lowered China's prestige and gave certain western nations an opportunity for a wider interference in Chinese affairs.

As we reflect on Japan as a modern state, it is difficult to realize that the new Japan has had such a short history. In 1868 the shogunate of the Tokugawas came to an end, and the dynasty of the Meiji Emperor became once more responsible for the direct rule of the country. The imperial decree of 1868 stated 'that the government of the country had been resumed by the Mikado . . . ' This decree added that the daimios must continue to direct their energies to establish Japan at the head of all the nations. The heads of the great clans and their clansmen were displaced from their position as functionaries, and a modern civil service was created. In 1873 the Japanese Government resolved to commute the hereditary pensions of the old feudal lords. In 1876 bonds were issued to them representing payments for a five years' to a fourteen years' purchase. With the small capital thus obtained some of the Samurai opened shops, but many of them became the victims of unprincipled speculators. The financial depression thus engendered amongst these people, with the consequent loss of their prestige and power, finally united the discontented elements. The leader of the Satsuma clan resigned his post as a Minister, retired to his native province, and finally, in 1877, at the head of 14,000 men marched out with the purpose, as he said 'of addressing some en-

quiries to the Government'. It was a seven months' campaign; Satsuma brought into action over 40,000 men and the Government over 65,000. The former lost 18,000 and the latter 17,000. The campaign cost the country £8,400,000.¹

These occurrences, however, were merely symptomatic of the general situation which remained unchanged even when the revolutionary movements were for the time being checked. The conservative elements had, it is true, received a set-back, and this fact hastened the political, economic and cultural changes.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries oriental conceptions of government and of society have been revolutionized and the intellectual attitude of vast numbers of people has been completely changed. What we have not already indicated in so many words—but is implicit in much that has been said—is the fact that a close connection exists in eastern cultures, and, as a matter of fact, in all cultures, between politics and social and religious conceptions on the one hand, and the economic foundations of a country. The mere concern of how a living is to be made has profound effects on human thought. Sometimes there is complete adjustment between political, social and religious ideas, and the economic order in which human beings holding those ideas have to live. Adjustment results in stability among a people, maladjustment on the other hand brings about instability. Oriental society has been distinguished by stability for the reason that, for centuries at any rate, harmony was established upon a basis of an adequate food supply. A breakdown of any of the elements making up this harmony will eventually affect the other elements, with the result that what had been for

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII, pp. 563-4.

so long stable is now characterized by instability. We have already pointed out that the outside world approached China by two routes. The landward approach, by Buddhist or the earliest Christian missionaries, philosophers or teachers, and even by vigorous nomadic peoples, resulted in a comparatively minor effect on Chinese society. To the modern Russian influence we shall refer later. On the other hand, the maritime approach has resulted in an upheaval for the reason that the economic foundations of China were thereby changed and with them, her religious, political and social conceptions. The same far-reaching causes in possibly divergent forms have affected the mass-life of the peoples of India and Japan, and the Sinofied and Hinduized populations of the south-eastern seas.¹

Cultural changes are more obvious and spectacular than economic changes. Perhaps it would be better to say that these latter, working more deeply at the roots of a civilization, are less apparent on the surface. The occasional observer would probably scarcely even recognize them. Cultural changes are also more sensational: they add singular interest to a traveller's journal, and can be made to adorn the newspaper columns or a

¹ Professor Giles of Cambridge, in his introduction to the translation of the late Richard Wilhelm's *History of Chinese Civilization*, referring to the political stability of ancient China, says: 'Chinese civilization may be regarded as based on two social elements; first, a class of peasant proprietors, firmly rooted to the soil; second, a small oligarchy of intellect and culture. It is the harmonious combination of these two elements that has proved of such immense value to the Chinese. In ancient Greece we find intellect and culture in perhaps a higher degree and, relatively speaking, even more widely diffused; but the system of city states was too unstable to endure very long. Under the Roman Empire the smallholders of Italy were gradually wiped out, and their place taken by hordes of slaves, who had little or no interest in the stability of the state.'

missionary record of work; to the superficial glance of the foreigner they appear simply as signs of progress, and he is either unaware of, or refuses to face the devastating economic changes, of which they are merely the outward sign and expression.

It was the developments consequent upon these economic contacts between East and West that were to prove so shattering to the ancient order, although in the early stages of their relationship we find the resulting dislocation attributed exclusively to cultural, political and even religious causes.

Let us glance for instance at the operations of the East India Company in the latter part of the eighteenth century in Bengal. In 1765 the East India Company demanded and received, in lieu of services to the decaying Mogul dynasty, the contract for collecting the revenue of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The balance between what they collected and what they paid to the native government became the source of a large revenue to the Company. This arrangement lasted for a period of a score of years, when misgovernment brought about by administrative duality led to the Company's accepting full responsibility for the functions of government. Thus failed an early example of diarchy. The Company settled down to the collection of revenue by a system of subinfeudation, and thus was created a class of persons who were in essence farmers of revenue, but with this difference, that their tenure was secured to them, provided that the revenue was paid punctually. The situation was further aggravated in 1793, when under the system known as the Permanent Settlement the cultivator was not protected against eviction, nor rack-renting. Under a system such as this the possibilities of grave injustice and oppression of the tenantry were very

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great. But even before 1793 the revenues had pressed heavily upon the people. Sir John Shore, in an official document written in 1789, referring to the revenues of Bengal, states that 'from the era of Todar Mull in 1582, until Jaffar (Moslem governor of Bengal) in 1728, the increase was moderate; from that period to the close of Aliverdy's administration in 1755 it was rapid, but not perhaps excessive; in 1763 it was violent and exorbitant.' This was the opinion of the most outstanding revenue administrator that the East India Company had in its service in India, regarding the revenues up to the date that his employers contracted for its collection. We shall express in tabular form¹ the amount derived from revenue over a period of two hundred years:

ASSESSMENT			COLLECTIONS
1582	-	-	Rs. 10,500,000
1658	-	-	Rs. 11,500,000
1722	-	-	Rs. 14,250,000
1728	-	-	Rs. 14,200,000
1763	-	-	Rs. 17,700,000
1764	-	-	Rs. 8,170,000
1765	-	-	Rs. 14,600,000
1786	-	-	Rs. 20,700,000 (practically all collected)

Under the old governors, for a period of a hundred and fifty years, there had been hardly any increase in the revenue. After the break-up of the Empire, the loosening of the central authority over the governorship of Bengal, and the resulting chaos, the demands made on the peasantry increased very rapidly. The East India Company accepted responsibility for the collection of revenue in 1765; in the next twenty years the actual assessment was very nearly doubled, but what is even more significant is that actual collections approximated

¹*Indian Journal of Economics*, April, 1930. 'Immediate Effects of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal', by J. C. Ghosh, pp. 831-835.

to the amounts assessed, and this in spite of the fact that in 1769-70 famine reduced the population of Bengal by one-third.¹

The East India Company's system in Bengal had disastrous results. For one thing, in their zeal to collect revenue they introduced the practice of eviction and sales of holdings. This practice had been unknown to India. It is true that the pre-British tax-collector might seize the products of the soil, he might even distrain the person of the defaulter, or constrain him by physical force, but the rights of the cultivator in the soil were generally recognized as being inviolable. The sale of land had also another result: it encouraged the speculator who invested money in the hope of making a fortune. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 threw agricultural authority into the hands of a comparatively few farmers of revenue, to the desolation of those who up to then had retained ancestral rights in the land. Nearly a century elapsed before justice was done to the claims of the tenantry by the passage through the legislature of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The early land revenue policy of the East India Company bore heavily on both the landlord and tenant. The British collector of Midnapore in 1802 made the following observations: 'It has been found by melancholy experience that the system of sales and attachments . . . has in the course of a very few years reduced most of the great landlords to distress and beggary, and produced a greater change in the land and property of Bengal than has perhaps ever happened in the same space of time in any age or country by the mere effect of internal revolutions.'²

¹*Annals of Rural Bengal*, vol. i. p. 32; by Sir William Hunter (Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1868).

²Cited by J. C. Ghosh, *ibid.*, p. 839.

Between the years 1821 and 1832 the agrarian situation in Bengal suddenly became acute, owing, the historian informs us, to a fanatical movement, Moslem in origin, known as the Wahabi movement, a form of puritanic sectarianism. For reasons into which we need not enter, Bengal, and particularly Eastern Bengal, presented a peculiar agrarian situation. The great bulk of the newly acknowledged landlords belonged to certain higher Hindu castes, whereas their tenants were recruited largely from the depressed Moslem communities whose ancestors had been converted to Islam. The Wahabi doctrines spread rapidly among the tenantry, and resulted in a movement which made its followers truculent and fanatical. It was not long before Hindu and Moslem riots broke out, in which the same excesses as we know to-day were committed. A study of the facts, however, makes it clear that the rising was agrarian in character, that is, a struggle between landlord and tenant, although the discontent was expressed in terms of religious divergences.

A record of the administration of the first Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal from 1854-1898 reveals that through this period of 44 years, during which eleven of these administrators held office, eight out of the eleven had agrarian troubles to deal with, brought about by the landlords in the first place, and in the second by the plantation system, which, created under the aegis of the new government itself, provides another instance of economic dislocation consequent on western penetration.

Under the plantation system certain landlord rights had been transferred to English indigo planters. After the planters had acquired long-term leases from the Indian landlords, they proceeded to renew the subleases

with the small-holding tenants, on condition that the latter bound themselves to cultivate a certain percentage of their holdings with indigo, which was ultimately bought by the planters at a specified rate. In 1830, as the result of the objections made by the subtenants to the fulfilment of the terms of their leases, difficulties in enforcing the contracts arose. Special authority, however, was conferred by legislation compelling the performance of these contracts. Serious trouble arose in 1859 when the general price of indigo fell and the cultivator realized that if he were to grow certain food crops he would be financially benefited. He also resented the interference and high-handed conduct of the factory agents who were employed by the planters to coerce the cultivator. Two factors in the situation demand attention. In the first place, India had entered into the orbit of world prices and the competitive demand for raw products. In the second place, the cultivator could be subjected to terrorism by the mere fact that the agents of the factories looked upon themselves as representing a higher and very powerfully organized authority. The records reveal the fact that the administrative officials themselves were swayed by one or the other of two considerations: the law, if rigidly applied, would on the one hand give some protection to the cultivator, but, on the other, would almost certainly alienate the English planter by impairing his social and commercial prestige. On occasions it would happen that the local magistrate applied the law to protect the cultivator against the planter, only to discover that his action might be overruled by his direct superior, also a British officer, and this latter in his turn might fail to receive confirmation of his decision from the head of the province.

Divergence of interest made a struggle inevitable. Discontent continued to spread, as it was impossible for hundreds of humble cultivators to bring their cases before the officials, and it became even more acute when the former discovered that in the case of some of their members the decision had gone in their favour. Meanwhile the planters charged the Government with inciting the cultivators to set aside their contracts. The Government next issued a proclamation informing the tenants that their contracts must be carried out within the scope of the law, and a temporary law was passed making it penal for a cultivator to refuse to grow indigo if he had received a monetary advance to do so. In 1860 disturbances occurred, some planters were attacked by the peasants, and a factory was sacked. In one district so many processes against the cultivators were begun that the ordinary work of the courts had to be suspended. The year 1860 was one of very great anxiety to the Government. Lord Canning, the Governor-General, wrote at that time: 'For a week it (the situation) caused me more anxiety than I have had since the days of Delhi. . . . I felt that a shot fired in anger or fear by one foolish planter might put every factory in Lower Bengal in flames.' For a vivid description of the expression of mass feeling, an extract from Lieutenant-Governor Sir John Grant's official minute on the subject may well be quoted:¹

'I have myself just returned from an excursion to Sirajganj on the Jamuna river where I went by water for objects connected with the line of the Dacca Railway and wholly unconnected with indigo matters. I had

¹For an account of the indigo troubles in Bengal the reader is referred to: C. E. Buckland, *Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, Vol. I, Chapter II, pp. 183-206 with appendix.

intended to go up the Mathabhanga and down the Ganges; but finding, on arriving at the Kumar, that the shorter passage was open, I proceeded along the Kumar and Kaliganga, which rivers run in Nadia and Jessore, and through that part of the Pabna district which lies south of the Ganges.

'Numerous crowds of *rai-yats* appeared at various places, whose whole prayer was for an order of Government that they should not cultivate indigo. On my return a few days afterwards along the same two rivers, from dawn to dusk, as I steamed along these two rivers for some 60 or 70 miles, both banks were literally lined with crowds of villagers, claiming justice in this matter. Even the women of the villages on the banks were collected in groups by themselves; the males who stood at and between the riverside villages in little crowds must have collected from all the villages at a great distance on either side. I do not know that it ever fell to the lot of any Indian officer to steam for 14 hours through a continued double street of suppliants for justice; all were most respectful and orderly, but also were plainly in earnest. It would be folly to suppose that such a display on the part of tens of thousands of people, men, women and children, has no deep meaning. The organization and capacity for combined and simultaneous action in the cause, which this remarkable demonstration over so large an extent of country proved, are subjects worthy of much consideration.'

But this agrarian struggle had repercussions on other classes which are of significance. A versified play appeared in Bengali entitled *Nil Darpan* or the 'Mirror of Indigo' from the pen of an Indian of poetic ability. In a preface the author says that the play records the 'annals of the poor'; 'It pleads the cause of those who are feeble;

it describes a respectable *raiyat*, a peasant proprietor, happy with his family in the enjoyment of his land till the indigo system compelled him to take advances, to neglect his own land, to cultivate crops which beggared him, reducing him to the condition of a serf and vagabond; the effects of this on his home, children and relatives are pointed out in language plain and true; it shows how arbitrary power debases the lord as well as the peasant, and reference is also made to the partiality of various magistrates in favour of the planters, and to the Act of the previous year penally enforcing indigo contracts.'

This Bengali play was brought to the notice of the provincial Government by a missionary, the Rev. John Long, who had it translated. The English version was circulated by the Government to its responsible officers. The Planters' Association prosecuted the printer and Mr. Long for criminal defamation, and the latter was sentenced to a fine and a month's imprisonment. A most bitter controversy now raged, carried on by the British commercial community against the officials of the provincial Government, which led to the immediate resignation from his office of the Chief Secretary, and finally Sir John Peter Grant, after making a valiant defence of his officials and the *raiya*s, antedated his retirement by several months.

Yet another example of the dislocation of the social and economic order by western interference is provided by the activities of the Dutch in Java. The Dutch system of economic exploitation, based on political domination, though limited to insular areas, and therefore not so extensive as elsewhere, was carried out with an intensity and precision unknown in India and China. In these latter countries policies of exploitation were limited by

the fact that a popular explosion might result, but with the simpler and less organized races in the Dutch Indies this contingency was very remote.

The replacing of the small holding by the plantation had the most profound effects on Javanese society, which have been well described by M. Angoulvant in his work on the Dutch East Indies:¹

‘The financial situation in the capital, and the steady increase of the colony’s expenditure, caused grave anxiety and rendered imperative an increase in revenue. Van den Bosch, who had been appointed Governor-General in 1830, set himself to this task, and in brief took up the work which Daendels had planned, but, under the menace of imminent war, had not been able to achieve. To provide this increase of revenue, Van den Bosch relied on a more thorough and energetic exploitation of the soil to be carried out at the vigorous instigation and with the close and constant supervision of the government.

‘The system was based on financial advances granted, free of interest, by the home government to contractors who were responsible for the exploitation of the land, and on a sharing of its produce in agreed proportions between the state, the contractor and the cultivator.

‘Van den Bosch, who regarded himself as substitute for the native chiefs, arrogated to himself their rights to one-fifth of the products of the land; he reckoned that he might use one-fifth of the peasant’s working time, and decided that one-fifth of the land should be used exclusively for the production of certain commodities which were in demand in the European markets, as for instance coffee, tobacco, sugar, indigo, tea, pepper and

¹*Les Indes Néerlandaises: leur rôle dans l’économie internationale. Le Monde Nouveau.* Paris, 1926, pp. 34-36.

cinnamon. The natives were forced to work up to a maximum of 60 days in the year. Land and labourers were farmed out to the contractors who were responsible for feeding the workers. This system was calculated to lead to intensive cultivation of commodities which would produce large profits. In fertile districts each family had to support 600 coffee workers, and to hand over the entire harvest to the government which paid 12 florins per picul¹. Since 200 trees went to the production of one picul of coffee, each family received 36 florins, which sum was reduced to 25 by the tax on rice. A European overseer superintended the preparation of products and their storage in government warehouses. The state centralized and sold them, generally through a trading society whose profits, which came from the difference between buying and selling prices, were enormous.

'The immediate results of forced labour were very satisfactory. The Javanese harvest produced from 250,000 to 1,000,000 piculs of high-grade coffee, which brought the government more than 30 million florins. The gross income of the government rose from 24 million florins, before the introduction of the system, to 115 millions in 1857, giving a surplus of 45 million florins, and this in spite of increased expenditure.

'One good result of forced labour was to turn the Javanese back to the land, their true source of wealth and prosperity. But the system led eventually to the despoiling of the natives. Government, after having promised them immunity from taxation on land, insisted on payment, and, having confiscated one-fifth of their land, proceeded to take the whole of it as soon as the owners had put it under cultivation for the production

¹133½ lbs.

of their rice crops, leaving them only such land as lay too far off for them to cultivate, burdened as they were with continual forced labour. The contractors fed them badly, and they were forced to sell their buffaloes and so fall into debt.

‘Little by little . . . this policy of exploiting the colony to benefit the capital aroused increasing protests in Holland, especially in the Liberal Party. . . . Van den Bosch wished to establish fortifications at Ambarawa to forestall any possible uprisings, and the resultant forced labour in 1849 prevented the natives from the eastern side of the island from attending to their rice crops. The result was a terrible famine costing the lives of half a million people. The system of cultivation by forced labour was thereby condemned. . . . The first law ameliorating the conditions of forced labour was passed in 1854. The agrarian law of 1870 guaranteed to the native his right of property . . . forced labour was reduced to 20 or 32 days in the year, according to the province, and could only be levied for works of public utility, while an annual payment of at least a florin a head could buy exemption. The last traces of this system of forced cultivation disappeared in 1916.’

Let us take yet another instance where the methods employed were more purely political, as were also the consequent disturbances. The reader will recollect that the East India Company included in its trade the opium monopoly, and transported to China large quantities of that commodity. With the opening-up of the China trade it was discovered that transactions were on the whole one-sided: whereas the western merchant, to meet European demands, purchased a substantial quantity of goods in China, such as silk and tea, yet the Chinese consumer’s needs were met almost completely inter-

nally. Hence payments to China were made in bullion. In a situation such as this opium as a commodity of barter came as a relief, and indeed the value of the balance of trade in favour of the Chinese was finally reversed. The anti-opium enthusiast has often held that the indignation of the Chinese against the trade was based on moral grounds; but, as a matter of fact, the amount of the payments on account of the purchase of opium by the Chinese increasingly outbalanced the debts of the trader who bought tea and silk. This adverse balance had to be liquidated by the Chinese in silver; and it was in order to stop this drainage of precious metal that urgent steps were taken to suppress the opium trade and thereby the Anglo-Chinese war was precipitated.¹

Apart from moral grounds, the Chinese were on purely economic grounds justified in their demands for the prohibition of the opium trade. Indeed their whole attitude towards foreign trade as carried on by the adventurous foreigner was one of suspicion. They realized the menace it carried with it of those changes which would break down the economic fabric on which their social and cultural life was based. However, with the changes brought about by this trade, Chinese demands for other commodities were developed, and in addition political pressure was put upon them to ensure the open door to foreign trade. Thus, by the Treaty of Nanking concluded between Great Britain and China, it was laid down that the latter country might not impose an *ad valorem* duty of more than five per cent on

¹It might further be suggested that the American trade in transport of Mexican silver to China was liquidated by export of Chinese coolies who were carried by American ships to the undeveloped regions of the western hemisphere.

imports into that country. By the Treaty of Tientsin it was made clear that imports passing inland from the ports should be similarly protected from transit duties.¹

The reader will by now have formed some idea of the disruptive effects on the economic life of eastern peoples by direct interference on the part of western powers. This disruption was, naturally, carried still further by the ensuing development of trade and commerce which, operating indirectly, changed the occupation of vast numbers of people and compelled them to seek employment in other already overcrowded vocations.

While the commodities of the eastern world were in demand in European markets, the reverse, as we have already remarked, was not true, an exception of course being made in the case of certain articles of luxury. In the *Ain-i-Akbari*² it is stated that European imports included commodities such as broadcloths, articles of furniture, saddles; but the demand for these was limited, and though among the courtiers there was a steady importation of European wine, this was a fact which naturally did not find its way into the records of an Islamic state.

The commercial companies were handicapped by the one-sidedness of the trade, but, with the advent of industrialization in England, it became possible to manufacture commodities on a large scale, cheap enough for the Asiatic markets. India through many centuries had been, if we may use the term, the Lancashire of the eastern world, and under the East India Company she became one of the largest, if not the largest, of the suppliers of cotton goods to Europe. But, with the invention

¹See Appendix.

²*Ain-i-Akbari*. The domesday book of Akbar the Great (1556-1605 A.D.). Compiled by his Minister Abul Fazal. Translation into English by Jarrett and Bloch (Asiatic Society of Bengal).

of mechanical spinning and weaving in England and the establishment of a great textile industry, subsequently protected by a tariff to exclude Indian goods, a textile current in the reverse direction now set in, with devastating effects on the old hand-industry both in India and in China. The village craftsman was thrown out of employment and was pressed back on the soil as an agricultural labourer. This process has not been arrested up to our own time, and explains in part the steady increase in landless agricultural labour as revealed in succeeding Indian census reports, published each decade. The first of these was compiled in 1871, and each subsequent report shows that both absolutely and relatively a greater number of people are dependent on the land for a livelihood. It is not only through the textile industry that this change has come, but the reports reveal that in every decade there are fewer metal workers and an increasing number of metal dealers. The old craftsman, the maker of the wonderful brass vessels, is being replaced by the dealer who imports the aluminium utensil. The Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture, which reported in 1928, quotes from the Indian Famine Commission Report of 1880 as follows: 'The numbers who have no other employment than agriculture are greatly in excess of what is really required for the thorough cultivation of the land'; and the Royal Commission adds, 'It seems clear that the observations of the Famine Commission are even more pertinent to-day than when they were made in 1880.'

Is the Indian problem of overcrowding on the land very different from that in China? Unfortunately the facts have never been examined with the same care as in India. From the visitor these matters are more or less hidden, but enquiry from other foreigners, who have

resided for long periods in China, regarding actual agricultural holdings, frequently elicits the information that every Chinese cultivator has very definite rights of ownership in the land. Apparently this is a widely accepted opinion, and is certainly in line with Chinese traditions for, as we have already seen, Chinese civilization was built up on the ownership of these small holdings. Among the Soviet experts, who were invited to become advisers to the Canton Government, were included a certain number of economists who investigated the conditions of the Kwantung Province. They discovered that at least 55 per cent of those engaged in agriculture were without rights of ownership in the land. Was this due to natural increase in population or to overcrowding of the ranks of agricultural labour consequent upon the decay of the old village industries brought about by the free circulation of manufactured articles and goods from abroad? Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his exposition of *The Three Principles of the People*, has the following statement: 'What is the situation now in China? Before China had a foreign trade, the goods used by the people were hand-manufactured by themselves. The ancient saying "Man tills and woman weaves" shows that agriculture and cloth-making are old industries in China. Then foreign goods began to come in. Because of the low tariff, foreign cloth is cheaper than native cloth. Since, moreover, certain classes of people prefer the foreign to the native cloth, native industry has been ruined. With the destruction of this native hand-industry, many people have been thrown out of work and have become idlers. This is a result of foreign economic oppression.'¹

¹*San Min Chu I*, Sun Yat-sen, English translation, China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations. Shanghai, p. 42.

Yet another disruptive element has undoubtedly been the development of communications and increased facility of transport.¹ Some years ago it was customary in certain forms of literature to pillory the Chinese for their conservatism in matters of industrial development. The story has been told, and frequently told, that when the first railway was constructed in China by a foreign company, between Shanghai and Woosung, the line, at the order of the Chinese Government, was purchased and finally taken up and transported to Formosa. It was said that the Chinese dread of releasing the spirits of earth and air had proved too strong for this modern development. A less biased view of the situation would doubtless have discovered a motive for the Govern-

¹The first Asiatic country to embark on a policy of building railways was India. In 1847 a paper published by that famous railway engineer, Sir William Andrew, drew public attention to the relation of railways to the security of India and the development of overseas trade. The first railways were, as a matter of fact, merely extensions into the hinterland of the sea routes which originally had been opened by the Portuguese, but were now under British control. The construction of these railways was carried out by British companies with British capital, but this proved a very expensive matter, and the companies became almost insolvent until they were rescued by the Indian Government who finally purchased the railways, raising the necessary finances by means of loans in the London market. The state embarked on a scheme of railway expansion and found finance again by further borrowing. Railway expansion after 1880 was guided by two considerations, namely the military protection of the Indian frontier and by what are termed 'famine protection schemes', for in time of famine the transport of food is obviously a matter of first importance.

Reference is made above to the ill-starred Woosung Railway, built by foreign enterprise in China without the sanction of the Chinese authorities. This railway, as will be recollected, was bought by the Chinese Government and finally torn up. Four years later the Chinese Government itself made an effort to construct a

ment's action in the fact that the line had been constructed without official permission, although it is probable that the real reason was that the masses of the people, with an instinct that was sound enough, dreaded the innovation that was to play such a large part in breaking up their ancient order of life. To the eastern peoples the railway must have presented a force that was beyond their control. This is corroborated by the existence of a strong anti-railway sentiment in India in the early days of railway construction. The European himself might recognize and sympathize with this dread. Some of the speeches and even state documents on the construction of the Channel Tunnel are evidence of a widespread fear of the consequences which might ensue

railway from Tientsin to the Manchurian frontier, probably with the object of guarding her northern province against the menace of the Russian advance. After the Sino-Japanese War China was financially incapable of proceeding with the policy of direct railway construction, and by 1908 her railways, which had developed very considerably, were privately possessed by France, Russia, Germany and Britain. The realization by the Chinese that the communications of the country were controlled, and in their own interests, by foreigners, was one of the potent causes of the Boxer Rebellion. From 1908 the administrative control by Chinese of these foreign railways was recognized. Both in India and in China railways have been looked upon as one of the main methods of the foreign economic invasion, and the people of these two countries have steadily worked to free themselves from the control of foreign companies. In India the state has taken over the ownership of the railways and in most cases is operating them. The total interest charges for capital loans have proved very heavy on the budget of these countries. China has partially met the situation by occasional defaults in payment of the debt charges; India has not, up to the present time, done so, though there is a widespread opinion that the original charges were unfairly made and that they constitute too heavy a burden on the resources of the country.

In railway construction, as in other similar matters, the economic policy of Japan stands in striking contrast, for she has never per-

on the closer union of Great Britain and the continent of Europe. Even Japan, as she faced the modern world, was suspicious of this new innovation in communications. Thus, at the time of the opening of the Tokyo-Yokohama Railway in 1872, a Japanese newspaper remarked as follows:

‘The opening ceremony of the railway between Tokyo and Yokohama, the first to be laid in this country, will be held in the presence of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. By means of this railway millions of people will enjoy the benefit of travelling the great distance of about twenty miles in only fifty-four minutes. The railway train will be as fast as the wind or a cloud. Without such a miraculous device it would be impossible for a human being to do a thing like this unless he possessed

mitted an outside nation to obtain a hold of her communications. The state itself undertook railway construction for which it borrowed money in the London market. The whole policy of Japan has been the development of her own internal industries so as to eliminate the necessity of going outside her own borders for the necessary material for railway or other mechanical developments. So successful has this policy been that the Japanese State has become one of the largest, if not the largest, constructor and controller of railway communications on the mainland of China itself. Since 1920 the capital of the South Manchurian Railway has stood at 440 million yen, of which the Japanese Government owns 220 million; this gives it the authority to appoint the members of the administration. The company operates six hundred and ninety miles, which is ten per cent of the total railway mileage of China, and, in addition to the railway enterprise, it owns mines and estates, it conducts electricity, gas, and hotel concerns, carries on a life-insurance business, undertakes Trust Company operations, maintains a sulphate of ammonia and soda ash plant, and conducts among other things an oil-shale business. In other words this company controls the modern economic policy of immense regions of Manchuria, an attempt at economic control which has never been undertaken by any other foreign country in China.

the wings of a bird, no matter how many millions he might spend. Since the days of the first reigning Emperor Jimmu, history has never recorded such an event. In western countries, it is said, citizens would congratulate themselves upon a similar success, on the opening day, each according to his social standing. In this country, however, none of the citizens of Tokyo seem interested in the matter. Their indifference discloses their lack of loyalty, since the Emperor is so deeply interested. These same citizens, however, show a great deal of enthusiasm on such occasions as the unveiling of an image of Buddha or on the appearance of a Shinto carriage, moving about the streets. On such occasions, men dress themselves in women's attire and women in men's not knowing what is meant by the word "shame". This is barbarous and nonsensical—a very deplorable state of affairs indeed! The citizens of Tokyo ought to be an example to the rest of Japan, living as they do so near the throne. It is their duty to get rid of all conventional practices, in faithful obedience to the wishes of the August Regular, who leads the nation in the awakening of His Empire.¹

The consequences of railway and sea communications are very marked, and they have undoubtedly a bearing on the profound changes which have taken place in society:—

(1) Railways were built in the first instance in India and China by British companies, and in Japan by British personnel with a loan from a British bank, with the purpose of promoting the circulation of foreign goods in the interior. We have already considered how

¹*The Railways of Japan: Past and Present*, by Hampei Nagao, p. 5, I.P.R. Conference, 1929. Papers on Cultural Relations prepared by the Japanese Council, No. 7.

the influx of these goods brought about unemployment and increased agricultural labour; to this, of course, must be added unemployment, as pointed out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, of the natural transport force of the country.

(2) Movements of population, as the result of the internal stress of unemployment, now became possible. The drift of population to Manchuria is an important example. Another is that to Burma and Malay from India proper.

(3) The recruitment of large numbers of coolies under indenture came into being. The British tropical colonies took advantage of these facilities, and the system, as far as India has been concerned, lasted over eighty years, during which period many millions went overseas, and incidentally new Indian communities were founded in alien surroundings. The system of contract labour, as far as China is concerned, apparently still exists.

(4) Improved communications have resulted in the imposition of an urban economy on agriculture and the great rural masses of the people. This may have been what Karl Marx had in his mind when he contributed a series of letters on India to a New York daily paper over seventy years ago, when Indian railways were in their infancy, and declared that with their advent the real exploitation of India had begun. Village finance has been linked up with the finance of the city, money is no longer as in former times subsidiary to agricultural operations, in other words a convenient method of exchange of commodity, but is now the controlling element in agriculture. Whereas 100 years ago the financier might take a week to visit a remote village, he can get there now in a

few hours.¹ Unfortunately in India, and possibly also in Japan, legislation affecting matters such as contracts, mortgages, etc., has been almost wholly in the interest of the towns as against the agriculturalists. A number of the cities themselves are rapidly being industrialized, and drawing in many thousands of unemployed as workers in factories, engineering shops, shipbuilding yards, or even as ordinary human draft labour.

Such are some of the most important factors which have led to the break-up of the old civilizations and so to the present-day turmoil. But there is yet another cause of unrest, possibly consequent on increased industrialization, namely the growth of population. Excess of population has been widely held as being the root of the difficulties through which China, India, and in a lesser degree Japan are passing at the present time. The figures of population and the ratio of increase are worked out periodically in two of these three countries; for China alone the data are unreliable, the population having been estimated variously at from 300 millions to 460 millions, the latter being the most recent estimate of the Nanking Government.² Some authorities believe that the maximum population of China was reached in 1870 and that since then there has been a decline. At any rate in no part of the world are such huge populations

¹In the latter part of the seventeenth century, François Bernier, physician of Montpellier, traversed the road from Lahore to Wazirabad, 72 miles in distance, in six days. At the present time it takes two hours and two minutes to complete the journey.

²At the International Statistical Conference held in Japan in September 1930, Professor Wilcox of Yale gave reasons for holding the smaller figure as being accurate. For these and criticism thereof the reader is referred to an article entitled 'Professor Wilcox and the Chinese Population Question', *The China Critic*, 28th August 1930, p. 819; also *The Transpacific*, 25th September 1930, p. 11.

carried by agricultural countries, for even in Japan agriculture is still the main industry.

In Japan the population for a period of three hundred years remained stationary, 'fluctuating between 28,000,000 and 33,000,000'.¹ But it has doubled during the period from the Restoration in 1868 to the present time. Dr. Shiroshi Nasu, in a paper on the Problem of Population and Food Supply in Japan, given at the Honolulu meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, points out that one of the causes of the phenomenal rapidity of the growth of population since the beginning of the Meiji era was the abandonment of the practice of birth control by the agricultural class. In this latter period indeed legal prohibition of the practice was enforced, but the Government, at last alarmed by the increase of population, has recently encouraged the diffusion of information regarding contraceptive methods.

The growth of population in India in the last fifty years has been approximately 20 per cent, although there are indications that a decline in increment has taken place. British India, excluding Burma (which is under-populated), has seven provinces with populations of from over ten millions up to forty-six millions. Four of these seven provinces showed a decline in population between the years 1911, 1921. The other three showed increases of 5.4, 2.7 and 2.2 per cent. British India as a whole showed in that decade an increase of only 1.3 per cent, and if the Indian States are included, the total population showed an increase of 1.2 per cent, compared with 7.1 per cent during the previous decade.² The out-

¹*Institute of Pacific Relations, Report of the 2nd Meeting, Honolulu, 1927, pp. 339-40.*

²*Statistical Abstract of British India, 1915-16 to 1924-25, published by H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 2793, pp. 6, 7.*

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standing feature of the last census (1931) is the 10 per cent increase which has taken place in the population. Unfortunately we are not in possession of the corresponding figures for China, but within this year the provincial government of the Hupeh Province has published the comparative census returns for the years 1925, 1929:

	TOTAL POPULATION			
1925	-	-	-	28,616,000
1929	-	-	-	25,553,000

Commenting on these figures, the Hankow correspondent of *The North China Herald* suggests that the marked decrease of over three millions is very striking, as there seems to be no sign that the birth-rate is declining. He then analyses the figures of population of the counties that make up the province, and finds that twenty-one of these show increases, while forty-six show decreases. He further suggests that the latter counties are those which have been marked during the period by communist activity. But this fact cannot explain a singular feature in the returns: in the total figures for males and females there is a very marked difference, namely fourteen million males to eleven million females. It is difficult to see how communist activity has brought about this particular result. The facts tend to show that probably as life becomes hard, a high female infant death-rate is deliberately brought about, and with the consequent defect of females the birth-rate drops.

The growth of population in former times was conditioned by two factors: (1) Natural causes which were uncontrolled, such as a high death-rate due to a high infant mortality, lack of sanitation, and the incidence of periodical famine; (2) by definite practice of keeping birth-rate down, or by permitting premature death of female infants or by religious prohibitions. It is in the

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light of this wish to limit the population that certain practices may be understood. The commonest, which is still fairly widespread, is by means of exposure of female infants. In India infanticide was prevalent among two classes of people. One class was the very high-caste Rajput, whose native country was unproductive, great tracts being nothing but sandy desert. The other class included aboriginal tribes who had fled into the highlands where again life was hard. But in India a more general practice to keep the birth-rate down was the prohibition of the remarriage of widows, which must result in checking the birth-rate of the country as a whole. The figures taken from the Census of 1921 given below are suggestive.¹

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF FEMALES OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE			TOTAL NUMBER OF WIDOWS OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE		
15-20	-	-	-	12,496,066	517,898	
20-25	-	-	-	13,502,280	966,617	
25-30	-	-	-	13,573,002	1,516,047	
30-35	-	-	-	12,761,619	2,354,122	
35-40	-	-	-	8,662,721	2,232,569	
40-45	-	-	-	9,512,071	3,678,416	
Totals				70,507,759	11,265,669	

Enforced widowhood, it is clear, reduces quite substantially the number of women who are permitted to bear children.

The facts, as far as we know them, demonstrate a widespread feeling of unrest in the great masses of the people, an unrest which almost to our own day was scarcely suspected. Throughout the nineteenth century the problem of vocation and increased population has lain heavy on the masses of the Indian people. That it

¹*Statistical Abstract, ibid.*, p. 23.

exists in China no one can deny, in appearance even more intensely than in India, partly because in the latter country efforts have been made to develop the land by means of irrigation, and to stay the worst features of famine. Few of these ameliorative schemes have been attempted in China. Yet in both countries millions of men have been uprooted and increasingly denied a livelihood. Is it any wonder that China finds it comparatively easy to recruit armies, hordes which by the inducement of food and clothing rally to any military leader who raises the standard of rebellion? Is it any wonder that men, women, and even children flock into the great industrial cities to become not so much the slaves of machines as members of great colonies of expatriates who can be exploited by the industrialist or the usurer and town bully?

The outer expression of these immense changes is significant enough. Thus in these three countries, within a comparatively short time, an army of a million and a half of textile workers has been created. To ensure motive power to factories and the transportation of manufactured goods, a million miners are constantly employed to bring up to the pit's mouth the necessary coal. Another million or more wage-earners are necessary to operate the railways. As the result of the growth and development of transport, land and maritime, great movements of population have taken place; thus the plantations in Malay, Ceylon and Assam hold between them a constant labour force of nearly two million coolies, expatriates from their ancestral homesteads, many hundreds, sometimes even thousands of miles away. Foreign railways and shipping have within three decades enabled the population of Manchuria to develop from almost nothing to 25 million inhabitants. Great

tracts of land are exploited by land companies, banks and similar corporations (Chinese or Sino-Japanese), and for this purpose they are actively engaged in inducing hundreds of thousands of peasants to migrate.

What is the urge behind these movements, which are indicative of a deep-seated unrest? First, is the steady growth of population, which is a nearly universal phenomenon in Asiatic Asia. In the second place, the penetration of manufactured goods has rendered the artisan and craftsman workless, and communications have released human draft labour from its hereditary vocation. In the third place, urban finance has imposed itself on the village, and the peasant is steadily losing proprietorship in the land and turned into a tenant or landless labourer. In order to seek a livelihood he enters the city and thus is uprooted from his hereditary tradition: from the condition of status he changes to that of contract. Thus the economic man is created.

CHAPTER IV

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL RETROGRESSION

PERHAPS THE greatest challenge in modern times to the invasion of the Asiatic countries by the products of western manufacture has been the development, first in India, later in Japan and China, of the cotton textile industry. In all three countries ancient indigenous textile industries were threatened with extinction by mass production in other parts of the world, as for instance Lancashire. The threat was countered by the internal development of industrial manufacture, the founders of which realized their enormous advantage in having easier access to the raw materials and a far greater command of cheap labour than was possible for western industrialists.

India, China and Japan provide themselves with textile goods from three sources:

(1) The products of their old hand-operated industries, which still fulfil a substantial function in the economics of these countries. (2) The importation of western machine-made textiles. (3) The development of the manufacture of textiles by machinery in these countries themselves. The earliest attempt in India to manufacture textiles by machinery was made over a hundred years ago in Bengal. This venture was for long the solitary instance of its kind, but fifty years later in Bombay, and later in the up-country towns around

it, the industry was launched. In Japan it was established between thirty and forty years ago, and China opened her first mills in and around Shanghai still later.

The statistics of this industry are well worth considering, and the attention of the reader is directed to the Indian Tariff Board Report on the Bombay Textile Industry.¹ The figures contained in that volume show that the total annual consumption of cotton piece goods in India amounts to approximately 4,500 million yards. Of this 1,900 million yards are produced industrially in India itself, 1,500 million yards are imported from abroad, and 1,100 million yards are hand woven. The corresponding figures for China are not available, but it is clear from the returns that the importation of cotton goods continues to increase. Japan, on the other hand, except for a small quantity from Great Britain, scarcely imports any cotton goods whatsoever. Both the Chinese and Japanese figures may be affected by the comparatively high consumption of silk and artificial silk textiles.

Now it is this industry precisely which throws into relief the growing economic interdependence of these three countries, which as it develops tends to eliminate western manufacturing countries as competitors in the textile industry.

The largest exporters of raw cotton to Japan are the United States and India. Importation from India shows a tendency to increase, while American importation has fallen, owing to higher prices consequent upon its higher cost of production. The following are the figures for the importation by Japan of raw cotton, including

¹*Report of Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile Industry Enquiry)*, 1927. Govt. of India Central Publication Branch, Vol. I, p. 239.

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yarns, ginned cotton and cotton in the seed (the unit being 1,000 bales, each containing 400 lbs.)¹:

YEAR			U.S.A.	INDIA	CHINA
1927	-	-	1,627	1,623	620
1928	-	-	1,047	1,526	549
1929	-	-	1,217	1,672	472

In the same way the high prices quoted for American raw cotton have affected its import into China unfavourably as compared² with imports from India:

YEAR			INDIA	U.S.A.
1927	-	-	1,111,793 piculs ³	1,282,146 piculs
1928	-	-	1,222,699 „	664,676 „
1929	-	-	1,448,056 „	1,028,144 „

Ten years ago a very substantial export trade in yarns was done with China by India, but this at the present moment shows signs of rapid diminution, owing probably to the fact that China is manufacturing yarns herself and protecting her market by preferential tariffs. The Indian figures reveal indeed that the current has turned, and that India herself is importing yarn from China. From Japan also a current of cotton yarns to India was established a number of years ago, although it is now drying up owing to Chinese competition. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that higher costs of production in Japan have led her to transfer her own yarn industry to China where costs are lower.

The import of Japanese piece goods into India dates from 1916-17, at a time when it was impossible for trade with Britain to be carried on. The result of this opportunity for Japanese penetration was that, whereas before the war the importation of grey goods⁴ was entirely

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1931, p. 387.

²*China Year Book*, 1931, p. 1071.

³A picul = 133½ lbs.

⁴Unbleached cotton goods of a low quality.

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from England, Japan had, by 1926, captured over twenty per cent of the trade, and nearly nineteen per cent of the trade in coloured goods. In 1926 the comparative imports of cotton goods into India was stated in millions of yards as follows:¹

LONGCLOTHS AND SHIRTINGS				FROM
			FROM JAPAN	UNITED KINGDOM
Plain Grey	-	-	83.5	87.2
White Bleached	-	-	1.2	86.5
Printed	-	-	1.2	14.9
Dyed	-	-	5.2	21.7
Coloured	-	-	21.0	5.2
			112.1	215.5
DRILLS AND JEANS				
			31.6	7.8
SHEETINGS, ETC.				
			28.4	1.2
FLANNEL AND FLANNELETTES				
			7.9	.6

Within the Asiatic markets themselves, Japan and India are engaged in a very intense competition which has extended to the east coast of the African continent. The crisis through which the Bombay textile industry is passing is not explained by the single factor of Japanese competition within India itself, but the export trade of Bombay has diminished as Japan has successfully captured its markets. One of the most interesting places in which to study this is the port of Aden, the centre for the import trade which feeds the Arabian hinterland and Abyssinia. This trade is largely in the hands of Indian merchants who are both importers and retailers. The

¹*Report of Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Text. Indust.), 1927, Vol. I, pp. 40, etc.*

Indian trade mission, as the result of an enquiry four years ago, made the following statement in its report on Aden. 'Taking the 1926-27 figures, it will be noted that the total imports of greys were 54 million yards or nearly three times as much as all other classes combined. Of these nearly 80 per cent are imported from Japan and China. Formerly this trade was held by America and India, but during the last five years America's share has dwindled to one-tenth of what it was, and India's to one-sixth, whilst Japan's and China's share of the trade has increased from practically nothing to from 30 to 40 million yards per year.'¹

In the manufacture of iron and steel, Japan was the first of the Asiatic countries to free herself from the necessity of buying abroad. Japan, though a great manufacturer of steel, was, until two years ago, dependent on India for pig-iron, and in a lesser degree on Manchuria. In the latter country she has now complete control of the industry. As may be seen from frequent references in the commercial pages of her journals, Japan is making an attempt to eliminate Indian pig-iron, although at the present time she is unable in her own interest to do so completely. Machinery, however, is still a European or American monopoly, although there are signs that Japanese technical skill may make her a formidable competitor in eastern markets. It has been stated that a few of her textile machines have been imported even into the United Kingdom. India, too, since the War, has founded a steel industry, and at the present time is manufacturing in very substantial quantities steel rails and bridge material necessary for her railways.

¹*Trade Mission to the Near East and Africa*. Govt. of India Central Publication Branch, 1928, p. 122.

It seems, therefore, probable that Europe and America cannot hope to preserve indefinitely their cotton and steel markets in India, China and Japan, which are becoming growingly interdependent, both in supplying raw material and in marketing the finished goods. M. Francis Delaisi in his very original study, *Les Deux Europes*,¹ divides the world into six great divisions, namely western Europe of the 'steam horse', which he terms Europe A; secondly, the extension of Europe into the new world; thirdly, eastern and southern Europe, called by him Europe B, which has in the past been looked upon by western Europe as its special field of exploitation; fourthly, the zone along a line drawn from Bombay to Tokyo; fifthly, an intertropical region which includes a substantial portion of Africa, Ceylon and the East Indian Archipelago, and lastly the nomadic world of Islam. He suggests that the Far Eastern zone is the one which of all parts persistently refuses to buy from the first zone. He has, in this connection, certain very interesting pre-war figures:

'In 1913 on the eve of the crisis in which the Far East is involved to-day, the 897 million persons spread over India, Indo-China, China and Japan, bought 700 million dollars' worth of goods put out by industrial Europe. In the same year Europe B with its 230 million inhabitants, possessing much the same rudimentary equipment and the same social organization (illiterate peasant masses working for an aristocracy having little interest in the products of the soil), purchased 1,300 million dollars' worth of goods. This section with a population only a quarter as large absorbed almost twice as much (185 per cent).

'This fact provides sufficient proof of the force of

¹Payot: Paris, 1929, pp. 142-143.

resistance which the simple factors of climate and tradition oppose to economic penetration.

'What follows is even more surprising. That same year the countries of the intertropical zone absorbed 722 million dollars' worth of goods produced by industrial Europe.

'Thus the Far East with its ancient culture and its population three times as large as that of Europe, counted for less in the economic balances of the Europe of the 'steam horse' than do the 260 million negroes and half-castes distributed on either side of the equator.

'Thus at one blow the naïve hopes, based in the past on the fabulous wealth of the Far East, are reduced to very modest proportions indeed.'

What we have said in the foregoing pages tends to confirm what Professor W. J. Hinton suggested in his paper read before the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1927:

'It is convenient and in accordance with the facts to consider India, China and Japan and the East Indies as one economic region, entered at the western end by the filaments of European trade, and at the eastern by those of American trade, and having a much slighter connection with the Australian and New Zealand, South African and South American regions.'¹

Japan has succeeded in establishing without foreign interference or control a modern economic system of industry and finance. China and India, and indeed the whole of the Asiatic seaboard, are being increasingly influenced by her mercantile activity and she is undoubtedly to-day the principal economic power in the Far

¹*Problems of the Pacific*: proceedings of the 2nd Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations. Univ. of Chicago Press, p. 386.

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East. The following figures for 1928¹ will clearly demonstrate Japanese trade interests:

	EXPORTS	IMPORTS
Asia - -	834 million yen	903 million yen
Europe -	160 „ „	403 „ „
N. America -	858 „ „	693 „ „

The export figures to America include a sum of 687 million yen which represents the value of one single commodity, namely, raw silk. As long as the demand for this luxury commodity exists, the solvency of Japanese trade with North America is assured. Two changes, however, might take place which would be disastrous for Japan. In the event of the restoration of China, the producers in that country, with lower costs to bear, might quite easily undersell Japan in the American market. The production of artificial silks may, on the other hand, increase so as seriously to reduce the demand for the natural article, and indeed in 1918 when the United States imported just over 30 million pounds of raw silk, she was manufacturing just 5 million pounds of artificial silk. By 1927 both commodities, imported and manufactured, had risen to nearly 70 million pounds. This increase may quite possibly have been at the expense of cotton textiles, but in the United States it has been asserted, though by no means universally, that by 1940 the consumption of natural silk would be reduced to one-quarter of what it is to-day. Perhaps this explains the feverish haste with which Japan is developing her own artificial silk industry. With the production of cotton textiles, Japan has had great success, but again two main markets in China and India are threatened by tariff barriers, which, in the latter country, have already begun to be effective.

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1931, pp. 448-9.

Japan, with an increasing population and small agricultural resources, is obliged to import food in the form of rice, and is impelled to direct economic invasion of the continent of Asia by the financing and operating of enterprises such as railways, banks and industries. In China she has definitely outstripped all other nations in the value of investments and their resultant returns, but further expansion of this character is becoming more difficult, and even the returns on her present investments may before long be reduced. Still such expansion is her only hope. The Japanese textile industries have been busy increasing their spinning and weaving mills in Shanghai. Towards the end of 1930 a Japanese journal announced that another 130,000 spindles and 3,000 looms were to be added to 1,175,000 spindles already owned and operated by Japanese companies in that city.¹ A Japanese company acquired a few years ago a spinning mill in Bombay and has successfully operated it. It is believed that further extension will shortly take place under the high tariff wall which India has recently erected.

Japanese transactions in the Asiatic financial and industrial world have been accompanied by an exercise of political authority, particularly over her neighbours, China, Korea and Formosa, the two latter being her accessions. From her own point of view these activities are inevitable, for the foundations of her own existence as a modern nation state are threatened. Around her has grown up, in a sense, the economic unity of Asiatic Asia, yet the moral prestige which she enjoyed in the eyes of Asiatic peoples after her victory over Russia has correspondingly declined.

¹*Japan Year Book*: 1930, p. 380; also *The Transpacific*, Tokyo, 9th October, 1930, article entitled 'Japanese Spinners in China expanding'.

Although her moral prestige has waned, yet Japan is, in the sight of all Asiatic peoples, the most outstanding example of success and achievement. Yet the sense of insecurity which prevails in Japan was brought home to the writer on reading a weekly summary of Japanese news supplied by a Tokyo correspondent to a British newspaper in Shanghai. Her economic stability is, as we have seen, precarious: is her social and industrial stability any more assured? Perhaps a résumé of one of these contributions might be of interest. The writer draws attention to an attack on the late Hamaguchi Cabinet by the leader of the opposition who asserts that the removal of the export gold embargo has brought widespread business depression, 'with bankruptcies occurring constantly amongst all classes, commercial, industrial and agricultural'. The unemployed early in 1930, according to official reports, numbered 350,000, though the writer would estimate it at double that figure. But the Government has furthermore betrayed the country in signing the Naval pact in London. 'Its action has put the national defence in jeopardy.' The Sino-Japanese Tariff Treaty is next discussed, and the apprehension of the Privy Council with regard to the damage to Japanese overseas trade is recorded. The drift to the cities is increasing. Nearly a million in 1929 passed into the manufacturing centres. 'This trek from the villages to the cities continues without intermission, and, with business in a very depressed condition and industrial plants cutting down wages and reducing their staffs, this constant drift . . . is regarded by the Government as extremely undesirable.' Japanese trademarks are being fabricated by 'unscrupulous Dutch and Chinese merchants in the Dutch East Indies, particularly in Java and Sumatra'. This report is confirmed by the

Japanese Consulate at Sourabaya. A Korean daily newspaper has been suspended for publishing an article by Bernard Shaw on the evolution of Czecho-Slovakia, and an article by another writer on the progress made by the Negroes in America. The authorities held that these and similar contributions were written 'with evident intent to give instigatory hints to the Korean race'. The director of the Korean Police Press Bureau remarks, 'The special issue was merely a cloak for political propaganda.' An announcement is made that the Government has placed rationalization in the forefront of its economic programme. When the Minister of Commerce was asked whether further unemployment would not result, he replied 'Rationalization might have been attended with unemployment in other lands, but industrial conditions here are different from those in say America, Britain or Germany. Besides, the policy we intend to start with is specially designed to encourage smaller industrial and commercial business.' Finally a wealthy Japanese industrialist has died, and his estate, so it is recorded, amounts to £25,000,000, thirteen per cent of which will come to the public treasury.

However one-sided this report¹ may be, and it is one-sided, the writer has simply recorded events in Japan as they occurred day by day, and impressed themselves on his mind; to study them in perspective was not his function. To an outsider, let us say a being from some other planet, how chaotic it all would seem. Whatever the benefits that have accrued from the westernization of an Asiatic country, and they are universally believed to be substantial, the rifts which now appear seem deeper and more ominous than were ever possible in the locally based society of a past age. At the end of the Tokugawa

¹*North China Herald*, 6th May, 1930, p. 221.

régime the economic foundations had, as we have seen, broken down. Will a future generation witness a repetition of collapse, possibly on a far wider scale? The glories and achievements of Japan are ever present in the minds of the political leaders of India and China. They realize that in the economic field they have a very powerful antagonist, and the method employed by Japan they look forward to applying themselves to their own national affairs. The western-trained economist will say that this is 'inevitable', which is but what Kismet is to the old-fashioned Moslem and Karma to the Hindu.

In spite of the industrial awakening of the East by which a new economic world area has been created, Asiatic Asia, not even excepting Japan, remains fundamentally agricultural. Agriculture still continues to be non-industrialized, still bears the features of the ancient system, upon which is based her traditional civilization and culture. But there are symptoms that the condition of agriculture is becoming acute. In the first place, as we have already seen in China, tenancies are taking the place of proprietary rights in the land, thus involving heavy charges on the industry. In Japan agricultural tenants form fifty-two per cent of those who hold rice-land.¹ Of the total increased area during the nineteen years previous to 1923, proprietary land increased by nine per cent, while land held by tenants increased by nineteen per cent. The tenancy farms are, we are told, provided with land, sometimes with a certain amount of seeds and manures by their landlords, who are also responsible for paying the land-tax, the landlords in their turn demanding fifty per cent of the produce.² In

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1930, p. 339.

²*Modern Japan and its Problems*: G. C. Allen, Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp. 121-2.

India too this increase in tenant agriculture has been very marked. Then finance, that is, urban finance, has a grip on present-day agriculture, such as was quite unknown in the past. Professor Nasu suggests that in Japan a very critical stage has arrived when agriculture has to bear such heavy burdens, and indeed in his opinion this is one of the main factors which has led to social unrest and has helped to direct thought towards the possibility of a complete change of the economic order. If these charges should continue and it becomes uneconomic to cultivate the farm on an individual basis, it may be necessary for the state to take over the land and socialize the industry. While Professor Nasu maintains that this socialization would not be desirable for his country, yet the present critical situation gives some justification, in his opinion, to those who would apply such radical ideas.¹ There is further the growth in India and China of an agricultural landless proletariat. In the former country, the Government itself, convinced though it always is of the general progress of the country, has grave misgivings regarding this particular problem which has been studied by it from the point of view of famine prevention. An official writer in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, as long ago as 1907, makes the following statement:

‘One class alone is being left behind in the general progress, and that a large one. Agricultural labourers, as already stated, are multiplying rapidly on the margin of subsistence, and beyond the requirements of agriculture, and by so doing are keeping their own wages low, while cash payments for work actually done are super-

¹*Problems of the Pacific*: Proceedings of the 2nd conference of the I.P.R., Honolulu, 1927. ‘Population and Food Supply in Japan’; Dr. Shiroshi Nasu, pp. 339-360.

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seeding over large parts of India the old customary payments of grain at each harvest.¹

This class, together with those who hold small and precarious tenancies, together with their dependants, numbers to-day nearly eighty millions. Not only has it grown in the last twenty years, but its proportion to the other agricultural classes has definitely increased.

Chinese figures as usual form the main difficulty in appraising the agricultural situation in that country, but the growth of tenancy farming, the landless proletariat and the power of urban finance are well illustrated by a recent survey made by Mr. C. C. Cheng in a statistical study of farm tenancy. The Soviet investigators under Borodin in Canton obtained certain results to which reference has already been made,² and Mr. Cheng's conclusions tend to verify the earlier results. Mr. Cheng divides China agriculturally into three areas; namely the North-East, the Yellow River Valley and the North, the Yangtse Valley and the South:

	PERCENTAGE OF OWNERS	PERCENTAGE OF PART- OWNERS	PERCENTAGE OF TENANTS
North-Eastern area	- 51	19	30
Yellow River and North	69	18	13
Yangtse and South	- 32	28	40

The Yellow River Valley and the North area is the part of China most subject to drought and famine conditions, and immense numbers of landless workers pass to the North-Eastern areas for seasonal agricultural occupation. The third area is usually fertile and well irrigated, and industrially and commercially it is the most highly developed part of China. 'These factors', we are told,

¹*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Clarendon Press, 1907, Vol. III, p. 499.

²Page 42.

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'might have made accumulation of capital easier than in the North, and the result has been the gradual buying up of farms.' It is of significance to note that the three seaboard provinces of Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung, the most important oversea trading provinces of China, show the tendency even more markedly than the other provinces in their group. Thus:

			PERCENTAGE OF OWNERS	PERCENTAGE OF PART- OWNERS	PERCENTAGE OF TENANTS
Chekiang	-	-	27	31	42
Kwangtung	-	-	30	24	46
Fukien	-	-	9	22	69

The North-Eastern or Manchurian region is a newly developed area. The average holdings are large, indeed land companies are already at work speculating in land values; the figures for tenants are not very high as the large holder uses seasonal agricultural labour from Shantung and the Yellow River area. These immigrants are showing signs of settling down and probably the number of tenancies will rise in the future.¹

It is a fact that agricultural production in India and Japan has actually gone up in recent years, the improvement being due to increased agricultural areas and also to better agricultural methods. But the expansion of agricultural land in Japan has, it would now appear, come to an end. For the last few years the effect of the average annual increase has been completely eliminated by the even larger amount of land that has gone out of cultivation. In India and in China there are great tracts of uncultivated land which might be devel-

¹*The China Critic*, 25th Sept. 1930, C. C. Cheng, 'A Statistical Study of Farm Tenancy in China': pp. 917-922.

oped. The Indian Government has shown what can be done in this line by the magnificent agricultural reclamation by means of canal irrigation in the Punjab, where many millions of acres of land, once upon a time completely barren, are to-day one of the most fertile parts of India. But unfortunately finance has its grip on this new agriculture, and it is difficult to see how in the future the heavy charges can continue to be paid. The total agricultural land actually under cultivation in the Punjab approximates to 30 million acres. The annual land revenue charges on this acreage amounts to 50 million rupees; the interest on account of debt is just short of 200 million rupees annually. China shows little progress in land development. Her internal dissensions and the absence of state government, either national or provincial, which could undertake agricultural schemes, has made development almost impossible.

Another point to be kept in mind in considering the agricultural problem of Asiatic Asia is that India, China and Japan have been brought into the orbit of world agricultural prices. Both China and Japan are now importing in substantial quantities commodities such as rice and wheat. India does so in times of scarcity only, but the tendency to increase imports shows signs of developing. The export of wheat from India has greatly diminished as the prices of this commodity have been kept low by bumper harvests in Canada and Australia.¹ Yet another serious factor in the situation is that

¹Perhaps one of the best illustrations of the results of world prices was demonstrated in 1930 in India. Australian wheat was selling in Calcutta at lower prices than Punjab wheat, with the result that the Punjab land-owning interests in the Assembly demanded that a tariff should be imposed on foreign wheat. This relief was given.

there are signs that agricultural land values are falling. Both in Japan and India, as well as in China, land revenue was the basis of national finance. In India, certainly, this is no longer true. Land revenue shows an inelasticity which makes it useless from the point of view of the expanding expenditures of governments. Agrarian unrest in certain Indian provinces is not infrequently the result of raising the incidence of land revenue. This is the inner meaning of the Bardoli Satyagraha movement led by the Indian National Congress¹ in a subdivision of a Bombay District after a reassessment of land revenue had been made.

Industrial enterprise in India, China and Japan is, as we have seen, assuming a size and importance which seriously threaten the markets of western powers. The growth of nationalism has given a tremendous impulse to production within these countries, and moreover their relative geographical proximity and the similarity in their climates and social conditions facilitate an exchange of goods which seems to point to the development of the economic unity of this vast area. It is doubtful, however, if this unity can be achieved in a manner to ensure the prosperity and stability of the fortunes of its peoples, under the present conditions of economic and political organization. The economic position of Japan, the dominating power in the trade of Asiatic Asia, is, as has been shown, extremely precarious, and the condition of agriculture, still the basic industry of all three countries, is steadily becoming worse. The heavy charges on this industry, the growth of the rural proletariat and fragmentation of agricultural land tend to make agriculture an uneconomic proposition for the actual cul-

¹*The Story of Bardoli*, Mahadev Desai. Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad, 1929.

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tivator. The strivings of the rural masses to obtain a livelihood and better conditions of living is probably the basis of that unrest of which these ancient countries, with their once well-ordered and stable societies, are the victims. It is clear that the continuation of agriculture on the basis of uncontrolled urban finance and uncontrolled individual ownership increasingly lessens the efficiency of the industry. Hence the first need in the economic reconstruction of Asiatic Asia is for rural reconstruction whether it be on the basis of internal co-operation, or of socialization.

CHAPTER V

'THE TWILIGHT OF THE GODS'

IN THE foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to give a picture of some changes in the economic bases of society which have led to social dislocation among the peoples of certain Asiatic countries. Specific instances have been cited as showing how the ancient orders broke up as the result of these very material changes, but the religious and philosophical ideologies, from which moral and social sanctions were derived, have suffered even in the absolute field where they have been consciously held, as the result of the impact of western ideas. That these religious and philosophical systems are themselves widely discredited, could scarcely be asserted categorically, but the gradual withdrawal from their domain of great zones of human activity is of very deep significance. We are witnesses of a process whereby, in succeeding zones, theocratic authority is being rapidly replaced by human authority: the zone where human authority alone operates is widening with every generation.

Religion in the past was both transcendently and pragmatically the basis of authority. A very clear illustration of this is provided by the manner in which Buddhism became the inspiration of the empire which the Chinese rulers imposed on their country in the fourth century. Dr. Hu Shih, quoting Wu Tse-hui, 'the veteran

thinker of contemporary China’, summarizes these changes as follows:

‘The ancient Chinese were characteristically simple farmers. They were not an imaginative people and were incapable of establishing religious systems. . . . It was only after the rise of several great sages from their midst, such as Confucius and Mencius, that they were emboldened to become an urban people. . . . But this new life never suited the wishes of the vast majority of the agricultural population, who only wanted good crops and no governmental interference. . . . Before the age of Buddhism . . . the Taoist philosophers, Lao-tse and Chuang-tse, represented the *laissez-faire* psychology of the farmer, while Confucianism expressed the more active political desires of the country squires. . . . Buddhism was a religion which teaches man to forsake this world and prepare for life in the other world. But when Chu Hsi and his co-workers unconsciously adopted this religion of the other world and superimposed its ideas upon the moral and political codes for life in this real world—then the new codes became terrors and made Chinese society a tragedy. How lifeless has Chinese society become since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries!’¹

Confucianism with its simple and democratic ethic was inadequate as a basis for the increasingly complicated and hierarchical structure of imperial government. Buddhism with its ‘rich imagery, its austere asceticism, its grandiose metaphysics of marvellous architectonic structure, its splendid ritualism with the gorgeously rich music and art—all these simply took China by surprise and conquered her by onslaught.’ If this

¹*North China Herald*: 12th Aug. 1930, ‘China’s Sterile Inheritance,’ p. 255.

diagnosis is accurate, it would appear that Buddhism, accepted by the intelligentsia as furnishing a more comprehensive account of the universe, yet achieved its success in competition with the original beliefs, as the instrument of dynastic imperialism, in short it subserved a sociological need.

Now in modern times the first great zone to pass from theocratic control was that of government and administration, together with those welfare services which the state has taken over on a small or large scale, as the case may be, in India, China or Japan. Secularization has taken place. The whole conception of government and its authority has changed: it is no longer regarded as the imposition of a divine, but rather the creation of a human order, which must therefore be justified by human standards, while welfare services are conceived not as works of grace or merit but as measures expedient and utilitarian whose benefits the individual accepts as his right.

Putnam Weale, in his history of the Chinese Republic up to the year 1917, records the struggle between autocracy and religion on the one hand, and republicanism and religious neutrality on the other. In 1913 General Yuan Shih-kai became president of the year-old Republic. A few weeks later he broke up the parliament which was in session, and shortly after issued his second mandate to the country.

This declaration is of singular interest:

‘Confucius, born in the time of the tyranny of the nobility, in his works declared that after war disturbances comes peace, and with peace, real tranquillity and happiness. This therefore is the fountain of republicanism. After studying the history of China and consulting the opinions of scholars, I find that Confucius must remain the teacher for thousands of generations.

But in a Republic the people possess sovereign power. Therefore circular telegrams were dispatched to all the provinces to collect opinions, and many affirmative answers have already been received. Therefore all colleges, schools and public bodies are ordered to revive the sacrificial ceremony of Confucius, which shall be carefully and minutely ordained.¹

In June, 1916, Yuan Shih-kai was dead. The most important business before Parliament on its reconconvocation was to undertake the draft of the permanent constitution. Certain proposals were highly contentious, and among them was a suggestion that Confucianism should be recognized as a State Church:

‘Remarkable discussions and fierce enmities, . . . marked the final decision not to make the Confucian cult the State Religion; but there is not the slightest doubt that in formally registering this veritable revolution in the secret stronghold of Chinese political thought, a Bastille has been overthrown and the ground left clear for the development of individual and personal responsibility in a way which was impossible under the leaden formulæ of the greatest of the Chinese sages.’²

In Japan, as has already been seen, an attempt has been made to link the conceptions of the theocracy to the principles of representative government, but it is quite clear that with the extension of the franchise the old outlook was bound to be radically modified. A similar state of affairs has resulted in India, not merely from the extension of the franchise and parliamentary institutions, but from the fact that an Indian government which could not appeal to the old tradition of the

¹B. L. Putnam Weale: *The Fight for the Republic in China*: Hurst and Blackett, 1918, p. 49.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 208, 209.

country, was compelled to justify its position by the efficiency of its administration in protecting the people, whether from external invasion or through the administration of justice. Nationalism, as will be shown in the next chapter, even though it has proved to be a substitute for religion, is itself rapidly becoming secularized. Sir Valentine Chirol, in his description of Indian revolutionary activities following on the disturbances of 1905, comments on the close association of the revolutionary and religious beliefs held by the leaders, and adds that the Bhagawat Gita was the devotional manual of the revolutionaries. To-day, however, the revolutionary movement is secular in outlook. The old nexus binding religion and political revolution no longer exists.

Education too has passed from the influence of theocratic ideas. Systematization has led to its quantitative increase. Thus in Japan the state has made provision for universal education; both India and China are headed in the same direction, and progress in the former country steadily continues. All these systems are under the control of a secular state. Thus education, which fifty years ago was definitely the expression of the religious morality of the time, has within a comparatively short period been transformed into a secular instrument. To a certain extent during the earlier days this tendency was modified by Christian educational institutions, and particularly by the foreign teacher. In India Hindu and Moslem institutions came into being as the result of this influence, but neither the missionary nor the indigenous religious institutions were effective in stemming the tide of secular education. The influence of the Christian schools and colleges (which fifty years ago constituted a substantial proportion of the modern educational institutions) might have arrested the tendency, had not their

own polemic been destructive of the authority of the indigenous religions. The weapon which they thus forged was turned against themselves in the hands of the new secularists. To-day the secular schools and colleges are in a majority, and in the universities the western romantic idealism of the nineteenth century is giving place to scientific and economic values. Thirty years ago the best students in the Indian universities selected the humanities as a major subject of study, but this has changed; economics and the exact sciences have taken their place, with the result that a critical attitude to religion generally has grown up.

In China a definitely antichristian movement, or more widely an antireligious movement, has emerged. Dr. Hu Shih declares that the cause of this movement is the universal questioning of apparently established values:

‘All traditional values are being judged from a new standpoint and with new standards. From small feet and concubinage to Confucianism and Christianity, nothing is free from this new process of transvaluation. Some of the judgments may be too subjective or too superficial. Others may be too harsh or unhistorical. All the same, the existence of the evaluating attitude cannot be denied. . . . The cry of revolt is heard everywhere. Tradition is often thrown overboard, authority is cast aside, old beliefs are being undermined. . . . the saner and more far-sighted leaders are trying to inculcate into the people what they regard as the only safeguards against these dangers, namely the historical and evolutionary point of view, and a truly scientific attitude to life. But that requires education and education is always a slow process, too slow for impulsive souls to wait.’¹

¹*China Year Book*, 1924. From an article by Dr. Hu Shih, ‘The Chinese Renaissance’, pp. 650-1.

The bluff General Feng, when visited a few years ago in his unmodernized province of Shensi by a deputation of Christians who asked his advice as to what Christian institutions should teach, is reported to have summed up his reply in the one word, ‘Science’.

Whatever may have been the view of the Central Government at Nanking with regard to religious education, the Department of Education, under pressure of the local Sovietized Kuomintang branches, ruled two years ago that it was no longer permissible for any religious instruction, whether voluntary or compulsory, to be given to children in primary schools, even though these institutions were themselves religious foundations receiving no grants from the state. Certain Christian universities, moreover, have been informed that if they desire registration as bodies competent to instruct students, they must abandon their theological faculties, otherwise their recognition will be jeopardized. It is possible, however, that this stringency which affects Christian institutions more than others is caused by factors other than a disinterested rationalism; they are doubtless looked upon by the Chinese as foreign agencies, under the protection of privileges acquired by what are termed ‘the unequal treaties’.

Another zone withdrawn from the empire of theocratic conceptions is the modern city, that centre of the urban economics which is relentlessly imposing itself on rural life. In the city we find two new classes created by this system: the bourgeois class whose outlook has been changed by the new conceptions of education and government, and the proletariat created by modern industrialism. Factory worker, miner, railwayman, the coolie engaged in the dockyard and port, as also the plantation coolie, have abandoned the old conceptions

of sacred authority which governed the relationships of master and servant. The sanctions of the old religion are decaying within them. These men deal with the new instruments of production whose influence upon them may be compared to the results of a scientific education on the student class already referred to. Their enrolment furthermore in the trades unions, and their experience of the group action which has proved their strength, have completely changed their outlook. The political and economic demands made by strikers in India, China and Japan are significant, for they reveal that these classes now realize that the centre of social authority is not external but within themselves. The influence of this class is growing widely and rapidly, and is already reaching the village and touching the masses there. One noticeable result in India is the frequent insurgence of outcastes against the religious and social intolerance of Hinduism. One of the minor stirrings indeed on the Indian political horizon consists of attempts through group action to compel Hindu temples and shrines to open their sacred portals to the outcaste. These movements have become political since they lead to clashes with the executive authority of government, which is bound to stand behind every custom sanctified by usage. Sometimes in such conflicts, where the temple authorities are supported by the Government, the innovators have the backing of certain political bodies. This challenge to sacerdotal authority indicates a rising consciousness that nationalist unity is only possible if it rests on equality of social rights which at present are denied by religious tradition.

The decay of the old religions was forcibly brought home to the writer on a visit to the city of Canton, which in the past was famous for its temples and a

centre of pilgrimage. To-day these shrines are neglected, the larger ones having been converted into institutions with secular purposes. Societies for the suppression of religious superstition have been founded, and carry on propaganda against the visitation of temples. The municipality, at the instigation of this body, levies a special tax on materials, such as candles used in commemorating departed ancestors. One of the largest of the Buddhist temples is to-day a police-training institute; in the innermost shrine, on the pedestal of the central image of Buddha, is fastened a picture of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and covering the draped limbs of the gigantic image are the flags of the Republic. But Canton, it will be said, is a city very secular in outlook; down its rivers, for many centuries, have poured streams of emigration and merchant travellers who have sought their fortune abroad. The city has been the repository of the fortunes made by these adventurers in the Straits Settlements and the Dutch Indies; her one concern is trade, and in this she has been eminently successful. But are things very different in the interior? A missionary writer contributes to the *Chinese Recorder* a description of the temples of Sui-fu in the province of Szechwan, nearly 2,000 miles from the sea-coast. He tells us that the temples are generally in a state of decay. Many of them are or have been in the occupation of the military. The ordinary people were ignorant of the nature of the temples; the names of the gods had in many cases been forgotten, and of other gods only the names were known and nothing else. Old maps of the city show temples non-existent to-day, their very traces having been wiped out and forgotten. The writer says:

‘The survey was not made too soon. As this article is being written, the streets of Sui-fu are being widened

and modernized. Four large temples are being transformed into vegetable markets. Some of the images have been destroyed, and others have been crowded together, sometimes more or less broken to pieces, into small rooms. There is talk of making over into a public park several large near-by temples, and of making others into arcades.’

On these facts the editor of the review comments as follows:

‘The attack on temples and idols in China is widespread, though it seems to be somewhat less in evidence in North China than elsewhere. Even in far-distant Sui-fu, Szechwan, temples are being turned to public use and idols relegated to the dustbin. The influences converging in this iconoclasm are various and somewhat obscure. Communism, in part, perhaps the aftermath of Russian influence, is one factor. China’s age-old rationalism is another subterranean disturber of her equally old religious institutions. Then too some of China’s modern leaders feel that everything superstitious is socially undesirable, and that the only way to get rid of it is to root it up—by force if necessary.’¹

Apart from the decay of religions consequent upon vast sociological changes, western ideas acting directly have influenced religion and social philosophy in the east along two lines. In India they have stimulated various forms of modern sectarianism. In China and Japan, the need for a religion consonant with the western ideologies they have adopted has placed Christianity in a unique position, temporary though this may prove to be. With the establishment of English education in India, the development of the universities (anterior in

¹*The Chinese Recorder*, February, 1930, ‘The Temples of Sui-fu’, by D. C. Graham, pp. 119, 748.

time to anything that had yet emerged of a similar nature in either Japan or China), and the resulting creation of a new class, the necessity for a new ethic and an inner moral inspiration to live the modern life became clear, and resulted in sectarian movements such as the Brahmo and Arya Samajes or the neo-Vedantic movement of Swami Vivekenanda. These movements fulfilled an admirable purpose, for they stimulated a scheme of social welfare, inspired social legislation, and gave a humanitarian turn to the mind of the modern educated class. These movements together with Christian teaching were the basis of the new civic morality.

Between the years 1905 and 1921 Christianity played a very important part among the younger intellectual leaders of China. It may have been that returned students from American universities were touched by the beliefs of Christianity as a gospel of success, which in those days held a prominent place among the controlling classes. Another reason for its influence and prestige was the fact that Christian missions in China had developed a magnificent system of modern universities. The Young Men's Christian Association, moreover, had done much to interpret what it termed the principles of Christian citizenship, the social value of which was not lost upon Chinese leaders, particularly at a time when China was seeking to create new civic conceptions. Men like Dr. Sun Yat-sen and many other leaders of modern China have given their adhesion, during some part of their careers, to Christianity, and even a militaristic leader, such as General Feng, has seen in Christianity something that was of value. His hymn-singing army was better disciplined and more effective as a military machine than the hordes which so many other military leaders commanded. For this army

he recruited a corps of fairly well-educated chaplains, who did much to contribute to the morale of his soldiers.

This association of the new China with Christianity was short-lived. The outlook of the American universities was itself changing. American scientific technology and the better appreciation of the economic forces at work, together with a parallel movement of philosophic pragmatism, led to the shedding of the religious garb which so long had covered over the inner motives and workings of the American people. The final disillusionment with the *bona fides* of Christian nations came in 1919, when President Wilson, so it appeared to the eastern world, silenced the Japanese demand for recognition of racial equality, by assigning to that nation the rights over the Chinese province of Shantung. One of the events of 1919 was the erection in the March of that year, in Peking, of a monument by which the Chinese Government commemorated the victory of justice through the allies, of which China was one. Yet within three months of that event the students of Peking were organizing riotous assemblies and processions to protest against the betrayal of their country by those very same allies.

The reinforcements which came to the ancient religions from western religious sources proved later to be small in their effect as compared with the destructive forces at work among the intelligentsia who came into contact with the secularized philosophy, science and sociology of England, France and Germany. A parallel secular current¹ was stimulated by the writings of John

¹As a definition of secularism we may quote the formulated principles of the British Secular Union, cited by Count Goblet d'Alviella in his *Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought*, Williams and Norgate, 1885, pp. 148-9:

(1) That the present life being the only one of which we have certain knowledge, its concerns claim our primary attention.

Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, some of whose works were translated into Japanese in 1878 and into Chinese twenty years later. India had access to their writings in the original English, and had already been prepared for their teachings by the positivism of Auguste Comte which in some measure deflected the religious current of modern sectarianism, represented by the Brahmo Samaj, into the secularism of Spencer and Frederic Harrison. Dwarka Nath Mitter and his group of Bengal intellectuals founded and carried on a Positivist Society in Calcutta from the years subsequent to the Mutiny up to the time of Mitter's death in 1874. These early English positivists and later the secularists cultivated a liberal outlook on the racial and other problems which imperialism had created. Count Goblet d'Alviella in his *Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought* records the names of a number of the leaders of this group. Of these it was John Stuart Mill who drew attention to the danger of racial arrogance which he held was one of the greatest disadvantages of British rule in India. In later years Mill showed the greatest courtesy to Keshub Chander Sen when the latter visited England. Another, Richard Congreve, in an extraordinary pamphlet justified the Indian Mutiny; Frederic Harrison and Herbert Spencer both sympathized with the Indian Liberation movement; and lastly Charles Bradlaugh, who warmly championed the Indian cause both in writings and in

(2) That the promotion of our individual and of the general well-being in this world is at once our highest wisdom and duty.

(3) That the only means upon which we can rely for the accomplishment of this object is human effort, based upon knowledge and experience.

(4) We judge conduct by its issues in this world only. What conduces to the general well-being is right; what has the opposite tendency is wrong.

speech, has not yet faded from the memory of India. Early political revolutionary thought in India has a genealogy in which figure the names of Herbert Spencer, Shyamaji Krishnavarma¹ and other secularist and positivist leaders.

In China to-day the pragmatic outlook of Professor John Dewey is a powerful influence with the intellectual leadership of the country. The Confucianism of the past doubtless facilitates the acceptance of this modern position, and an interesting parallel may be drawn between the supersession of the temporary acceptance of Christianity by his philosophy in the Confucian tradition, and the intellectual movement in the seventeenth century when a revitalized Confucianism stripped itself of the Taoistic and Buddhistic trappings with which it had been overlaid for three centuries.

The stages of Japan's development into modern statehood have been marked, according to Dr. Umaji Kaneko, by corresponding stages in philosophical thought, also strongly influenced from the west. The first period from 1870-90, says Dr. Kaneko, was characterized by the importation of western philosophy:²

‘The average Japanese came to look upon Spencer as the greatest of western scholars. The experimental theory of evolution, as expounded by this philosopher and his school, soon became the dominant philosophical influence in Japan.’

¹Shyamaji Krishnavarma, an Indian revolutionist, who died in Geneva in 1930, over seventy years old, was at one time an undergraduate at Oxford. Thirty years ago he gave £1,000 to that University for the endowment of an annual lectureship on the teachings of Herbert Spencer.

²*A Survey of Philosophy in Japan*, Dr. Umaji Kaneko. I.P.R. Conference, 1929. Papers on Cultural Relations prepared by the Japanese Council, No. 3.

In the fields of politics and economics, however, French liberalism was the prevailing influence. During the second period, 1890-1900, Japanese leaders were evolving a theory of nationalism, and it is not, therefore, strange that they turned to Germany for guidance. The philosophical ideas of Hegel, with the conception of the state as the highest expression of the absolute reason, naturally commended itself. Both Germany and Japan were working to harmonize these ideas with the new nationalist conception of the state. One effect was to throw Japanese scholars back to the study of both Buddhism and Confucianism and to make them attempt a synthesis between the transcendentalists of these systems and the teaching imported in recent years from Germany.

The next stage lasted from 1900-1910 and was marked by a search for an adequate philosophy of life. Japan was industrializing herself; she had built up an army and a navy highly skilled in war. Human life had been lost in the service of the state. The situation thus created by the dual factors of a new economic system which imposed its rigidity over masses of human beings, and of war, which had sacrificed thousands of lives to the purposes of the state, very naturally led to questioning as to the significance of human life. The outward expression of this period of questioning was twofold. On the one hand, we find the development of the doctrine of Bushido, and, on the other, the first symptoms of industrial unrest. The philosophers attempted to import ideas of æsthetic values, such as Nietzsche's theory of æsthetic living or instinct. The period from 1910 to 1920 showed a growing interest in the German transcendentalists, but this movement has suffered a check with the growth of economic maladjustment characteristic of the post-war years.

Ever since 1910 Japanese intellectuals seem to have

been dominated by the struggle between two definite currents of thought. The philosophers have been seeking an adequate philosophy for those who uphold the divine authority of the state. On the other hand, there has run an underground current of thought directed by the conception of social justice, which refuses to accept the transcendentalism to which the other school seems to have dedicated itself. The second school has been powerfully affected by the French and German socialist movements whose conceptions are purely materialistic. It may be added that, with the very widespread literacy in Japan, the new ideologies have a far more extensive influence than is possible in illiterate countries such as China and India.

While national and social developments, together with the current of events, have thus played upon Japanese philosophic thought, the people, as we shall see in the next chapter, have been provided with a religion calculated to nourish most effectively the devotion and the virtues necessary in the citizens of a developing nation-state. Yet at the present time, while to the casual observer Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples are in excellent repair and thronged with worshippers, it would appear that within these religions there has been a transmutation of the old conceptions, bringing them into line with modern demands and in such a way as might become unacceptable to the Government of the country. The Government, having used the religious motive to the full in the building up of a strong nationalism, now fears that the fabric of religious organization may be utilized by non-nationalist forces in resisting the state. Hence its overtures in recent years to the representatives of Buddhism, popular Shintoism and Christianity to unite in their efforts to sterilize the in-

fluence of Marxian materialism with its ominous implications for the stability of the existing state. Not satisfied with this appeal, it has further threatened to take measures to ensure that these religions themselves are secure against taint. During the early part of 1929 the Government placed before the Diet a draft enactment entitled¹ ‘The Religious Organizations Bill’, which provided inter alia:

(1)² For a more adequate legal means than now exists for controlling overt acts against the state and society, perpetrated under cover of religion.

(2)³ For the protection of normal religious organizations and the promotion of their best interests by law.

(3) For the better control over pernicious religious development.

(4) For the setting up of better safeguards for the property of religious bodies.

The widespread generalization made more frequently in the past than to-day, that the east is more spiritual than the west, needs to be challenged. The world owes this myth largely to the European orientalist, the investigator of Indian religious philosophy. A wide currency was given to the belief by a certain type of religious Indian, possibly too ready to generalize in claiming for his race virtues to compensate for its political subordination. Such a one, it may be, was Swami Viveken-

¹*Japanese Christian Quarterly*: Vol. IV, No. 2. Article by the Rev. Sanehara Ojima, ‘The Religious Organizations Bill’.

²The Government position amounted to saying that the guarantee of religious freedom in the Constitution related only to matters of the heart, that is, to inner belief. Overt acts must be specifically regulated by a religious organizations law.

³The assumption seems to be that life can be given by law and that legal machinery is necessary to the proper direction of religious thought.

anda who utilized with such success the sounding-board of the Chicago Parliament of Religions in 1893 to spread the idea that the east was more spiritual than the west. A generalization like this, which covers a continent, is on the face of it preposterous. If, moreover, religious practice is far more in evidence in Asiatic countries than in the west, a comparison with medieval Europe would be the true analogy, since religious superstition is more universal in countries not yet penetrated by modern ideas and currents of thought. Theocratic conceptions, of which all peoples during some period of their history are votaries, still have empire over the minds of many, for the secular influences have not been at work long enough to eliminate the 'left-over' of a régime whose authority has passed away.

If the rule of religion has been withdrawn from certain zones, in others it would appear that it remains unshaken and that the progress of the years has even strengthened it. To certain features which are peculiar to the Indian situation attention must be directed when appraising the influence of religion on the people. The mere fact of foreign invasion, both in the past and the present, has resulted in developing the protective instinct of Hinduism both religiously and socially. Hence Indian nationalism, in its earlier stages at least, had a peculiar relationship to the Hindu religion, even as in Ireland there was a bond between Roman Catholicism and Irish nationalism. Religion in India receives an indirect protection from the state to an extent unknown in any other country. Religious shrines, temples and endowments, as well as ecclesiastical law, have been fenced around with safeguards in order to preclude accusations of interference with religion by an alien government. The consequence is that external forms are kept

alive even though the inner spirit has long been dead. But even in this matter public opinion has begun to express itself. Recent legislation reveals the fact that representatives of the people are gravely concerned with the question of the better control of religious endowment held in trust by temples and shrines. The ancient endowments, it is held, might be better used for social purposes, such as education, than for maintaining the services of priests. The most remarkable of the movements in this direction was the Akali movement in the Punjab, which a few years ago compelled the Government to legislate so as to deprive the hereditary ecclesiastical trustees of the endowments of the Sikh shrines and to vest them in a body of trustees, mostly lay, who should be elected by the community itself.¹

India presents another distinctive religious feature from which very important political situations have resulted. The periodic displays of apparent religious fanaticism have given rise to the belief that differences of religion are matters of the deepest concern to the people of India. Amongst the modern youth of India an opinion is current that the sooner all religion is abolished the better the outlook for the country. That this is not merely irresponsible opinion is proved by its expression in a recent book by an Indian of eminence.² Now it

¹China has naturally been more unimpeded in making such adjustments. Even at the time of the founding of the Republic a serious proposal was made that the government should take over religious endowments and administer them. Legislation to effect this did not at that time go into force, yet during the last few years encroachments have been made on religious property by confiscation of particular estates by municipalities or provincial governments. To this process there are no limits, especially when governments or other public authorities are chronically in financial straits.

²*The Crux of the Problem*: R. P. Paranjpye, Rationalist Press Association, 1931.

is true that certain minority communities or sects in India have during the last half-century become intensely self-conscious, if not fanatical in outlook. These communities as a rule have been backward in progress, economically weak, and, as a result, have been exploited by urban finance. They are very largely composed of agricultural classes which have been left behind as the country developed politically and economically. To such communities religion has provided a method, perhaps the only one, by which the greatest number of individuals could express their material griefs. Their leaders, who realized that the future of these communities depended on the capture by them of political authority, saw the necessity of mobilizing the masses of their community, and this they could only do by an appeal to religious fanaticism, the expression of which they realized would result in the exaction of material advantages. Thus it was possible to raise the Moslem agricultural tenant in revolt against his landlord or the moneylender who so frequently were Hindus.

The annals of the recent Round Table Conference are disfigured by the demands, quite incompatible with the general good, made by the so-called religious communities. With zealous fervour the protagonists of each community debated the number of seats in the Legislatures constitutionally to be reserved to them, and the division of the spoils of party victory. These discussions will be pointed to as proof of the rigid hold that religion has on the people of India, but these controversies in London and in India do not in the least degree deal with the main concern of religion, namely God, man and the universe, or even with the economic development of the masses. Is it surprising that the cause of true religion has greatly suffered in consequence?

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In contrast with this form of pseudo-religious vitality, religious enthusiasm lives on in its esoteric manifestations. From one zone at least the influence of religion has not been withdrawn and that is from life itself, with its æsthetic, mystical and transcendental demands. Does this explain why in Japan, that most westernized of Asiatic countries, the temples apparently still hold the allegiance of large companies of devout worshippers? It may be that both in that country and in India men and women, who within a generation or thereabouts have been torn from their traditional allegiances in politics, in economics and in education, are afraid of this uncontrolled and desperately hard world, and turn for solace quite often, and inspiration less frequently, to worship and contemplation.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONALISM

WITH THE invasion, whether economic, political or cultural, of Asiatic Asia, a new defensive attitude of mind has been created amongst its peoples. The western world has recognized this phenomenon under the name of Asiatic nationalism, to which is attributed that spirit of resistance to European authority so characteristic of these present times. The general problem faced by these countries was how best to protect themselves against, or at least how best to control, the invasion of outside forces, and, in order to do this, how to acquire for themselves a solidarity, a unity and an inner inspiration which would give them the dynamic or moral power to overcome their own internal disruptions and deal adequately with the new situation which had been forced upon them.

INDIA

The seizure of political authority by an alien people was the outstanding feature of the invasion of India. Is it then to be wondered at that Indians themselves, throughout the nineteenth century, directed their energies into political channels, or that succeeding attempts were made to acquire such political authority as would control the administration and its agents? The history of England itself was an incentive to Indians to think along political lines, and to visualize political

action for themselves, and to these influences further reference will be made in a later chapter. In a memorandum submitted to the Board of Control by Raja Ram Mohun Roy, and transmitted to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Indian Affairs (1831), he recommended the employment of Indians in the higher ranks of the revenue and judicial systems of the government. As the result of his recommendations, the Charter Act laid down the principle that in the public services in India no racial distinctions should be made. Within the next twenty years attention was directed by the Indian Government to the reform of the law courts, whose authority was extended to secure the subject against the invasion of his rights even by the executive government. Furthermore, Indians, first of all in Calcutta, later in Madras, agitated for recognition of the right to sit as jurors. Finally the demand for association with the government in making laws was granted by the passage through the British Parliament of the Indian Councils Act of 1861. Political agitation now took a new turn, which by 1885, when the Indian National Congress was founded, directed attention to the necessity of making the executive responsible in some measure to public opinion. On this basis a definite programme for the creation of a system of representative government was adopted. By the Reforms of 1891 authority was given to the enlarged Legislatures to criticize the budget of expenditure of both the Central Government and certain provincial governments. It was only then, after a lapse of fifty years since the first Reforms of 1834, that the existence of economic issues was dimly perceived, but even so the political leaders persisted in demands for political reform, hoping thereby to bring about economic readjustment. Objections to existing economic

conditions were raised in connection with the following matters:

(1) The necessity for the establishment of Indian industries was now generally recognized, that most capable of development being the textile industry, which in its primitive form had been born in India over two thousand years previously, and was now threatened with extinction by the flooding of the country with imported cotton goods. It was true that a comparatively small modern cotton textile industry had been established in Bombay, but its future was rendered insecure by the refusal to give it tariff protection. Indeed the English principle of Free Trade was carried to such lengths that, under the instructions of the Secretary of State for India, an internal excise duty was levied on all Indian machine-made textiles, equal to the duty placed by the Indian Government, for revenue purposes alone, on cloth imported into the country. Thus the issue was raised as to whether India was being controlled for the benefit of her own people or subordinated to the interests of the British producer.

(2) The development of the agricultural classes, it was believed, was retarded by the high incidence of taxation in the form of land revenue. Attention was drawn to this matter in 1901 by a very distinguished official, Mr. Romesh Chander Dutt, an Indian by race and a retired member of the Indian Civil Service. His opinion was supported by a number of British civilians, who had themselves, in their official capacity, been responsible for collection of land revenue.

(3) Unemployment amongst the educated classes at this period became an acute problem for the first time. It was realized that in the exploitation of the country these classes had not been given the opportunity

of direction and control. The example of Japan was studied with increasing interest, and it became clear that Japan had succeeded in making the foreigner dispensable after the initial period of each attempt that the country had made to develop its resources.

It was not until 1905 that the economic issue became much clearer, but even then it was only incidental to a political demand. We have already commented on the fact that 1905 is an outstanding year in Asiatic history, the date of the Japanese victory over Russia. In that year Lord Curzon, with honest motives it may be true, authorized certain adjustments in the administration of the great province of Bengal, by separating it into two divisions, each with a distinct provincial government. The change was opposed on the grounds that it divided the Bengali-speaking people, but the actual question was soon lost sight of in the more fundamental issue as to whether Government was or was not prepared to take account of an overwhelmingly unfavourable public opinion. Lord Curzon took the view that administrative efficiency was the one and only concern that the Government should, in the circumstances, recognize. The challenge was taken up, and for the first time the weapon of the boycott was made use of by the political leaders. Whatever the political results, and they were very substantial, the boycott movement gave a great stimulus to the old hand-weaving as well as to the cotton textile industry in Bombay. The leaders, however, still continued to be obsessed by political considerations, and down almost to the present time these have been the main concern in the Indian mind, although the necessity for certain economic adjustments is realized. The result has been that in India parliamentary institutions have come into being on a far larger scale than in any

other Asiatic country, and have indeed become a real power, but whether they can deal in any fundamental way with the economic situation of to-day is quite another matter.

Although the term 'Indian nationalism' is of recent usage (how recent will be realized when we say that it was scarcely current before 1905, the year of the Japanese victory over Russia), yet the roots of the national movement lie in an age prior to the advent of British rule in India. It is astonishing that historians have given so little consideration to the social and cultural adjustments consequent upon the foundation of Moslem government in India. The Moslem conqueror, after he had settled down and established a dynasty, contented himself with controlling two functions in the life of the state. In the first place, he ruled by means of an army, not that his rule was a military despotism, but the control of the army as far as the imperfect circumstances of those days would permit was directly under the control of the Moslem ruler. In the second place, the courts and the administration of justice were placed in the hands of Moslem judicial officers. The Hindus, on the other hand, controlled the finance and revenue-collecting departments of the government. The Hindu trading communities also controlled the ordinary finance of the country, that is to say, they were bankers, revenue agents of the great estate-holders, traders and retailers. The financial machinery of the country, official and otherwise, remained, therefore, largely in their hands. A dynasty, such as the Mogul dynasty, governed well, according to the standards of those times, but in spite of this fact and particularly as the result of Aurangzebe's intolerance, a widespread Hindu consciousness emerged in the following way. Religious leaders, arising frequently from

the ranks of the common people, re-wrote the old mythologies of the Sanskrit classics in the vernaculars understood by the masses. These leaders had disciples who carried their message among the people, and thus vernacular hymnologies became current. Such were the beginnings of the renaissance of the vernacular tongues. Now almost every one of these revivals of the vernacular produced not merely groups of worshippers, but, in the later days of the Mogul Empire, armed rebellion against its authority. The sequence was as follows: a religious teacher, a collection of hymns, and a military leader. The Moslem Empire was overthrown not by the forces of the East India Company, but by military confederations such as the Marathas, the Sikhs of the Punjab and the Jats, and each one of these groups had its own hymnologists and military adventurers. If this interpretation of history is accurate, it will be readily understood that the early Indian nationalism was in essence a Hindu revival against the Moslems. Ultimately, both Hindu confederations and the residuum of atrophied Moslem states were finally outmanœuvred by the British. In the early days of British rule this particular form of nationalism lost its significance as a force, but underground there continued to exist resentment, particularly among the priestly and governing classes of both religions. The flare-up of the Indian Mutiny was a reminder that the resentment had sufficient strength almost to imperil British rule in India.

Subsequent years witnessed a great literary revival in Bengal; Madhusudhan Dutt's life and work is particularly interesting in this connection. Educated in Calcutta and a convert to Christianity, he found work as a teacher in Madras. Unsuccessful in his profession and in great poverty, he found his way to England and qualified for the Bar. As a young man he composed English

verse, and indeed it appeared that he might have made his name as a poet in that language, but on his return to India he broke out into Bengali verse, and his fellow-countrymen recognized his genius which up to that time had been unsuspected. The next great landmark in Bengali literature was the founding in 1872 by Bankim Chandra Chatterji of a magazine in which his own novels and the contributions of a brilliant band of writers were given to the public. His greatest work, *Ananda Math*, a novel, the scene of which is laid in the eighteenth century, has passed into the classics of India, not merely of Bengal. Lord Ronaldshay, in his *Heart of Aryavarta*, has a chapter on its later significance for Indian nationalism.¹ In its pages appears the song *Bande Mataram*, which thirty years later was to become the revolutionary song of young Bengal and to-day is the national hymn of India.

The foregoing paragraphs deal with the literary revival of one language only, but the other great languages of India, Tamil, Marathi, Gujarati and Hindi, experienced also a transformation. Apart from the growth of the literary nationalistic revival, increasing attention has been turned to the study of Indian history and archæology. A foreign system of education had its centre of gravity in the west and not in India. This cultural invasion put the Indian writer on his defence, and resulted in his ascribing to the India that was gone, glories which most probably never existed. But later this very attitude of looking back developed in him an interest in that past. One of the most hopeful signs is the growth of schools of historians and archæologists, who in their investigations of the past, philosophical, religious and historical, are ready to apply modern standards of scien-

¹*The Heart of Aryavarta*, Lord Ronaldshay. Constable, 1925, pp. 31-32.

tific scholarship. Interest in these studies led on to consideration of politics and economics, as relevant to the existing Indian situation, and later to the exact sciences.

While nationalism has proved itself to be the dynamic which has brought about the developments above described, it has failed to bring about national unity in any such complete form as has been achieved in Japan, for present-day Indian nationalism has its roots, even as had its seventeenth-century form, in the Hindu life of the country, and not in Moslem India. This statement will need further elucidation.

We have already noted that the culture of Asiatic Asia is different to that evolved by the nomadic tribes of Islam. We hinted also that possibly Islamic Asia might come under the cultural dominance of Europe. It was Adly Pasha who definitely stated that Egypt had turned her back on the East and had allied her forces with Europe. The Moslem world belongs to a culture group different from the Indian. While it is true that the vast majority of Indian Mussulmans are of indigenous races, yet the inspiration of their leadership has been extra-Indian, and some of them, a not inconsiderable number, declare that their loyalties are extra-Indian. Is it to be wondered at that the recent political renaissance of Islamic states inspires the descendants of those who enjoyed power and wealth under Moslem rule with the hope that they may once again control the destinies of India? With the Christians it is otherwise, for they realize that there is nothing save the spiritual tie which binds them to their co-religionists in Europe or America. They are in their isolation willing to be citizens of India. The Indian Moslem will probably be disillusioned when the gates of central Asia are once again reopened, for he has not realized the social and economic revolu-

tions which are taking place in those parts of the world, while the Turk to-day has little sympathy for the Indian Mussulman, and it is unlikely that in the years to come this attitude will change. In the meantime nationalism has failed to unite the Mussulman and Hindu, although attempts are now being made to adjust mutual relationships by other means. The Mussulman agriculturalist, tenant or small peasant-farmer, as he almost invariably is, has been subject to that form of exploitation by the Hindu trading classes to which we have already referred, when it was suggested that an urban economy was bringing rural agriculture under its control without industrializing it. A similar diagnosis might be applied to the consideration of anti-nationalist movements such as the non-Brahmin or the depressed classes movements, which have been characteristic of Indian political history during the last ten or twenty years. But Indian nationalism has been essentially a cultural growth; Hindu in origin and socially high caste in leadership as it has been, it could make little appeal to the Moslem or to the outcaste. On the other hand a Moslem nationalism has been created by the events, Indian and extra-Indian, of the last fifty years, and this has resulted inevitably in a clash between the two nationalisms. But, as will be made evident later, there are other forces at work, not fully recognized, that might transfer the problem of unity from the cultural to the secular plane of economics.

JAPAN

Even before the advent of the western trading-powers in the China seas, the old rice economy of Japan had already begun to be influenced from outside. In the first instance, apparently, it was affected by trade with China, whose merchants introduced money in the form

of currency. This process was greatly accelerated in subsequent years by the trading operations of the Portuguese and the Dutch. The chieftains or heads of the clans acquired a taste for imported articles of luxury, which could only be procured by payments in money, and this taste was pandered to by groups of merchants who acquired thereby considerable power. The economy of Japan, so small are its own internal resources, demanded the strictest discipline in order to ensure a livelihood to the population. As we have already seen, the population imposed on itself a strict regulation of births, and after the advent of the Chinese trade we find records of sumptuary legislation. These facts indicate that the livelihood of the population was a matter of very grave concern. It may be that the strict control of foreigners entering the country and the expulsion of Christians were also caused by fear lest the old disciplined régime should be dissolved. But, in spite of repeated sumptuary edicts in the last year of the Tokugawa rule, the economic situation had gone too far to be cured, and in the resulting social instability the overthrow of the Shogunate proved to be comparatively easy. The reader is referred to an unusually interesting publication by Dr. Takizawa entitled *The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan and its Effects upon Social and Political Institutions*. Special attention is called to the bibliography included in this book. Apparently throughout the eighteenth century a number of Japanese works on economic subjects appeared, as, for example, *A Memorial on the Recoinage of Gold and Silver*, published about 1736. Another publication, entitled, *A Critical Discussion of a Book called 'A Description of the Circulation of Gold and Silver'*, appeared still earlier in 1723. In 1726 a book was published which was a guide *For those People who want to Attain Wealth and at the same*

Time to Cultivate Good Taste. Two years later appeared a book entitled, *Reflections of a Townsman on how the wealthy Townsmen of Kyoto were Ruined chiefly on Account of the Loans to the Daimios*.

Dr. Takizawa in concluding her book adds:

‘One may think that Japan is indebted to Commodore Perry for her progress as a modern nation; but a more careful study of the later Tokugawa period leads us to conclude that, even without the influence of the foreign powers, the next inevitable step in the development of the Japanese nation would have been the establishment of a constitutional government. The visit of Commodore Perry and the influence of other foreign powers merely precipitated the event which was destined to take place when the pressure of economic forces within the country had become strong enough to throw open the doors to foreign intercourse. The ruin of the feudal government and the building up of a centralized constitutional government, and the subsequent development of Japan as a world power, are the stages of political history Japan has passed through since the middle of the nineteenth century; and it was the penetration of the money economy that necessitated and brought to fulfilment the political evolution.’¹

If what we have said is an accurate estimate of Japanese history, it must be evident that the leaders of the Restoration had two very clearly defined objectives in their minds: (1) the economic development of their country on modern lines, and (2) the control of this development by themselves. They set about their task with a twofold programme of educating the people and creating a state which could defend itself by means of a modern army and navy. The other concerns were com-

¹pp. 148-9.

paratively unimportant. The governors and governed were brought together in co-operation by insistence on the theocratic conception of the state, rather than by ideas of political reform. Although the Restoration dates from 1868, the first Diet was not called until twenty-two years later, in 1890. In the meantime the government carried out an intensive programme of economic reconstruction. Its whole energies were bent upon pushing industry and projects for promoting general prosperity, while at the same time steps were taken for reorganizing the administrative system after the western manner. Even after the calling of the Diet in 1890, and of its successors, parliamentary government was in reality ineffective until the fall of the Terauchi, the last bureaucratic cabinet in 1918. Only since then has there been some semblance of Cabinet rule and responsibility to the Diet. This body, elected though it is now on a franchise of universal suffrage, is not actually in session for more than two months in the year, a period considerably shorter than the sessions of that imperfect parliament, the Legislative Assembly of India.

Reference has been made in Chapter II to the unique position in which the Shinto shrines were placed at the time of the Restoration. When Japan attempted to form a modern administration, the pre-Restoration Board of Commissioners for Temples and Shrines was abolished, Buddhism was denied state recognition, and substantial portions of religious property were appropriated by the Government, but the primacy of Shinto was recognized by the creation of an office for the Shinto religion which ranked at the head of all the other departments of the Government. In 1872, however, the Department of Shinto was abolished, and a Department of Religions created. The Government then

attempted 'to support the institutions of the state with an amalgamation of Buddhism and Shinto'. The functions of this Department were as follows:

(1) The establishment or abolition of shrines and temples, as also the determination of the rank and grade of priest, both Shinto and Buddhist;

(2) The licensing or the withholding of licences for the publication of doctrinal work;

(3) The licensing of those who call religious meetings and give doctrinal instruction or form religious associations. The main duties of these licensed teachers of religion and morals were (i) 'To embody the principles of reverence and patriotism'; (ii) 'To make plain the Laws of Heaven and the Way of Humanity'; (iii) 'To lead the people to respect the emperor and to be obedient to his will.'

'These principles', the regulations laid down, 'must be observed always and care must be exercised in preaching not to go contrary to their purpose.' Orders were issued that all instructions were to be based on these principles, the priests were told that they should lead the people to study so widely that there would be no one who was ignorant. 'Thus civilization should be promoted and the fundamental principle of the unity of religion and the state would be realized.'

But the ancient breach between Buddhism and Shintoism could not be healed in this fashion. The idea of amalgamation was abandoned, and their distinction recognized by the erection in 1877 of a Bureau in the Department of Home Affairs, for the control of Buddhist Temples and Shinto Shrines. Meanwhile, in 1873, the proscriptions of Christianity inherited from the past régime had been withdrawn. Ideas regarding religious liberty and even religious scepticism having, as we have

seen, taken root during the period from 1875-1900, the Government was faced with the prospect of being deprived of the support of religion, the nexus of national unity. To meet the new situation, the Shinto religion was recognized legally in two forms, namely the Shinto shrines and the Shinto congregations, and in the Government two bureaux were created, the bureau of shrines and the bureau of religions, both in the Department of Home Affairs. The first bureau was charged with the administration of Shintoism as an official cult, whereas the second was responsible, as far as the Government was concerned, for the Shinto sects, Buddhism and other religious bodies. Provisions were made for the establishment of the following seven bureaux in the Department of Home Affairs: (1) Bureau of Shinto Shrines; (2) Bureau of Local Administration; (3) Bureau of Police; (4) Bureau of Public Works; (5) Bureau of Sanitation; (6) Bureau of Religions; (7) Bureau of Prisons.¹

Finally in 1913 the Bureau of Religions was transferred to the Ministry of Education, but the Bureau of Shinto Shrines, together with the Bureau of Police and of Prisons, etc., still remains in the Department of Home Affairs. The official cult of Shintoism is no longer constitutionally a religion: it exists as a cult for the greater glory of the state, in which the Emperor is supreme. Ito Hirobumi, in his commentaries on the constitution in 1889, said: 'The sacred throne was established at the time when the heavens and the earth were separated. The Emperor is heaven-descended, divine and sacred; he is pre-eminent above all his subjects. He must be re-

¹*Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XLIX, Part II, 1922. 'The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto', D. C. Holton, Ph.D., p. 15.

verenced and is inviolable. He has indeed to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it.'

The two most important groups of shrines are Government Shrines and National Shrines, which together number 183. Above them is the Imperial Shrine of Ise, over which a member of the Imperial house presides. What are the objects of worship in these shrines? There are usually four groups: Emperors, Princes, Subjects, and Nature Deities. The Emperor Shrines, whose primacy is undisputed, are twenty in number, one group being dedicated to the worship of the God of War. The shrines of the Imperial Princes are eleven in number, and are dedicated to members of the royal line who have shown unusual loyalty to the Emperor, either by military service or by protecting the claims of the throne. Most of these persons were killed on military expeditions. It is interesting to note that at least four of these shrines are of recent foundation. Shrines commemorating subjects date only from 1871, and are connected with the names of persons who have rendered conspicuous service, in almost every case military service, to the state. Past history has been ransacked to discover men who deserved this recognition; thus a new group of shrines dedicated to persons who lived anywhere between A.D. 663 to 1891 has been added to the nation's list of sacred places.

Nature Deities, worshipped at Government and National Shrines, include the legendary ancestors of the Imperial house, such as the Sky-Father, the Earth-Mother, the Sun Goddess, the Great Food Goddess, the Ocean Deities. To these are added the Goddess of Mount Fuji, the Harvest God, the fierce Rain God, etc.

Under its control the State supervises a complete hierarchy of shrines and priests, which in 1928 numbered

12,190 of the former, and of the latter 14,804. These Shinto officers are servants of the state, and are graded correspondingly to the Civil Servants. On examining the figures from 1880 to the present time, we find that the figures for shrines up to 1902 show a steady increase. In that year they numbered 196,056; since then the numbers show a very gradual but continuous fall. It would appear that the largest groups of shrines are the village and ungraded shrines which are more or less under the control of local communities, although the state has general supervision. It is among these shrines that the decrease has taken place, and not among those over which the state has complete control. Indeed these latter show a definite tendency to rise in number. The state prescribes the ritual to be used in these shrines, as, for example, on the Festival of New Year's Day, or when civil officials appear at the shrine on grand local festivals, or on the Emperor's birthday. Here is an example of one of the set prayers:

'From the great House of the Sovereign to the people of the land, guard and prosper all, continuously and widely. Bring it to pass that this country, under heaven, with its unnumbered countries and unnumbered islands, with not one left out, as far as the limit where the wall of heaven stands, as far as the boundaries of lands standing afar off, bring it to pass that all may look up to the great Emperor, and that all lands may be covered with the august light of the Imperial land.'

In an Imperial order recommending thrift and diligence, which was sent out in 1908, the Emperor uses the following words:

'As for the future, it is now desired that the essence of our national life and the glory of our national history be exalted by developing the spirit of reverence, and,

furthermore, that the shrines be utilized in promoting the unification and the administration of the country.'

Teaching given in the schools emphasizes the merit won by citizens who visit these shrines, and in 1911 the Minister of Education instructed school teachers to conduct their pupils in a body to public shrines to do obeisance before them.

What were the reasons which lay behind this gigantic effort to inculcate loyalty? In the first place it was an attempt to transmute that remarkable heritage of the Japanese, clan loyalty, the knightly virtue of Bushido,¹ into something more magnificent, namely loyalty to the new national state of which the Emperor was head. Thus with a local patriotism the foundations of a national patriotism were laid. In the second place, it was calculated to hold in check internal disruption due to the invasion of subversive ideas in a period of transition. The first fifteen years of the new state were critical indeed, for during that period extreme demands were made by the intellectuals for the immediate establishment of parliamentary government, even before the educational, economic and defence policies of the state had been brought to fruition.

It is significant that Japanese sectarianism in its most important manifestations simply seeks to reaffirm the nationalist teachings of the official religions. It may be that the people, faced with radicalism and subversive doctrines imported from abroad, instinctively sought reassurance in the freshly formulated patriotism of Omoto-Kyo. This sect has been much in the public eye

¹For an exposition of Bushido the reader is referred to Dr. Inazo Nitobe's book on the subject. In the preface to the 10th edition the author comments on the fact that the book has been translated into Marathi, and that a Chinese edition is contemplated.

since 1918. It was founded about the time of the Sino-Japanese war, by an ignorant but visionary woman who claimed divine origin. It did not come to notice until the founder had won her most important convert, an ignorant farmer, who laid the foundations of the first temple of the sect. In 1915 a very well-known Japanese scholar of English literature became a convert, and made the doctrine of the sect known to a wide public. The following extracts are taken from an authoritative edition of the scriptures of Omoto-Kyo:¹

'Japan is the country which was made first by the gods. Being senior, the duty of safeguarding the world falls upon her. As the country of the gods she will not have performed her duty well unless she rescues the world from distress. This Japan is the land of five gods. Our souls are derived from the direct descendants of the gods. They are, therefore, one or two degrees better than souls abroad. At present Japan is as clouded as foreign countries. The country is the country of the gods only in name. This is lamentable to the gods our ancestors.'

At one period since 1916 the sect is said actually to have had ten thousand propagators throughout the country. Among the most devoted adherents are, we are told, many educated workers, for example managers of companies, doctors, advocates, retired military and naval officers. A writer in the Japanese *Asahi* once remarked that it would be quite easy to form an Omoto cabinet in the event of the headquarters of the sect becoming the sacred capital of the world.

The following is a summary of some of the articles of the creed:²

¹*Japan Chronicle Reprints No. 1: 'Omoto-Kyo: An account of one of Japan's Popular Faiths, by a Japanese Scholar', Kobe, 1920, p. 20.*

²*Ibid.*, p. 28.

'We believe that His Imperial Majesty is a descendant in the holy line of Amaterasu Omikami and reigns over the world with his divinely endowed three virtues of Master, Teacher and Parent.

'We believe that Japan is a holy land peerless in the world and especially that Hongu at Ayabe, Tamba Province, is the Takamagahara¹ on earth where the gods of heaven and earth assemble in order to discuss and decide the divine law and establish a perfect and unblemished Imperial rule.

'We believe that Kunitokodachi-no-Mikoto,² the founder of the country, is a great guardian god who effects a reconstruction of the world and establishes peace and order in the world agreeably to the august intention of Amaterasu Omikami.

'We believe that Toyokumo-no-Mikoto is a great god in the first rank who assists the founder of the country and takes the lead in exhibiting the entire virtue of benevolence and love.

'We believe that the foundress of Omoto is the only great religious teacher in the world, and that by her body Kunitokodachi-no-Mikoto, the founder of the country, has granted the purest and noblest divine instruction in Omoto to show the landmarks of Imperial rule.'

In a magazine of the sect we find its aims set forth thus:

'We are only aiming at making the Emperor of Japan ruler and governor of the whole world, as he is the only ruler in the world who retains the spiritual mission inherited from the remotest ancestor in the divine world.'

The dramatic rise of this sect is only paralleled by its comparatively rapid decay of influence in post-war years.

¹Abode of gods.

²One of the Shinto gods.

The Japanese Government has known how to utilize the religious instincts of the people in the cause of nationalism. There is yet another ancient organization that it has inspired with devotion to the state. As far back as the twelfth century the town of Kamakura had young men's associations whose object was to promote and protect the public welfare. These societies have now spread throughout Japan. At the time of the Sino-Japanese war a strong patriotic sense was stimulated among them, and great encouragement was given to them by the state. It is estimated that the societies number nearly 15,000 with a total membership of two and a half millions, while their annual budget amounts to two and three-quarter million yen. The society promotes the spread of education and public welfare schemes of all kinds. In times of national calamity, such as the great earthquake, it has rendered conspicuous service, marred, so it is alleged, by the murderous attacks made by some of its members on inoffensive Korean labourers resident at that time in Japan. In the recent tramway and bus strikes in the city of Tokyo these groups offered their services to the employers in order to ensure the transport services of the city.¹

With this anchoring to a dynasty whose origin is divine, Japanese nationalism has thrust forth her people into the world to conquer its secrets. Her feverish economic activity of the last sixty years, that curiosity of mind which impels her scholars and technicians to scrutinize every new device in order to take it over and make it the heritage of their nation; these, it may be, were only possible because of this tie that binds the people eternally to a heaven-born state. To the leaders of modern Japan so central is this doctrine of loyalty to the

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1930, p. 202.

state in its present form, that alien ideas subversive of it are regarded as criminal. On 11th May, 1925, the Peace Preservation Law came into effect, the first article of which provides 'That those who have organized an association or fraternity with the object of altering the national constitution, or of repudiating the private property system, or those who have joined such an organization with full knowledge of its object, are to be punished with penalty, ranging from death to servitude of over five years.'¹ Does this Draconian severity imply that the state is faced by a cleavage which threatens once again the national unity?

CHINA

Sun Yat-sen in his lectures, subsequently published under the title of *San Min Chu I* (The Three Principles), emphasizes the necessity for rediscovering the spirit of nationalism in China. That it existed before the occupation of the Imperial throne by the Manchu dynasty is evident to him. Unfortunately the custodians of this tradition, the scholars and the official hierarchy, were bought over by the incoming dynasty, but some of it survived in the secret societies recognized among the common people. Perhaps Dr. Sun Yat-sen idealized the extent of the ancient nationalism and its content, but apparently he believed that the old Confucian morality of 'Filial Devotion, Loyalty, Love, Faithfulness, Harmony, Peace' contained elements on which a Chinese social state could be built up. Other nationalities might demand liberty, but not so China, whose democratic society had known neither feudalism nor an ecclesiastical hierarchy, except perhaps as mere temporary ex-

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1930, p. 211.

pedients. What China required immediately, however, was cohesion, and that habit of mind upon which a rational but strong and benevolent government could be built. Unless she could obtain this external bond of government based on an inner moral sanction, she would continue to be the prey of external aggression and the victim of internal dissolution.

At this juncture it might be well to realize that Chinese nationalism, unlike the nationalisms of India and Japan and in line with Chinese pragmatic rationalism, has not provided itself with a transcendental basis of authority. The individual Chinese, believing that he shares in the virtue of his ancestors, is linked by his nationalism in a partnership with the race—this gigantic community of 400,000,000 people undivided by the servitudes of ecclesiasticism or feudalism. The very magnitude of a socially ordered population is an inspiration; perhaps this explains the resentment which habitually meets an assertion that the classical figure of the Chinese population just mentioned may be an over-estimate. Dr. Sun Yat-sen points with sorrow to the estimates made by foreign statisticians revealing the ominous fact that China's population had actually fallen, and he suggests that the lack of a government which could provide adequate sustenance had led to this tragic situation. If only China were developed, she could support eight hundred million people, and thus the peril of the extinction of the Chinese race would be overcome. Such generalizations as to the basis of Chinese nationalism may, however, be questioned, and with justice; the inner workings of the mind of other peoples are always difficult to understand, and this is particularly true of the Chinese.

In India and Japan strong governments exist, which have at different times either frustrated or moulded the

developments of nationalism, but the responsibility for the country has continuously remained vested in strong hands, hence nationalism as a movement sooner or later influenced the government of the country, though it was not responsible for creating that government. Modern nationalism, it must be remembered, in China has had that responsibility to face continuously and imperatively.

Japan, as we have seen, has successfully asserted her control over all her economic development, and has successfully retained it, moulding it to her own necessities and the enrichment of her people. China, in spite of her national autonomy, has been unable to do this, and the whole of her modern history, as far as the outer world is concerned, is a record of her efforts and frustration in obtaining such control. In the earlier stages she succeeded in laying down the lines of foreign trade penetration. This was achieved by refusing to acknowledge the foreign trader, but permitting commercial companies like the East India Company to establish relations with a guild of merchants in Canton, who under administrative supervision traded with the foreign merchant, these guilds being responsible for the action of the foreign merchant companies. The system broke down, and, after China's first war with England, special ports were selected where trade could be carried on; even to-day it is, in theory at least, illegal for foreigners to trade in any places other than specified in this and subsequent treaties. But China has not preserved her old life by these restrictions, and it is probable that the reactions which from time to time have convulsed her have been largely due to this indirect penetration of her life by the new economic forces.

The growth of political power in India, and the administrative successes of the alien government, which,

though swayed by the financial interests of its home country, yet realized that the contentment of the masses was the condition of its own authority, gave that country a more efficient administration than it had had under the old régime, and superior to that possessed by China during the nineteenth century. The Government of China was by its very make-up inherently incapable of laying hold of the new economic order, even as Japan laid hold of it, to use it for the general benefit of the people. This incapacity ultimately led to the fall of the Manchu dynasty and the dissolution of the only form of central government that China so far had possessed. Ever since the disappearance of the old Empire, Chinese effort has been directed to the creation of a central government, and to these efforts we must now direct our attention.

After the proclamation of the Republic the leaders of China resolved to create parliamentary government. Whether this resolve sprang from an urgent inner demand or was merely the result of the foreign education of large numbers of the intelligentsia is uncertain; in any case an attempt was made to summon a parliament. This body of very nearly 900 members met in Peking. The result was, as might have been expected, that it died by a process of attrition and sheer inability to function, although legally it remained in existence for many years. But China had in the meantime broken up politically and even administratively, and it had become apparent that it was not representative government that was the most urgent necessity but a powerful central government capable of controlling, for her own purposes, the economic machinery created by foreign trade and supported by the authority of western governments. That this need has been recognized by

China's statesmen is evident from a study of their successive constitutional projects. In the Provisional Constitution of 1907, in the second Provisional Constitution of 1912, and in the Permanent Constitution of 1923, a system of parliamentary government was provided for. The Organic Law of 1927, however, does not seem to envisage the parliamentary system, but a dictatorship on which public opinion might play. What are the reasons for this change? Recognition of the futility of the first parliament is undoubtedly one cause. The experiment was an attempt to create a democratic government without first creating a democracy. That student of Chinese affairs, Putnam Weale, expressed the opinion that it had worked well. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, however, held a contrary opinion. Here are his words:

'Since¹ the revolution, China has wanted to follow the example of Europe and America and to apply political democracy. Since western political democracy has developed to the point of representative government, China too must have a representative government! But the fine points of western representative government China has not learned; the bad points she has copied tenfold, a hundredfold! The members of parliament have become mere 'swine', filthy and corrupt, worse than anything the world has seen before, an amazing phenomenon in representative government. China has not only failed to learn well from western democratic government but has been corrupted by it.'

Democracy might have been necessary for western countries to ensure the freedom of the individual against the 'divine right' of kings, ecclesiastical and feudal tyranny, but these servitudes were non-existent in China.

¹*San Min Chu I*, Shanghai edition published by China Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927, p. 290.

In the past, public opinion, according to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, constantly played on public affairs through the family or the guild, and he proposed that government should be vested in men of ability, and that full responsibility be given them even though the people remained sovereign. It is on the principles of these latter-day teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen that the present Nanking Government is based. His insistence too on the necessity for a solution of the problem which he terms in the *San Min Chu I* 'the principle of livelihood', has directed the attention of Chinese leaders to this outstanding and persistent demand of the masses whom the nineteenth-century system has so very effectively exploited, and an appreciation has grown up of the fact that there are other more important tasks of government than the creation of organizations through which the people at the best can only inadequately express themselves.

What then are the tasks of the Nanking Government at the present time? They may be summarized as follows: (1) the creation of a centralized authority by the elimination of rival authorities; (2) the elimination of the economic authority of foreign trading concerns, which incidentally raises the question of the rights and privileges acquired in the last hundred years on the soil of China by the foreign resident; (3) the support of indigenous enterprise through the finance and authority of the Government itself; (4) a programme of national education, and, most serious of all (5) the problem of dealing with the mass uprisings, in a number of important provinces in China, of agricultural and industrial workers (whether under Communist influence or not does not matter), who apparently are determined to break the authority of the Chinese landlord, merchant, financier, and employer. Such is the formidable pro-

gramme with which Chinese nationalism, as it finds expression in the Nanking Government, is faced to-day. The recognition of certain fundamental elements in this nationalism will help towards a better understanding of the situation.

First: The belief in revolution as an instrument of progress has apparently been generally accepted. Perhaps this is in line with the tradition of the ancient secret societies and the Taiping Rebellion, but Dr. Sun Yat-sen is the outstanding example and expression of this spirit. Since his success in overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty, revolution has been abroad in China, not merely as a political weapon but in many other spheres, such as the attempts at social revolution and the revolution in literary and educational expression.

Second: The search for unity, as expressed in the creation of Government, has been the main concern of Chinese nationalism ever since the revolutionary overthrow of the old dynasty. The Government must be a unitary government. Chinese society is one; it has an inner unity. For the guidance and expression of that unity, a Government is necessary, which will give protection against external enemies and insure adequate 'sustenance' of the people. Dr. Sun Yat-sen rejects the analogy of the United States, the constitution of states in a federation; these conditions of independent territorial units do not exist in China. What China needs, according to Nationalist thought, is a realization of the sovereignty of the people, combined with a 'high-powered government and effective control'. These, as we have seen, were the ideas which the present Nanking Government was created to express. It has undertaken the task, whether it will lead the country beyond the period of tutelage no outsider can predict, but at any rate all

Chinese leaders at the present time, including the military feudalists, would declare that they looked forward to the day when the whole of China would be under the single authority of a strong Government, itself the expression of the sovereignty of the people.

Third: Another element in Chinese nationalism is what may be termed the psychology of frustration. The Chinese have been called, and rightly so, a proud people. As individuals they are rarely vain, but have that magnificent pride which comes to them from a knowledge of their civilization and marvellously regulated society. Alien though he was by race, yet perhaps the Manchu Emperor correctly expressed the sentiments of his people when he thus addressed George III of England:

'If you assert that your reverence for our celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization—our ceremonies and laws differ so completely from your own that even if your envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transport our manners and customs to your alien soil. . . . As your ambassador can see for himself we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures.'¹

The achievements of this people were recognized throughout the eastern world. Burma, Siam, the kingdoms of Indo-China, Korea and Japan, had in heart and mind paid tribute to Chinese civilization and learning, and in acknowledgment thereof many of them sent their envoys periodically to Peking to make obeisance to the Throne. But every Chinese Nationalist, as he looks back over the latter half of the nineteenth century as well as into the twentieth, is overwhelmed by the

¹*China in the Family of Nations*, Henry T. Hodgkin, pp. 52-3.

shrinkage of Chinese national authority and prestige. Perhaps it was the victory of Japan over Russia that changed the mentality of the Chinese. Read the account of Lord Elgin's negotiations which led up to the Treaty of Tientsin. The dignity of these old courtiers, their sense of realism, as they signed the humiliating clauses of that document, stand in contrast to the refusal of the Chinese delegates at Versailles to acknowledge the loss of Shantung in spite of the unanimous resolution of the Allied Powers.

Nationalist China in carrying out her intentions is frustrated, if not by the coercion of foreign powers, then by her own failure to create a settled order, and to get her own laws obeyed. The Chinese are accused of being anti-foreign, as if this were an inherent racial characteristic, but it is well to remember that few races with large colonies abroad, like the Chinese, have had so little trouble in their relations with other peoples. If an anti-foreign spirit is undoubtedly a part of the nationalist spirit to-day, it is not inherently so; but the historical causes for it are still kept alive, even though the foreigners' authority is definitely on the wane, by that sense of frustration in achievement which the revolutionaries have experienced in the failure of their efforts at reconstruction. Revolutionaries demand immediate results, but all problems do not invariably yield to that form of treatment.

With regard to the spirit of revolution which has touched areas other than politics, it might be well to develop still further the nature of some of these changes.

(1) Statements about the change in the position of women may be exaggerated. Foot-binding has been officially abolished, it is true—a truly revolutionary change—but still the old practice continues in an immense number of households. In cities such as Canton

and Shanghai the complete freedom of women is practised by certain sets only, but their liberation is surely a prelude to the rapid but ordered change bound to follow upon the change in attitude which has already led to a reform in customary law relating to marriage, divorce and woman's right in property.

A birth-control movement, discussions on the institution of marriage, and a vast literature translated from the Russian, are some of the signs of changes in this sphere.

(2) The outstanding achievement of modern China has been the phenomenal growth in education and the transformation in literature. According to some reports China has nearly ten million children in school. If this figure is accurate, it is only a million or two behind the corresponding Indian figures, a strange commentary on the comparative efficiency of the education authorities of the two countries. At any rate one fact is clear, China has made up for considerable educational backwardness in a surprisingly short time.

Dr. Paul Monroe summarizes the changes in education proposed by the new Government:¹

(a) The alteration of the curriculum so as to encourage the spirit of democracy instead of that reverence of the old Manchu authorities;

(b) The enlargement of school facilities by the opening of a large number of new schools, especially primary schools;

(c) The increase of emphasis on handicraft work and physical exercise;

(d) The introduction of co-education in the primary schools;

¹*China, a Nation in Evolution*, Paul Monroe. Macmillan, New York, 1928, pp. 279-80.

(e) The elimination of the ancient classics from the lower schools.

Since the above was written, the prohibition of religious instruction of any kind, which touches Christian schools in particular, has been ordered.

A literary revolution was brought about fifty years ago when Chinese writing was freed from the artificial restraints of the old classics. The aims were twofold: first a change in literary expression from the formalities of the classical age, that is, from the official mandarin in which up to that time the chronicles, commentaries and official correspondence had been written to the Pei-Hua or mandarin dialect in which the popular romantic literature of the Ming dynasty had been composed; in the second place the content of serious literature was changed. The burning questions of the day became the subjects of expression; thus a social and political polemic came into being. In literature everything, religion including Christianity, morals, institutions such as the family or marriage, became subjects of criticism—'re-valuation', Dr. Hu Shih, the most prominent exponent of this movement, would call it.

The revolutionary spirit, the intensity of the immediate situation and the upheavals of civil war and banditry, may lead the visiting foreigner to lose his sense of perspective, and he may thus fail to discover the constant evolution of the Chinese people linked to its traditions and its ancestral pieties, still showing that ancient self-reliance which has been its heritage. A visit to Nankai University at Tientsin may help him to recover his balance. Dr. Chang Po-lin, the president, began life as a young cadet in the old Imperial Navy. His vessel put in one day to a port where a British cruiser lay. What impressed the Chinese youth was the orderliness and

preparedness of the foreign naval crew. Returning to his home port, he resigned in order to found a school for training Chinese youth to take their place in the new world which China had now entered. A friend entrusted him with his two sons, and from modest beginnings was created a school which to-day has 2,000 pupils, and a university with 500 students. From the University Research Department proceeds a constant stream of studies dealing with matters such as labour conditions in factories, price-level indices, the agrarian problems in Manchuria, fluctuations in wages. This interpretation of Chinese life conditions is of the utmost value to those to whom the sovereignty of the people is more than a pious phrase.

The Chinese newspapers occasionally refer to the work of a veteran statesman who, having retired to his ancestral village near Macao, has introduced co-operative farming among his agriculturalists, and has constructed roads and planted orchards, expressing thus the patriarchal character of the ancient Chinese village in modern terms. These men, together with many others such as schoolmasters and schoolmistresses, doctors and engineers, who work not infrequently under difficult circumstances, keep constantly before themselves a picture of their country in distress, need and peril, which urges them to renewed endeavour. These also are the children of the Chinese national movement.

CHAPTER VII

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INFLUENCES

IDEAS OF government, as was pointed out in a previous chapter, have been withdrawn from the zone of theocratic concepts. During the nineteenth century the science of politics was born in Asiatic Asia, as indeed was inevitable with the passing of the time-honoured autocracies of the past. At the beginning of that century the Mogul Empire passed into dissolution, a hundred years later the Manchus abdicated the throne of China, and just about the middle of the century the military autocracy of Japan gave way to an Emperor whom the exigencies of the time called to a new leadership of his people. In the whole range of government, politics and economics, three countries have influenced or are in the process of influencing Asiatic Asia. In the first place, the institutions of colonial England have been an outstanding influence and have probably done more to mould political life and institutions than have those of any other country. In the second place, in the domain of political and social ideas metropolitan France has inspired a radical leadership which in some countries at any rate has been most influential. In the third place, continental Russia, during the post-war years, is proving in the social realm an inspiration to revolutionary movements, which, it is quite conceivable, will make her the successor of both France and England in the outstanding nature of her influence.

The operations of the East India Company with the

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East were conducted in various ports through the agency of what were known as 'factories', small settlements of merchants who were housed together in a building and its dependencies. The counting-house, warehouses and private residences were all grouped together. In later years they expanded into regular settlements on the water-front, frequently called the Bund, a name which was carried from India to China and Japan, where the word is still used. Provision was made for the security and sanitation of these settlements, and thus was laid in India and the Far East the foundations of modern municipal administration. Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Malacca (and later Singapore), the Shameen at Canton, Hong-kong, Shanghai and Tientsin, and last of all, Kobe and Yokohama, formed a chain of settlements, which were later to become centres of modern enlightenment in Asiatic Asia. But British tradition imposed on them municipal government, conceived in the political traditions of England, namely the creation of a civic electorate and civic responsible government. Read the records of Bombay and Calcutta, Shanghai and Kobe. In India this form of modified self-government spread to the cities and towns in the interior and even to the rural districts. The growth of municipal and district self-government up to 1927 can thus be indicated:¹

		NUMBER	ELECTED MEMBERS	NOMINATED MEMBERS	TOTAL
Municipalities	-	771	11,684	902	12,586
Local Boards (Dis- trict and Sub-dis- trict)	- -	1,265	15,889	5,543	21,432
Totals	- -	2,036	27,573	6,445	34,018

¹*Statistical Abstract for British India*, 1930, Dept. of Commercial Intelligence, pp. 286, 298.

In Japan the corresponding figures¹ cover elected bodies in every prefecture, city, town and village, altogether 12,701 in number. The constituencies elect no less than 157,826 members to these various local government councils.

The facts regarding China are very difficult to obtain, but apparently the ancient district system of local government based on the village council of patriarchs has been remodelled, for, according to regulation, the District Government is assisted by a District Council, elected by the inhabitants, its members holding office for three years. Municipal government in actual practice has not developed beyond the stage of the nominated mayor, who presides over administrative bureaux,² but the revolutionary constitutions, swept away by the Organic Law of 1927, made provision for elected municipal councils. In this connection we would draw attention to the fact that while the Chinese in their own municipalities have, in practice at any rate, no elective institutions, yet the demand for this right has come from them, and has been conceded in the British settlements such as Shanghai and Tientsin.³ Their rights to this privilege need not be discussed here: the interesting fact is that the demand itself indicates the influence exercised by the every-day practice of self-government in these settlements on the Chinese residents themselves. During the widespread labour strikes between 1925 and 1927 which affected many Chinese cities, demands of various kinds were made, but it was the coolie strikers in the British colony of Hongkong alone who included a specific demand for the extension of the franchise to themselves.⁴

As British settlements developed, the King's Courts

¹*Japan Year Book*, 1930, p. 87. ²*China Year Book*, 1930, pp. 692-3.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 99, 101.

⁴*China Year Book*, 1926, pp. 965-6.

were established to administer justice between British subjects, or in suits where they were defendants. A new standard of judicial purity was set up (marred unfortunately on occasions by the perversities of juries), and the freedom of the courts from interference by the executive was soon recognized, so much so that the aggrieved, whether native or foreign, looked now to the courts to protect their lawful liberties against invasion by the executive. The eighteenth century lawyer, William Hickey, in his amazing journal, records that a Bengali client came to him to complain that the British authorities, during the excavations of the harbour, had irretrievably damaged his house. On Hickey's advice he sued the Executive in the King's Court, and obtained substantial damages. In the history of the Settlement of Kobe, the following story is told of the earliest British consular court: two sailors, a British and an American, were arrested for having cut off a Chinese coolie's queue; the former was charged before the British court and suitably punished. The prestige of British justice among the Japanese was greatly enhanced when the American Consul acquitted his fellow-countryman. It may be remarked, in mitigation of the moral, that history does not record the grounds of acquittal. The Supreme Court, soon after its establishment at Calcutta in 1773, on more than one occasion came into conflict with the Executive, presided over by Warren Hastings, and indeed, in subsequent British parliamentary legislation, limits to its authority had to be prescribed.

It is a fact that British judicial institutions such as the courts, with this freedom from executive control, with their procedure, their jury system and powerful bar, were one of the earliest and strongest exponents of

political liberty. India naturally has been more influenced by these institutions than has any other Asiatic country, but the British consular courts in China, the Hongkong judicial administration, and particularly the Mixed Court in Shanghai, have been a pattern to China. The direct influence of the Shanghai Mixed Court (now abolished) on the practice of the modern Chinese courts, is undoubted. The recent extension of the jury system in Japan, although declared by observers to have been of doubtful value, is itself a demonstration of the influence of British judicial practice. But in India the courts have a prestige and authority unknown elsewhere in Asia, except perhaps in the British Crown Colonies of Ceylon, Singapore and Hongkong.

In addition to municipal government and the law courts, the British transferred to Asiatic soil two other institutions which have taken root and become indigenous.

To these settlements of British merchants and Government agents were attracted adventurers of a very different type—persons of no great repute but with considerable ambition. Among these were individuals who realized their fellow-countrymen's passion for a controversial newspaper. Such a person was Hickey, the Calcutta journalist, another than the lawyer referred to above, a man of violent temper, always on the eve of bankruptcy. Abuse and scandal were his chief stock in trade, but he will live in Anglo-Indian history as one of the earliest newspaper proprietors. Freeman of the city of London he called himself, and considered himself, in that capacity, the champion of a free press. An enterprising American merchant during his residence at Canton a century ago, on a visit to Malacca, puts it on record that he met another of these unfortunate news-

paper pioneers, an Englishman whose debts finally proved his undoing.

Thus it came about that the first regular newspapers, not merely chronicles of events, but expressions of opinion, were in the English language and British-edited. This was true of India, China and Japan, where these papers were the unofficial organs of the settlements in Calcutta, Shanghai, Yokohama and Kobe. The next development came when William Carey, the missionary, issued from his press at Serampore, in 1817, the first newspaper in an Indian vernacular.

Apart from some short-lived papers which in form were but political pamphlets, the first newspaper in Japanese was the *Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun*, which appeared in 1871 from a British press. A few years previously an English newspaper had been established in this port as also in Kobe in 1868. In China, while the English weekly, *The North China Herald*, was founded in 1850, the first Chinese newspaper did not appear until 1870, the *Hsin Pao*, a news-sheet, which was quickly followed by a regular newspaper, the *Shen Pao*, the owners of which were Messrs. Major Brothers, a British firm.

The development of journalism has been one of the most obvious symptoms of the changes that have taken place in the mental demands of the peoples of India, China and Japan. Putnam Weale estimated that in 1917 China produced 10,000 periodicals which reached no less than 50 million people. India reports nearly 5,000 periodicals, but, as might be expected, Japan with universal literacy and now adult manhood suffrage, leads comparatively to her population in the production of newspapers. In 1926 she had 8,345 journals of all kinds, of which no less than 1,093 were dailies, and the

balance weeklies or monthlies. Certain Japanese dailies claim a circulation of a million each.

Associated with newspaper production is the problem of the freedom of the press, which in English history has been a burning question. Now the British assumption that the press in principle should be unfettered in its free expression, has been generally accepted in India, although the actual practice has changed from time to time. Censorship has been applied sometimes, and that for short periods, as also the system of compulsory deposits of security in substantial sums, which were liable to forfeiture in case the paper overstepped the limits of judicious expression. This latter system was abandoned, although it has been temporarily revived during the last few months.

The press in India, China and Japan has become a true organ of public opinion, even when hampered by censorship, as in China, or the systems of security and censorship as in India and Japan. Probably it would be correct to say that where British influence has gone deepest, the press in general has been least hampered in its expression of views. This freedom exists also in the Philippine Islands, where the British tradition has been transmitted through American influence.

Yet another British tradition is the right of public meeting for the expression of grievances. The establishment of the Town Hall as a place of public meeting appears as an early feature of the settlements. The three Indian cities, originally foreign settlements, of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta had Town Halls. They also had, and still have, officers dependent, not on the executive, but on the King's Courts, known as sheriffs, whose duty as in England was to ensure that the judgments of the courts were carried out. Now the citizens of these cities

preserve up to the present time the right of presenting to the sheriff a request that he should call a meeting at the Town Hall in order to consider matters affecting the general welfare of the community, or to express public opinion on a matter of common interest. This demand is still termed a 'Requisition'. This method of drawing attention to matters of public concern has thus become indigenous to India and is one of the most powerful instruments for the expression and propagation of political opinion.

One particular aspect of the functioning of democratic government should be mentioned here as having very significant consequences in at least one Asiatic country: namely the idea of political opposition legally modifying the action of government. Political group action, organized among the British settlers in opposition to their own government in India, first gave the example to Indian nationalists, and Indian political agitation was thus born.

An early and, as it proved, unsuccessful attempt to deflect the Government from carrying out its policy was made between 1834 and 1838, when the British community attacked the Government of India in general and Thomas Babington Macaulay in particular (then legal member of the Governor-General's Council in Calcutta), for a change in the law under which Englishmen in the interior now came under the jurisdiction of the Company's Courts, though presided over by English judges, instead of being sent to Calcutta for trial in the King's Courts.

'After preparing the way', says Trevelyan, 'by a string of communications to the public journals in which their objections to the Act were set forth at enormous length, and with as much point and dignity as can be used by a

copious use of italics and capital letters, they called a public meeting, the proceedings of which were almost too ludicrous for description. "I have seen", said one of the speakers, "at a Hindoo festival, a naked dishevelled figure, his face painted with grotesque colours and his long hair besmeared with dust and ashes. His tongue was pierced with an iron bar and his breast scorched by the fire from the burning altar which rested on his stomach. This revolting figure, covered with ashes, dirt and bleeding voluntary wounds, may the next moment ascend the bench, and in a suit between a Hindoo and an Englishman think it an act of sanctity to decide against the Englishman in favour of the professor of the true faith."¹ Another gentleman . . . reminded the tyrant (Macaulay) that "There yawns the sack and yonder rolls the sea." "Mr. Macaulay", he added, "may treat this as an idle threat, but his knowledge of history will supply him with many examples of what has occurred when resistance has been provoked by milder instances of despotism than the decimation of a people."²

A petition was finally signed, but the Government in London refused to yield to this demand of its nationals in India.

Reference has already been made to the indigo controversy, but a few details are especially relevant in the present context. The British merchant community, as we have seen, took direct action against the Indian

¹For Mr. Winston Churchill the century-old fears of his countrymen have not, apparently, been wholly exorcised. Cf. his description of Mr. Gandhi, "The nauseating and humiliating spectacle of the one-time Inner Temple lawyer, now seditious faquir, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceroy's Palace."

²*Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*, G. O. Trevelyan. London, 1908, pp. 287-288.

Government. This counter-agitation against the remedies proposed by the Government was successful in that the tenant was not wholly freed from compulsion to cultivate indigo. Fifteen years later an English official in charge of the indigo district realized that friction between the planter and tenant was increasing, and suggested a Commission of Enquiry, but this was refused by the Lieutenant-Governor 'on the ground that it would create a considerable disturbance . . . shake vested interests, place capital in jeopardy, and bring proprietary status and occupancy rights into uncertainty for a time. He preferred to trust to the existing law and its enforcement.'¹ As a matter of fact, the Government was unprepared to face the organized resistance of the planters whose power it had experienced fifteen years previously.

But the most astonishing instance of group action on the part of the British resident in India against his own Government in that country, came some years later in 1884. Early in that year the Indian Government proposed amending the law regarding the criminal trials of European-born British subjects. The following is a quotation from the statement of reasons given by the Government:

'Shortly after the Code of Criminal Procedure Act X of 1882 was passed, the question was raised whether the provisions of that Code which limit the jurisdiction over European British subjects . . . to judicial officers who are themselves European British subjects, should not be modified. It was thought anomalous that while natives of India were admitted to the Covenanted Civil Service and held competent to discharge the highest judicial duties, they should be deemed incompetent to

¹*Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, C. E. Buckland, Vol. II, p. 639.

be Justices of the Peace and to exercise jurisdiction over European British Subjects outside the Presidency towns . . . the Government of India has arrived at the conclusion that the time has come for modifying the existing law and removing the bar.'¹

The statement included a classification of the grades of the Indian magistracy who would be invested with the power to try European British subjects.

On 28th February 1883, a meeting of the European community was held in the Town Hall in Calcutta. 'The room was crowded and no one who was present can ever forget the scene. The speakers were cheered again and again and the utmost unanimity to resist the measure was established.' Thus was launched a virulent campaign against the Bill and the Government; racial animosity was stirred to the depths; the Governor-General, Lord Ripon, was insulted at the gates of his residence, his official functions were boycotted by the European community, and finally it was discovered that a number of resolute British merchants had banded themselves together, in the event of the Bill's becoming law, forcibly to enter the Viceroy's palace, arrest him, place him on a steamer and deport him to England *via* the Cape. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Province had knowledge of this conspiracy. The Government bowed before the storm; the Bill was amended so as to ensure that even in a magistrate's court an Englishman could demand a jury with not less than half of its members his own countrymen. Thus amended and recast, the Bill was passed in January 1884. The British residents in India had themselves set an example of agitation which had resulted in the defeat of their own Government.

¹*Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors*, C. E. Buckland, Vol. II, pp. 773, 774.

A year later a few educated Indians, on whom the lesson had not been lost, came together to consider a programme of political reform, and thus in 1885 was held the first meeting of the Indian National Congress, which ever since that date has met regularly each year and has grown in power, influence and insurgence.

These suggestions as to the influence of British institutions require more historical research than the writer has been able to undertake, but it is clear that certain institutions, imported to the continent of Asia by the Englishman for his own use, sprang up after the lapse of half a century or in some cases of an even shorter period, in new forms and gave rise to new demands; these institutions were invariably directed to securing political liberty.

The enlightenment which resulted from experience with all or some of these institutions, created that demand for parliamentary government which at one time or another proved irresistible throughout Asiatic Asia. The Diet in Japan, the abortive House of Representatives in Peking, the Indian Legislative Assembly, are but the coping to those other edifices of local representative government, so dissimilar in construction, built on the humble foundations for which the early English merchant adventurers were largely responsible.

If substantial evidence of the political influence of colonial England is forthcoming, the reason lies in the fact that the concreteness of its expression and the wide area of its operation render description comparatively easy. On the other hand, the contribution of metropolitan France has been mainly intellectual. France's influence has been characterized by political and social radicalism: the French expression of equality, racial, social and political, of 'the rights of man', was bound to make a profound

impression on Asiatic minds which had experienced the bitterness of an inferiority imposed on them by western imperialism.

Declaration of the equality of men was made both in the constitution of France and in her legal codes, and since the Revolution has been constantly reaffirmed in the application of the law. In the first place, this passion for equality was demonstrated by the prescription of adult suffrage in the first revolutionary constitution. In the second place, these political privileges were not merely reserved for her own citizens, but the assumption that the colonies and the metropolis were under the régime of the same law led almost immediately to the extension of the franchise to the Asiatic and even African inhabitants of her colonies, although since the establishment of the Third Republic zeal in this direction has greatly abated.

By a curious coincidence France has been responsible for inspiring in Asiatic countries codes of modern law. England, which itself has never been under the régime of a legal code, gave to India a criminal code inspired apparently by the Napoleonic code of France. This was followed by procedure codes both civil and criminal. The Japanese codes were also inspired by France, so also the codes of modern China.

Finally France herself and particularly the metropolis provided a singularly sympathetic intellectual home to social and political thinkers from China, Japan and possibly to a smaller extent from India. It is a recognized fact that the older leadership of the Kuomintang consisted of a number of prominent Chinese who had received an education in France or had been resident there for considerable periods of time. The early socialist leadership of Japan was also inspired from

France, and here again it was the Japanese group of socialists who had lived in France who took back to their country their revolutionary ideas.

On India the French influence has been less marked, although a small group of anarchical revolutionaries in Bengal were touched by French example. That movement has been greatly strengthened in recent years and has become wider in scope, but it is probable that the social ends to which it has been directed have been inspired rather by Russia than by France. The extraordinary similarity in the methods followed by Chinese, Japanese and Indian revolutionaries on their return to their own countries, indicates that it was in Paris they had found their source of revolutionary inspiration and had learned that theirs was a common problem.¹

But if the social revolutionary movement was inspired by French intellectual radicalism, it was undoubtedly the groups of the Russian intelligentsia who gave it form, and it was in Paris that the eastern revolutionaries came into contact with the early political

¹On the occasion of the declaration of the Chinese Republic, Shyamaji Krishnavarma, an Indian revolutionary, resident in Paris and editor of *The Indian Sociologist*, published in the issue of that organ for March 1912, the following letter to Dr. Sun Yat-sen:

‘My dear Friend,

I hope my cablegram of yesterday congratulating you on the establishment of the Republic in China has safely reached you. You will see from the enclosed February number of *The Indian Sociologist* how highly I esteem your splendid initiative and patriotism in securing the desired change in the form of government of your country. Last year when you honoured me with a visit here, I hardly thought you would succeed so soon; it was therefore a most agreeable surprise to me to learn that, thanks to your untiring zeal and resourceful activities, China has set all at once such a noble example to those countries that are still writhing under the heel of the despot.

You may perhaps wonder why I, an Indian, should take so in-

émigrés from Russia. The centre of gravity of the movement, whose early inspiration came from French sources, has now been transferred from Paris to Moscow, and the application of its principles on so large a scale in continental Russia has arrested the attention of the peoples of China, Japan and India.

Russia is Asia's greatest associate, for whereas the Russo-European frontier is very little more than two thousand miles, her Asiatic frontier extends for 6,000 miles. Thus Russia abuts on the frontiers of every Asiatic country save the three minor Turkish succession states of Syria, Iraq and Arabia, and the three Chinese succession states of Siam and Indo-China and Burma. Russia's Asiatic frontier has involved a defensive expenditure, which must constitute a very formidable sum, on the part of the Asiatic Asian states of India, China and Japan, to ensure their frontiers against Russian advance. The responsibility for defence has mainly fallen on the two insular powers of England and Japan. Wars on behalf of, or diplomatic support to, Turkey, military adventures in Persia and Afghanistan, loans and subsidies to these latter states, the annexation of Korea, the penetration of Manchuria, have all been the expression

tense an interest in Chinese politics. I can merely say that China is the next-door neighbour to India and that we have much in common, as you know. Moreover, the same sentiment which prompts us Indians to win back our own rights, leads us, by its sympathetic excitement, to rejoice when our neighbours successfully assert their rights. I wish my countrymen had one-tenth of the grit and ardent love of liberty which yours have so admirably demonstrated to the whole world.

Congratulating you again most heartily on your unique success.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Paris, France,

Shyamaji Krishnavarma.'

21st February 1912.

of an unshakable firmness of purpose to secure that the Russo-Asiatic frontier which lies between longitudes 40 and 140 east, should be barred and doubly locked against Russia. So successful were Russia's adversaries that, in spite of the gigantic size of her empire, all attempts made by her to find a place on the world's great highways of trade, commerce and influence in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and in the Yellow Sea have been foiled. Thus Russia has never reached the stature of the economic greatness of England or of France, possessed though these are of far inferior internal resources. In spite of this frustration Russia has in the course of time become the greatest adversary of western economic Europeanism as it touches Asiatic countries.

Russia is styled not infrequently an eastern country. With this goes an implication of the inferiority of non-European civilisations and peoples. What exactly does this expression mean? The term 'European' in this context has come to denote those countries in Europe which are based on a modern industrial system. As a matter of fact, Europe thus conceived is a comparatively small portion of the European continent. The eastern traveller, as soon as he passes into Poland or eastern Slovakia or even into Austria, discovers himself in an environment which seems familiar. This is even more true, should he visit the three Baltic Republics, Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia. The agricultural landscape of the country, the poverty of the peasant, the use of draught animals, the primitive form of agriculture, are strangely reminiscent of India and China. The same is true of Russia, where, moreover, the economic conditions of last century and the period prior to the revolution were characterized by many of

the features which may be observed in India and China to-day.

In Russia, as in the east, the capitalistic system was imposed upon an agricultural community from without. Peter the Great, after a visit to the countries of western Europe determined upon the economic development of the country, and to this end he extended his patronage to the merchant guilds and the German business men and Jews, who were thus enabled to lay the foundations of their future fortunes. Agrarian reforms were undertaken with two motives in view, the first to secure the larger revenues needed to rehabilitate the army, and the second to ensure that the factories founded by the merchants should not lack for labour. Further to serve the latter end the system of serfage was extended to the cities. A system of education, moreover, was established with the special purpose of creating a directing class which later became the foundation of a more or less efficient bureaucracy.

During the nineteenth century the process continued. Monsieur Platonov in his *Histoire de la Russie* gives a vivid and succinct account of developments, emphasizing the economic dislocation which resulted:

‘The Russia of the first half of the nineteenth century had already moved far from the régime of a natural economy and was rapidly approaching an order characterized by wide developments in exchange and in industrial output. The landed nobility had played a certain part in this economic evolution. It had extended areas of cultivation in view of the export of cereals, and had experimented with various branches of industry. The entire weight of this intensified cultivation and of the new forms of labour fell on the shoulders of the already exhausted peasant masses. . . . In proportion

as commerce and industry developed, relationships between serfs and landlords became more acute, the former sometimes giving free rein to their dissatisfaction, and the latter growingly apprehensive for their future. On the other hand, the introduction into the feudal economy of complex and perfected industrial methods made no contribution towards the improvement of the material situation of the proprietors themselves. The mines and factories set going by a certain number of the landlords could not face the competition of those exploited by merchants, with big capital and better equipment at their disposal. Serf labour proved inadequate to the demands of intensive production. . . . Even those of the landlords who were not carried away on a wave of idealism, were convinced that the old order was moribund and needed radical reform; their one fear was that such reform might complete their own ruin.¹

India presents a similar problem to that faced by pre-revolutionary Russia—the problem of agriculture and a peasantry unadjusted to the economic forces which have been let loose upon them by the western world. Between India and Russia in particular there are several interesting parallels. In spite of the almost universal illiteracy in both countries, a highly trained intellectual class was developed throughout the nineteenth century, which entered into a struggle with the efficient but lifeless bureaucracy to whom the destinies of the people had been entrusted. The principle of autocracy on which the Russian and Indian systems of government were based, was constantly challenged by this intellectual class. Indeed both Lord Curzon in India, and the last of the Czars during the early part of this century, contended with the intelligentsia on the *bona fides* and responsibility

¹*Histoire de la Russie*, S. Platonov. Payot, Paris, 1929, pp. 909-911.

of autocracy, and in Russia as well as India the intellectuals were resentful of this implication of their natural inferiority. Certain elements of the intelligentsia rebelled against that westernization to which Count Tolstoy and Mr. Gandhi (whom he influenced) were opposed. The Russian Slavophil saw in the life of his church, its practice and doctrine, a means by which the rapid materialization of his country might be arrested. Even so, thirty years ago the western-educated Indian believed that his spiritual heritage offered a way of salvation to his country, if not indeed to the whole world.

In spite of these ideological movements, however, the cause of freedom in both countries made very little headway. The agriculturalist, because of his ignorance, was more completely exploited as the economic instruments of exploitation were perfected. The industrial development of both Russia and India was financed by foreign capital, and its promoters and directors were aliens. The rapid construction of railways for the triple purpose of military defence, internal security, and commercial development was undertaken with loans from foreign countries, and both Russia and India were called upon to bear charges for interest and to meet annual deficits which involved increased taxation. Thus the financial situation periodically became acute and was aggravated by expenditure on military expeditions as also by the incidence of famine.

As the result of these conditions and the failure to relieve them, Russia and India entered upon a very long period of agitation. The seditious newspaper and equally seditious meeting, whether secret or public, led to the enactment of rigorous press laws. In both countries a political secret police was brought into being, to keep under close supervision those responsible for agitation.

On both countries the result of the Russo-Japanese war had a profound influence. Their autocratic governments, as well as that of China, realized that the time for some sort of concession had arrived. In 1905 the Chinese Government sent a commission to study the governmental systems of Europe and America. On their return they recommended that the throne should issue a decree 'fixing on five years as the limit within which China would adopt a constitutional form of Government'.¹ As a result of their recommendations, provincial assemblies for the discussion of local affairs were constituted. In 1906 the Czar promulgated a constitution creating an elected parliament with powers which were greatly restricted, both legally and in practice. In 1909 by the amendment of the India Councils Act the number of members of the Central and Provincial Legislatures in India was nearly trebled. The principle of election was introduced, to work side by side with the existing system of nomination. The reforms undertaken in all three cases were speedily discovered to be inadequate; but much more serious was the fact that the autocracies responsible for government in these countries were speedily losing their moral authority.

The parallel developments which have been enumerated have stimulated mutually comparable political and economic movements. Both the Indian National Congress and the Society for the Advancement of China, of which Sun Yat-sen was one of the members, were organizations whose aims were at first reformist and later became revolutionary. As early as 1895 Sun Yat-sen imported arms into Canton for military action against the Manchu dynasty. In 1905, after the American Government had restricted Chinese immigration

¹*Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII, p. 522.

to the United States, a boycott of American goods was carried out in the Chinese markets. This example influenced India,¹ for in succeeding years an effective boycott of British goods was organized in Bengal, the results of which continue in the country and periodically become acute. Boycott and group action have now definitely become in both China and India effective political weapons, and to this armoury has been added the industrial strike.

Enough has been said in this and previous chapters to demonstrate the vital influence of western thought and practice on the political inspirers of Asiatic Asia. British institutions of constructive government and organs of public opinion, French radicalism and Russian social revolutionary movements have stamped themselves indelibly on these countries, but what a gamut of values the whole range of change constitutes—from the jury system and parliamentary government to the implacable hostility of the political terrorist and socialistic republicanism!² It may well be asked what are the causes which have led to the acceptance of these influences.

In the first place: the instinct of imitation was undoubtedly operative in the minds of people brought up and educated in certain western educational moulds. Western political forms and ideas appeared to bear the hall-mark of success, and thus became acceptable to a

¹*A Nation in the Making*, Sir S. Banerjea. Humphrey Milford, 1925, p. 191.

²Referring to a paper found in the pocket of an arrested man charged with criminal political conspiracy, a government official stated to the Bengal Legislative Council that this document declared for independence and 'the means proposed were mob violence, dacoities, mob risings, revolution, organized terrorism and finally the establishment of a republican form of government'. *The Times*, London, 5th February, 1932.

generation which, as was pointed out, had withdrawn the zone of government from the empire of the theocracies.

In the second place: What were the alternatives to which the leaders of these peoples could turn? Their new economic rulers were unmoved by appeals to the old moralities. Japan still clothed the new in forms of her ancient and theocratic dynasty, and at a later stage summoned all established religions to keep back the tide of oncoming revolutionary ideas. But have these old forms proved adequate, and if so how long can they hold fast?

In the third place: Some of the very conditions which had compelled European peoples into these channels of political thought and action were now operative on Asiatic soil. The havoc created in India, Japan and China by the break-up of the old society by the forces of an alien economy, prepared the soil for acceptance of remedies or weapons of defence which were themselves selected from the armouries of the west. Perhaps it is permissible in this connection to quote from the pages of a political autobiography which appeared a few years ago:

‘If to-day revolutionary principles have found acceptance among some young men in Bengal (and their number is a handful), the fact is traceable to conditions, economic and political, which are more or less independent of all propagandism. The teacher or preacher may incite but he cannot create the nursing ground from which the revolutionary draws his inspiration and support. The writings of the pamphleteers would have fallen upon barren soil if the conditions in France, political and economic, had not prepared men’s minds for the acceptance of revolutionary ideas.’¹

¹*A Nation in the Making*, Sir S. Banerjea. Humphrey Milford, 1925, p. 179.

The Indian and Chinese movements are matters of deep concern to the Governments of colonial powers such as France and Holland. Exemplification of this may be found in the distinct hostility to the Indian liberation movement which the great Parisian daily journals have shown during the last two or three years, or their frigid attitude towards China in the recent Sino-Japanese crisis. Dutch Asiatic authorities are directing their energies to a scientific study of the colonial problem in particular and the effects of modern forces on the Far East and India in general.¹ In a speech delivered at Marseilles a recent French Minister of the Colonies, referring to the political trouble in which the French have been involved, stated that the insurgence of their Indo-Chinese subjects was the result of a movement sweeping over south-eastern Asia for which communist propaganda was largely responsible. The Paris *Temps* in its columns has urged more than once the necessity of a common understanding regarding policy among the colonial ministries of France, Britain and Holland in order to secure their Asiatic possessions against these revolutionary influences from without. The *Temps* fails to realize that the Russian revolutionary movements, both pre-war and post-war, were caused by some of those very conditions which are existent to-day in Asiatic countries, and, as a consequence, no amount of successful elimination of Russian influence will be of avail to subdue the insurgence of colonial populations.

Thus in nineteenth-century Russia the maladjustment of the old and new, the compulsory imposition on the country of the economic system of western Europe,

¹Perhaps the most remarkable study available to English readers is A. D. A. De Kat Angelino's *Colonial Policy*, translated from the Dutch by G. J. Renier, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1931, 2 vols.

the failure to give the people an adequate system of education accessible to all, together with the growing knowledge that the day of absolutism was doomed, gave strength to the revolutionary movement. Finally, when the Empire was weakened by war, the government was overthrown and with it went the ancient dynasty, as also the aristocratic and bourgeois classes together with the foreign industrialist and financier. The revolutionaries were prepared with a new programme. The new Russia was built on the foundation of communist republics, and authority vested in the proletariat who were promised an adequate share in the fruits of socialized industries and agriculture. To describe the new Russia is not the task before us now, but already the U.S.S.R. is a greater force in Asiatic affairs than the Empire ever was. Her influence in Asia is not confined to her alleged ambitions for territorial expansion, but it is immeasurably strengthened by her missionary zeal in appealing to the masses to whom she holds out prospects of an improved livelihood and a social reintegration based on justice and racial equality. The ideas of colonial England and of her institutions, glorious as they appeared through long periods of the nineteenth century, now seem to the new generations somewhat tarnished and dull.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNISM

THE SUBJECT of communism in Asia is peculiarly difficult to understand and describe. The movement has been largely underground and the issues are at all times confused. Yet any diagnosis of the condition of Asiatic Asia to-day would be incomplete, not to say irrelevant to the real problems, if it did not reckon with this tremendous force and make some effort to describe it.

In Japan the word 'socialism' has been in usage for very nearly sixty years, but over the greater part of that period it has represented merely a particular ideology of interest to certain intellectuals. At the time of the election of the first Diet in 1890, however, the liberals included in their programme matters such as 'abolition of landlords'. When they failed to implement their programme, a certain number of idealists left the party to propagate socialist ideas elsewhere. Chief among these was Nakai, the translator of Rousseau's *Contrat Social* into Japanese, and his disciple Kotoku. 1901 saw the formation of a Social Democratic party. In the meantime the Government resolved to suppress popular movements such as the Trade Unions, which had come to birth under the stress of the Sino-Japanese war and the years which followed it. Of the leaders of the Social Democratic movement of this time two later acquired notoriety: Kotoku himself was tried for treason and executed

in 1911; the other, Katayama, migrated to Russia after the revolution and has since become a prominent figure in the International Communist party. In 1912 a Social Welfare Movement was founded, which in spite of its constitution became tinged with Socialist thought. After 1914 the economic conditions of war, produced by the failure of wages to rise correspondingly to the cost of living, led to widespread strikes. In 1921 a League of Socialists was inaugurated, but was immediately dissolved by Government order. The existence of labour organizations and federations is to-day permitted by the Government so long as their radicalism does not prove excessive.

The continual changes, purgings and secessions taking place in the various Trade Union Federations to-day indicate that heretical elements are both numerous and powerful, since official recognition of these elements by the Unions themselves would result in a Government order of dissolution. Attempts to bring these movements into affiliation with the Third International are apparently being made. The discovery from time to time of alleged widespread communist plots, as for instance in 1923, and again in 1928, may indicate either the spread of the movement or a hypersensitiveness on the part of the Government. Japanese law, indeed, against radicalism both in thought and action has been constantly strengthened. The Proletarian party so far have been unable, in spite of universal suffrage, to exercise much influence in the election for the Diet, but in townships and villages they have achieved striking successes.¹

¹*The Development of the Social Movement and Social Legislation in Japan*, Junshiro Asari. I.P.R. Conference, 1929. Papers on Cultural Relations prepared by the Japanese Council, No. 15.

In summing up the general situation with regard to socialist movements in Japan to-day, we would emphasize once more the fundamental problem of over-population and the consequent unemployment, industrial, agricultural and intellectual, the lack of unemployment insurance, and the constant drift of people to the cities.

Japan is in constant touch with Russia, her neighbour, who is economically a very valuable neighbour indeed. The fisheries of the Vladivostock coast bring the fishing fleets of both countries together. The Japanese State Bank, the Bank of Chosen, has a branch in the Russian port, and the Soviet State maintains a branch of the Dall-bank at Osaka. A Russian railway mission of technicians visited Japan and were, not long ago, the guests of the Japanese Government, while at the request of the Russian Government a railway mission was recently sent by Japan to advise the Soviets on railway administration.

On the other hand, contacts between Japanese and Russian socialists have been frequent. As far back as 1891 Sakai was present at a meeting of the International Socialist organization held at Brussels. In the early days of the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese socialists sent a strong anti-war protest in a message to the International Congress of Socialists held in Amsterdam in 1904. This message, delivered in person by Katayama, contained these words: 'The Russo-Japanese war is nothing but a conflict between two capitalistic governments, inflicting great loss upon the labourers in both countries.' In view of the situation two of the Congress nominations for the three vice-presidencies went to Katayama and Plekhanov, the Russian Socialist, who had once been 'le maître le plus écouté de Lenine'.¹

¹*Ma Vie*, Léon Trotsky, Trans. Maurice-Parijanine, Paris, 1930, Vol. I., p. 228, footnote.

Russian communist doctrines are widely known and discussed in Japan itself. For years now books and pamphlets on the Marxian theories have been in circulation, and with the high literacy of the country it is not surprising that the knowledge of these doctrines is so widespread, while the high standard of education of so many has made possible an intensity of intellectual activity unknown in any other Asiatic country. There are probably hundreds of societies of students and workers who are studying the immediate problems of their country with fervour, under the spell of the tremendous Russian revolution in which all values are expressed in economic terms. The palliative measures recently recommended by the Japanese Education Department would indicate that the Government is disturbed by the gravity of the situation as it is affecting students. A recent conference held at Tokyo was attended by the Minister of Education, several officials such as the heads of the Criminal, Police, and Peace-Preservation Bureaux, representatives of the Department of the Interior, as well as social workers and educators. Information was given as to what steps were being taken to deal with the situation. In an interview with the Press, the head of the Student Bureau in the Department of Education made the following statement:

‘So-called “dangerous thoughts” admit of various definitions. A general definition would be the present unrest exhibited by the collective student mind of the nation. The causes probably are manifold, and defects in the national educational system may be responsible in part. The Japanese educational system did not grow up slowly as an expression of national life, but may be said to have been organized. We adopted western learning hurriedly and organized the present system of teach-

ing to serve the immediate purpose. . . . The present unrest among the thinking youth of Japan might, in a sense, be compared with the religious "revolt" of the younger generation in western countries. Student communists, I might say, need more common sense and experience of life . . . the average student's study of Marx is too superficial. He reads two or three books on the subject and poses as a disciple of the Marx school of thought. He fails to take into consideration that other schools of thought exist, and does not think to compare them with the Marx school. Student communists all know too little about Marxism and still less about the world.'

While these intellectual movements among students and organizational movements in labour groups continue to exist and merge occasionally in sympathetic alliance, the Japanese state has, at the present moment, and probably for many years to come will continue to have, the support of the Japanese people whose traditions cannot be overthrown so easily as some would imagine.

In British India, outwardly at any rate, Soviet influence is not manifest in the same vivid manner as in most other parts of Asiatic Asia, although a number of Europeans attribute the present expressions of the revolutionary spirit to that influence. So long as an alien government holds the reins of power, the expression of Indian discontent will be through political, cultural and economic nationalism. On the other hand, agrarian and industrial labour problems have definitely come to the forefront. What, after all, are the causes of the Hindu-Moslem conflict or the Depressed Class movement? The roots of the former lie in the exploitation by Hindu trading and agricultural finance of

the Moslem small landholder or tenant farmer, and of the latter in the condition of landless agricultural labour. Industrial labour, particularly in the city of Bombay, has in the past few years been undoubtedly influenced by Russian propaganda through the agents of the Third International, whether Indian or English by nationality, but the number of such persons and the extent of their activities have been relatively small. Attempts have also been made in foreign ports to influence Indian crews on British vessels. In the Trade Union Congresses which meet annually, the leftist influence has grown considerably; quite recently a resolution was passed recommending affiliation with the Third International.

These developments under the general ægis of the Indian National Congress (which, however, is not directly responsible for them) might have led, one would expect, to Indian capitalist interests combining against labour and the Congress. The unexpected toleration shown by this class is due to their warm sympathy with the political demands of the Congress, which causes them to overlook its general economic policy, undoubtedly inimical to their own interests. The Congress, indeed, since the advent of Mr. Gandhi into its councils, is rapidly transforming itself into a people's movement, and is no longer the organ of those classes which the Government of India so often refers to as 'the natural leaders of the people, with a stake in the country'.

Another group interested in Russia, and important because of its energy, enthusiasm and even recklessness, is the continually extending class of young men, most of whom have had a middle-school and college education, whether they have returned to India after an education abroad or are actually in the Indian universities. This

group, if not exactly exponent of, is sympathetic to, the Russian ideology. For one thing, they view with approval the completely secular philosophy of bolshevism, for they are convinced that India's weakness is due to the religiosity of her people. The old religions, and the later idealistic nationalism which took their place with the previous generation, can in the view of these younger people create only discord. As in Japan, Indian youth is indeed in revolt against the religion of its fathers; in Japan it is the religious conception of the state which is condemned, in India it is the conception of the religious community, whether Hindu or Moslem. These young men's groups are increasingly in touch with industrial workers and peasants.

A small but important group of scholars and educationalists have in recent years been impressed with what Russia is believed to have accomplished along cultural and educational lines. Personalities such as Dr. Tagore and others have recognized the tremendous energy and enthusiasm with which the Bolshevik Government has attempted to educate its citizens. Parallels are drawn, not unnaturally, between the success attending these efforts for the reduction of illiteracy in a poverty-stricken country, and the corresponding failure of general education in India, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The results of the application of Bolshevik principles to the central Asian Republics are not unknown on the Indian frontier. To what extent information and interest about their affairs is spread would be difficult to discover, but events in those states, whether under the Khanates, Russian Czarism, or Soviet rule, have always been matters of discussion in the bazaars of the Indian frontier. Three outstanding features of these republics

may here be mentioned: In the first place the government, from the presidentship downwards, is now in native hands; secondly, very substantial economic developments have given the people employment, and have brought about the elimination of the landed proprietor and priest who through the centuries had demanded their toll of rent, cesses and benefactions; thirdly, the rapid expansion of education is leading the people into a new civilization which, in spite of what is said by English writers to the contrary, has a value even in the eyes of the rough tribesmen of the central Asian regions. The recent demonstration of the Red Shirts on the North West frontier, displaying the emblem of hammer and sickle, is not without its significance.

To the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China Soviet Russian influence has also penetrated, and again it would seem through the activities of the Third International and its Eastern Bureau which is supposed to have been located at Canton. Under the patronage of the Dutch Government, an official of the Colonial Service, attached to the Ministry of Colonies at The Hague, published not long ago a book entitled *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises*.¹ The writer gives a very detailed account of the growth of Javanese nationalism, which expressed itself in the religious form of the Sarekat-i-Islam. Appreciation of socialist doctrines came to the labouring masses through certain Dutch socialists, but the development of the revolutionary movement was the consequence of the direction of leaders who had been in touch with the Third International. The book includes a description of the attempts, not wholly

¹J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, aux éditions du Monde Nouveau, Paris, 1929.

unsuccessful, to bring the Sarekat-i-Islam under communist influence, attempts which led to a cleavage in that body. The Javanese communists had a very definite plan for the form of the future organization of their country, and for the active steps necessary to bring about revolution. Finally, numerous localized revolts broke out in Java during 1926, in Sumatra early in 1927. After the suppression of the risings the Government appointed a commission of enquiry to each area, to look into the causes of the risings and to make recommendations. The recommendations of the commission on the Java revolts is a document such as might be expected from the officials of any power with dependencies. Stronger government and a better gendarmerie, force and justice, sympathy and a sharing of the administration with the people, are the recommendations made. But an indication in the report suggests that the belief was widely held among the people that a successful revolution would have happy material results.

Indo-China is on the frontiers of China, and it is said that the Cantonese revolutionaries who were tinged with communism have been an important influence. The attempted assassination, by an Annamite revolutionary, of the Governor-General of Indo-China, when on a visit to Canton, seems to bear out the contention. In Indo-China, in the Dutch Indies and possibly in British Malaya the highest officials are convinced that Soviet influence is an important factor in the recent political unrest to which these territories have been subject. By a recent decision the Governor of British Malaya, Sir Cecil Clementi, lately transferred from Hongkong, banned the local branches of the Kuomintang.¹ Now Singapore, according to the Dutch reports, has pro-

¹This has since been reconsidered.

vided a centre where communist revolutionaries from the Dutch Indies, Indo-China and elsewhere from the Far East, have consorted, the other centre being Canton, where, as already pointed out, the eastern branch of the Third International is supposed to have been located. On 9th November 1930, according to a dispatch in the Paris *Temps*, the Governor-General of the Dutch Indies was entertained by the French Governor-General at a banquet. The latter in welcoming the guest said that the aim of the visit was to bind 'with bonds of friendship their respective administrations with a view to mutual confidence and peace in the Pacific'. In reply Jonkheer de Graeff emphasized the necessity for a liberal policy towards demands for reasonable reforms; the authorities must know when to accord these at the opportune moment, even before they were actually made. He added that this was only possible if the populations entrusted to them could be protected against the menacing forces of destruction, 'in particular against the communism of Moscow. Its danger obliges us to combat the plague of communism with the greatest energy, since all our colonization, all our efforts at civilization are at stake.'

Communism plays a very much larger role in China than in the countries we have been considering. Japan and India, as also the Dutch and French possessions, have strong governments, whether alien or national, which do actually govern and control their own territories. China is in the throes of creating such a government. A series of revolutions with their resulting changes, economic, social and even intellectual, have made transmutation comparatively easy. Tradition in all things has been overthrown. China has developed the spirit of revolution, and her leaders are earnestly

searching for some method by which this vast country can be united and the machinery of government be made to function adequately. In this connection it is well to remember that in the early days of the Republic the young revolutionaries expressed their programme simply yet radically:

‘To unify the executive power, to enforce local self-government, to nationalize the Hans, Mongols, Moham-medans and Tibetans, to adopt state socialism, to extend free education, and to maintain the equality of men and women.’¹

The first revolution, which led to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, resulted in Yuan Shih-kai’s dictatorship. The chaos into which the country fell just before and after his death, stultified almost completely the concrete results of the revolution. It demonstrated that China was not united. Yuan Shih-kai’s successors, in spite of opposition, and without the sanction of parliament, which was forcibly prevented from meeting in session, declared war against Germany. As a consequence, the southern provinces broke away under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, and this led to another civil war. By 1919 Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s efforts had been neutralized by intrigues within Canton itself and by his failure to impose his will on the Peking Government, which had been financed by foreign interests. But two other forces had arisen: the first was the student movement centred round the Peking educational institutions, the second was labour centred round Shanghai. The war shortage of manufactured commodities had stimulated industry, the rising of world prices had brought hardship to the masses, and labour began for the first time to become self-consciously discontented.

¹*China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1310.

The treaty of Versailles was regarded as a deliberate betrayal of China by its traditional friend, the United States of America, when it was discovered that Shantung had been assigned to Japan. China looked forth upon an outer world that seemed hostile to her. Russia too was passing through revolution. The powers, by encircling diplomatic movements and by military aid to the anti-revolutionaries, were attempting to encompass the downfall of the new Russian Government, a government which had made proclamation to the eastern world that the two-century-old imperialism of her former rulers had been renounced and that she would in future conduct her relations with eastern nations on a basis of equality. Even as Chinese students in the past had gone to Tokyo, they now travelled in large numbers to Irkutsk, Moscow, Leningrad, and later to the Bolshevik training centre at Tashkent. Economic and socialist literature from European sources was at this time entering China in Japanese translation.¹

Russian influence in China, and especially in North China, has been greater than is supposed. The geographical proximity of Russia is an important factor. No one who travels by the Chinese Eastern Railway, or what was once its extension to Dairen, can fail to be struck by the magnificent Russian-built cities of Dairen, now in Japanese hands, Mukden and Harbin. There are many of these contacts arising from territorial proximity, as for instance in the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and in outer Mongolia, where although Chinese sovereignty is recognized by treaty, the autonomous republic is federated to the U.S.S.R.

Diplomatically Russian influence has been equally great, although to-day Chinese official and commercial

¹*China Year Book*, 1928, p. 1316.

circles would consider it somewhat tarnished by the events of the last few years. In 1919 and again in 1920 the Soviet Government made declarations in which the old Czarist treaties with China were denounced. In January 1923, M. Joffe arrived in Shanghai to confer with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. A joint statement issued by them contains the following paragraph:

'In order to clarify the situation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen has requested from M. Joffe a reaffirmation of the principles defined in the Russian note to the Chinese Government dated 27th September 1920. M. Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen that the Russian Government is ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all treaties and exactions which the Czardom imposed on China.'

Mr. Karakhan, M. Joffe's successor as Soviet ambassador, took an even more definite line. He cited the Turkish repudiation of extraterritoriality as one of the results of Russia's friendship with that country. He added further that the capitalist powers were rejoicing in the chaos which had overtaken China, for thus they could fully protect their own interests, and he added: 'Only the Soviet Republics, only the Russian people, desire to see China strong and powerful, possessing a strong army and capable of defending the interests and sovereignty of its people.'

The Soviet representatives took one further precaution in their official attitude, and that was not to press their ideas regarding communism on the Chinese political leaders. In the very forefront of the joint statement, cited above, the following words appear:

'Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced

into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by M. Joffe, who is further of opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.¹

Russian diplomatic successes led Dr. Sun Yat-sen to apply to Russia for advice. Michael Borodin was delegated for this duty, and duly took up residence at Canton. Through his agency the Southern Government obtained munitions from Russia, and, what was of even greater moment, advisers, both military and civil, to whose instructions in technique the Kuomintang owed its startling successes. Although Borodin and his advisers were finally driven out of the country, their influence on it was so deep that the Kuomintang to-day is modelled after the Soviet system, and functions according to its technique even though the communist ideology is rejected.

But a definitely communist party is established in China to-day. Its work is carried on underground, but visible signs of its activity are not wanting, and may be found, in the first place, in the temper and outlook of the students, secondly in labour movements, and thirdly among the rural masses, as is revealed by the various upheavals. Few outsiders can have a knowledge of the actual strength of the communist party: the outward signs are impressive enough.

Universities and High Schools are naturally objectives of communist effort. When the Nationalist Govern-

¹*China Year Book*, 1928, pp. 1318-19.

ment was extending its authority by its astonishing successes, the communist sympathies of the students abated in the expectancy that a new ally was at hand. But with the failure of Nanking (temporary though it may have been) to give the country good government, acute discontent spread once again. What have been the results of the communist movement in the universities? Firstly, student unrest which shows itself in a contempt for all authority, and secondly the immense amount of literature on socialism which is absorbed by them. A Chinese writer in the *China Critic* rather contemptuously describes the intellectual puzzlement of the student class.

'Socialism beckons and smiles, and under the direction of able propagandists makes out a good case for itself. The flirtation of communism is readily responded to by a few, but is repulsed by many because of its strong association with Soviet Russia. . . The question may be pertinently asked: To which would young China turn? "Towards socialism," we hear the young generation say. . . . If we are not too obstinate to shut our eyes to the obvious, we cannot fail to see the growing sentiment for and towards socialism, especially among a class of people composed of college students and juvenile clerks and labourers. Go to any small book store in Shanghai and see for yourself the number and variety of books which purport to be translations or abstracts from Karl Marx . . . mostly worthless commentaries and interpretations thereon: and also the eager young faces which gather around the cheaper section of the book stands in these stores, fingering (*sic*) this book and that, and whose susceptibility and poor economics render them easy victims to Marx's flawed but seemingly strong logic.'¹

¹*China Critic*, Shanghai, 2nd October 1930, p. 941.

A striking commentary on the interest of these groups is the very large output of translations into Chinese of Russian books, particularly the new type of novel such as Gladkov's *Cement*. Three separate translations of a Bolshevik schoolboy's diary have been produced during the last three years. Anti-religious literature directed particularly against Christianity also has a vogue.

On 25th August 1930, a spokesman of the National Government made reference to the execution in Nanking during the previous week of twenty communists:

'Of the twenty Reds executed . . . fifteen were above 20 but under 30 years of age, while two were under 20. To uphold the law of the Government and to preserve peace and order, these young people had to be executed, but it was depressing to see the younger generation going astray. . . . Young people who come out of the schools and colleges are unable to find work. . . . Circumstances often force them to join the reactionary forces. . . . The teachers of elementary schools are shockingly underpaid. This fact partly explains why a great number of the elementary school teachers are discovered to be acting as secret agents of communists. They must be given a living wage, and steps ought to be taken for the reorganization and betterment of our schools and colleges so that our students may not be led astray.'¹

Proletarian movements, whether among industrial labourers or among peasants and agricultural labourers, have been influenced from two sources. Students in schools and universities have undoubtedly been in touch with labour groups, but it is said that the rural masses have been stirred by the direct agents of the communist party, ex-students and communist leaders who

¹*North China Herald*, 2nd September, 1930, p. 348.

have returned from the Russian training centres. While three years ago, and anterior even to that, industrial labour in the cities seemed to be affected, more recent times have witnessed a very marked development of rural movements, although these are by no means universal. Now these movements are not all communist in character. Communist movements must be distinguished from bandit risings and those protective peasant movements against the extortions of military commanders in north-west China and other parts of north China. Thus in Shantung and in Honan there exist organizations such as the 'Red Sword Clubs', composed of peasants who are banded together to protect themselves. While these bodies are not communist, they might easily be drawn into communism, particularly if unsettled conditions continue. According to a Japanese writer, a peasant movement has grown up under 'the influence of the Soviet revolutionary doctrine' in south China, where it developed first in the wake of the Nationalist armies in their sweep to the north.¹ The foreign legations in Peking, according to an American press message, are reported to have a list of no less than fifteen Communist armies operating south of the Yangtse. The daring attack on Changsha during the middle of 1930 by one of these armies astounded China. Discipline is well maintained, and in the case of Changsha only the houses of the well-to-do, of officials and some foreign residents were attacked. 'The poor were left alone and even given some of the loot,' says the report. Each of these armies is equipped with a well-organized education and propaganda department, whose business is to win over the farmer to communist principles.²

¹ *Transpacific*, Tokyo, 16th October, 1930, p. 5.

² *North China Herald*, 16th September, 1930, p. 425.

Exaggeration of communist influence in China is easy. The foreigner uses it in dialectic against Russia, and Chinese authorities find it an excuse for covering up their own failures. Given stable government and definite schemes of economic development, it is probable that the acute symptoms will quickly die down, but whether the idea of the communist state brought about by revolution will disappear is much more difficult to judge. It is hard to believe that Chinese reconstruction will be so rapid that even the preliminary condition of allaying communist fervour can be fulfilled; but perhaps the Government or the stable governments in various parts of China may themselves be converted if not to pure communism, at least to some form of socialization.

To sum up: the reasons which underlie the influence of Russia on Asiatic peoples are roughly as follows. In the first place Soviet Russia undoubtedly presents a challenge to the old imperialism. Her international dealings with countries such as Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and, in the immediate post-war period, with China were indicative of her desire to recognize the equality of Asiatic nations. Whether her actions in this sphere were *bona fide* or not is in this connection immaterial. The fact remains that the Russian example opened a new chapter in intercontinental diplomacy. In the second place, Soviet Russia holds herself bound to accept the principle of racial equality, both as an article of belief and in practice. To non-European races the significance of this assertion is profound. The fact may here again be recalled that at the Peace Conference in 1919 the Japanese contention for the inclusion, among the resounding phrases of the Covenant of the League, of a phrase acknowledging racial equality, was rejected. In contrast to this, a manifesto of the Third Inter-

national, issued from the Kremlin in March of the same year, indicated and in later commentaries re-emphasized the fact that in the ranks of the Komintern 'the peoples of the white, yellow and black races, the workers of the world, are . . . fraternally united'. In the third place, the Russian doctrine of immediate progress by revolution, as contrasted with the very English principle of 'the inevitability of gradualness', could not but find widespread acceptance in circumstances such as those in which India and China find themselves. What was India promised in 1917? Responsible self-government in stages, with the possibility of enlargement or retraction according to her proved capacity or failure, of which others were to be the judges. China was told by the powers that the régime of extraterritoriality imposed on her could only be gradually relinquished as she developed her own legal and administrative institutions, whose adequacy or the reverse was to be pronounced on by an external authority. The entire evolutionary critique, so dear to the hearts of colonial administrators from Delhi to Keijo or the Legation authorities in Peking, has thus been challenged by the Russian dynamic of revolution.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

MANKIND IS witness to-day of a vast drama on a threefold stage: the inner transformation of three great Asiatic peoples in their passage from the conceptions of theocracy to those of the national state. The nationalist leaders of these three countries have had before them a common aim, namely the creation of strong national states in possession of (1) an inner cultural and even spiritual unity; (2) national sovereignty expressed through responsible parliamentary government; (3) an adequate capitalistic industrial and financial basis to ensure economic independence; (4) an efficient army and navy with which to protect national independence and ensure international authority; (5) systems of education and physical welfare to produce a citizenship sufficiently prepared for these ends of national reconstruction.

Forces working towards these ends have been in operation in Asiatic Asia now for several decades, in the case of Japan for over sixty years. Democracy and capitalism are the political offspring of the western conception of individualism: though philosophically each be logically and respectably derived from the parent concept, doubts may be entertained as to whether they can dwell in the same house or whether they will not annihilate each other. In these Asiatic countries, in Japan and India in particular, the growth

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of the forms of political liberty has been accompanied by the retraction of economic freedom. This fact explains the deep social unrest that has been such a marked feature of Japanese national history for the last thirty years. The extreme 'radicalism' in student, industrial and peasant groups has been in evidence to such an extent that the state has been compelled to adopt the most drastic measures to eradicate what it considers subversive propaganda. Faced by such problems consequent on the social injustice which seems to be inherent in the uncontrolled capitalist order of the democratic nationalist state, Japan, in order to continue as a national state, is compelled to take the one course now open to her, namely to pass on from the stages of cultural, political and economic nationalism to the final stage of territorial imperialism. This, apparently, is the meaning of the Manchurian developments of the last few months. For some years Japan has been faced with formidable internal difficulties. In the first place, she has had to ensure a livelihood to a growing population in face of diminishing external resources, threatened by the growth of Chinese resistance in Manchuria and by the closing of markets in other parts of the world by means of high tariff walls. In the second place, the gravity of the internal situation has been intensified by increasing exploitation of the masses by powerful financial and industrial interests. At times it was even feared that the country was on the eve of a revolution. Whether this was actually the case or not it is difficult to say, but, at any rate, with Japan in almost complete economic possession of Manchuria, the chances of internal revolution have already become more remote. Abundant signs exist that the Manchurian policy has united Japan as nothing else has in recent times. The late

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Minseito Government was constitutionally responsible for the Manchurian policy. It fell even as the occupation of Manchuria was in full swing. Another government succeeded it. 'Manchuria', wrote *The Times* correspondent, 'did not enter into the case against the government, and the interests which desired to change financial policy were not deterred by any fear of swapping horses in midstream. They knew, everybody knew, that there is only one national policy in regard to Manchuria.'¹ Some indication of this national unanimity may be gathered from reports regarding student groups, which during the last decade have, as we have seen, been a problem to the authorities because of their radicalism: competent observers now note the startling fact that Japanese policy in Manchuria has evoked the enthusiastic support of the majority of Japanese students.

But can the other peoples of Asiatic Asia remain unperturbed by the happenings of the past months? For even though Japan has reduced Manchuria to the status of a fief, yet periodically she will again be presented with the problems of an increasing population. With increased military, naval and financial power, she may yet displace certain western powers in their hegemony in the eastern seas. Thus Swaraj India may prove to be an idle dream, even though the British Raj were to come to an end. The Pax Britannica may be superseded by a Pax Japonica, in the assurance of which Japan, by industrial exploitation, the control of communications and finance, and police of the seas, could dispense with the burden of political and judicial administration which she would leave in native hands.

Chinese attempts to reconstruct their country as a

¹*The Times*, London, Saturday, 16th January 1932, Article entitled 'Party Tactics in Japan'.

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national state have proved so far a failure. The various political national unities attempted first in Peking and later in Nanking have scarcely demonstrated that the adequate foundations to support a national state are existent. The cultural unity which China undoubtedly possesses is of itself insufficient to bring about a national unity in the absence of a modern system of education which would subserve a nationalist purpose. China lacks too the unity which would grow up on the basis of a great national army organized for defence. The time which has been at the disposal of China for the effecting of such vast changes, has, the critic must admit, been very short, but the problem itself is so colossal that one wonders whether the dream of a united China can be realized within a reasonable period, notwithstanding the intense national feeling which is fanned into a white flame from time to time by events such as the recent Japanese activities in Manchuria. That the forces of nationalism have so far failed to free China from the incubus of foreign political and economic domination, is due perhaps to the undoubted fact that the country is at the same time in the throes of a very extensive social revolution. The rise and growth of the Communist movement is pregnant with meaning, for it represents a widespread protest against exploitation of the masses by the merchant, financier and landlord, and the absence of any well-planned and adequately carried out programme for the development of agriculture or insurance against famine. That the movement has been directed by the Socialist ideology of present-day Russia has already been made clear. The extreme difficulty of organizing China into a single national state may suggest to the communist that economic unity may be effectively achieved through the formation of a series

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of socialized republics, all members of the Soviet Union. Agrarian conditions are ripe for some kind of revolutionary reform. It might be added that the psychological predispositions of the people, their ancient conceptions of the sovereignty of society, their fatalism which might easily be transmuted into a form of Marxian determinism, make acceptance of reorganization, based on the ideas of communism, not wholly impossible. Omission of any reference to parliamentary government in the present Chinese constitution is a significant fact. The Minister of Industry of the Nanking Government at the time that these pages are being written, Mr. Cheng Kung-Po, issued a statement on his assumption of office early in 1932, in which he said:

‘There have been three theories advanced for the unification of the country. Some have maintained that China can only be united by armed forces; others believe that the country can be unified by political means; the third group are of the opinion that unification may be achieved by economic means. . . . Events of the past have shown us that unification by military force can only be of a temporary nature. Political means have failed to accomplish the desired end. I firmly believe that China can only be saved by the economic method. . . . When the country’s economic problems are solved, social and political stability will be the natural result.’¹

Evidence is forthcoming to show that the Governments of western European nations and the United States of America as well as of Japan, influenced by trading and financial interests, are deeply concerned as to the fate of China. These Governments have proffered from time to time their aid to the Nationalist Govern-

¹*North China Herald*, 5th January 1932. Article entitled ‘Five-Year Plan for China’.

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ment of China. The League of Nations, under their influence, has been called in to advise the Chinese Government, and invitations to help in the solution of Chinese national problems, such as finance, health, education and communications, have been eagerly accepted. Such offers might almost be regarded as so many enticements to China to walk in the paths of democratic government, instead of running with the wild asses of communism. A socialized China could only be created with the aid and close co-operation of the U.S.S.R. Is the recent violent banging of the open door in Manchuria by Japan an indication that she desires to secure China against a possible alliance with Russia?

The cultural unity of India is an even flimsier basis for political unity than that possessed by China. India has schools, but no national system of education. Her army, well disciplined and efficient for purposes of war, is not the expression of the national will and the guardian of its sovereignty, but is in a sense a hired army. Parliamentary institutions, it is true, exist and function, but in no sense are these bodies in control of national policies.

The recent proceedings of the Round Table Conference of 1931 reflect in a peculiar degree the elements in the conflict which lies ahead. The Indian National Congress delegation was conspicuous by its absence in the first session of 1930. The persons who attended represented specifically those parties which were mainly concerned with the political reconstruction of India on the basis of a national state. As such they were willing to give almost any gages, external or internal, to the British people, so long as the political forms of parliamentary government were conceded to them. Further progress on that occasion was thwarted by the failure to

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agree on what was termed the communal problem. The second session was very different, for another immense issue was added to those which had emerged previously. The conference, and particularly the British Government, was brought face to face with the urgency of a popular movement in India whose demands were not so much political in nature as concerned with social reconstruction. Even though Mr. Gandhi made frequent use of nationalist terminology, it was clear that he was more interested in the achievement of economic reconstruction within India itself. With this end in view, he demanded the elimination of the present government, for, in his opinion and that of his party, it was responsible for the heavy burdens laid on the people, administratively, financially, and even morally, and their uplift would continue to be impossible so long as it retained power. In his opinion, the safeguards on which the representatives of the British Government insisted were a device for the economic control of India, even after its political and administrative role had come to an end. To almost every political demand made at the conference the British Government replied with an affirmative: even as to most of the economic demands the Secretary of State for India tendered a negative, and in this he had the support of his colleagues. The discussions of the conference on the safeguards necessary to protect British commerce in India proved of peculiar significance, and they were criticized from two points of view. The nationalist reluctantly acquiesced in giving his British competitor a guarantee that in the future commercial discrimination would not be exercised against him. On the other hand, Mr. Gandhi opposed these claims, as it was clear to him that the British industrialist, plantation proprietor, import and export

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agent, and international banker formed the nexus which bound India to the capitalist world of the west.

Mr. Gandhi's younger followers see the issues not in his Tolstoyan terms, but in those of the revolutionary modern world. To them the offer of responsible parliamentary government must seem like a stone offered where the demand was for bread. The democratic parliamentary machinery, to which India will now doubtless be harnessed, may prove ineffective as an instrument for the fundamental reform of the land problem, of agricultural finance, in short, of the conditions of the masses. At such a time as the present in world history, it seems to be the most ironic of fates which has decreed that India should be offered parliamentary government, while the continents of Europe and America are littered with parliaments which have failed to function in accordance with the needs of their people, but stand rather in the way of radical reform. An Indian Executive, responsible to an Indian Parliament, it is true, will be more vulnerable than is the present executive to great popular movements within the country itself. Is this the reason why the British Government insists on the control of the army as a safeguard in the interests of India?

Japan has succeeded in transforming herself into a national state within a period of two generations and, as we have seen, her further evolution would seem to be along the lines of imperialism. It is doubtful whether independent national states can be created in either China or India, in spite of the moral aid given to the former by the League of Nations, and the benevolent help accorded the latter by Britain. Japan may yet create orderly government in Manchuria, even as Britain has created it in India, but imperialism, whether western or eastern, is doomed, for, as we have known it, it is based on

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racial inequality and economic exploitation, against the results of which the suffering nations have reacted so violently that in time the advantages which have accrued to the ruling nations will be completely offset. The evils of imperialism are so glaring that we are apt to forget, on the other hand, its contribution to the progress of the world and even to international relations.

Whatever inferior motives may be attributed to the imperialist as prompting the political and social expansion effected in the exploited countries, the fact remains that certain beneficial results have been achieved. These advantages might perhaps be summarized thus: (1) The creation of orderly government and the substitution of the rule of law for the exercise of arbitrary action based on the will or personal desire of the ruler; (2) the establishment of systems of welfare services which have as their end the intellectual and physical development of citizens; (3) economic development based on scientific technology; and (4) fruitful results from intercultural relationships.

These benefits, offset though they are by the gravest disadvantages, suggest that intimate and even organic relations with other peoples may be necessary for both India and China if they are to take their place in the life of the world. The problem then before us would be to enquire as to what form this relationship is to take. If these two countries should fail in their attempts to transform themselves into national democracies with capitalistic economic foundations, their only hope may lie in becoming members of a union of socialized states. This, of course, will be impossible unless certain profound changes take place in the outlook of the nations at large. In other words, it is no longer a local problem but a universal one. Imperialism is failing, but if one people is

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to help another, it can only be on the basis of equality and mutual profit, mutually recognized. Thus mankind will be ultimately compelled to face the alternative to our present order, namely the creation of a world state, into which national states can merge their identity, as political and economic organs, for the general benefit of mankind.

But how can such fundamental changes be brought about in society and government? Is it conceivable that the ancient sanctions may be revived to inspire the evolution of a new order? That the countries which make up Asiatic Asia have arrived at a critical stage in the political and economic realms has been made plain in the preceding chapters, but it is equally true in the moral and spiritual realm. Thus in Japan within the last few months a most unexpected protest against economic exploitation (domestic or overseas) has resulted from the Manchurian situation in which the army is involved. It is a matter of common knowledge that certain great firms in Japan have exercised a powerful influence over the bureaucracy as well as over the Diet. The proletarian movement and socialist intellectuals have protested in vain against this concentration of economic power in the hands of the few. The situation as it affects the masses has become acute: land indebtedness, in view of the low level of agricultural prices, is now a burning problem which affects the Japanese soldiers particularly, as seventy-five per cent of them are recruited from the peasant classes. It is evident from reports that a movement to bring about certain reforms, which would revive the old clan loyalties, has made headway among the junior army officers. 'The national socialist movement which bears many points of resemblance to Hitlerism in Germany has penetrated the army and is said to be

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particularly popular with the younger officers. They are imbued with a passion for the old ideals of Japan—a Spartan simplicity and unconditional devotion to the interests of the nation as their chosen leaders see them. Their tendency is away from democratic ideas, from over-industrialisation, and from Western standards and modes of living. They desire the reorganization of society round the person of the Emperor, with the army dominant. They have a vision of a self-sufficient Japan exercising a virtual protectorate over neighbouring parts of the Asiatic mainland. And the vision is supplemented by details and elaborate plans for making it effective.¹ It is this party which has laid plans for the future of Manchuria from which, if it had its way, the economic exploiter as well as the party politician would be eliminated and where ample opportunity for self-development would be given to Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Manchus and Mongolians, as well as to the White Russian immigrants, to live a modest but adequate life.

In India a similar protest has been clearly evident ever since the advent of Mr. Gandhi into Indian politics. At the Round Table Conference it was obvious that in spite of all the apparatus of democratic government which was being examined and the proposals made thereon, Mr. Gandhi's thought was elsewhere. Over his mind the ancient conception of the Indian village and the rule of Dharma had empire, even as his hands turned the spinning-wheel—the ever-present symbol of his convictions. His adversaries at that conference included Dr. Iqbal,² better known as a writer of Urdu and Persian

¹*The Times*, London, May 17th, 1932. Leading article on the Future of Manchuria.

²Dr. Iqbal, because of his outstanding contributions to Indian literature received some years ago the honour of knighthood and is officially known as Sir Muhammad Iqbal.

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poetry than for his political leadership. Both Mr. Gandhi and he are members of the English Bar, both have practised their professions before British courts, one in India and the other in South Africa. Dr. Iqbal in his earlier days was the poet of Indian nationalism. His song *Hindustan Hamara* has rivalled the Bengali song *Bande Mataram* in the affections of North India. But Dr. Iqbal, like Mr. Gandhi, has gone back on his education. As President of the All-India Muslim League (the most outstanding association of Moslem politicians) he was called upon to consider the question of the future Indian constitution as it affected the Indian Moslem. In his presidential address Dr. Iqbal took the opportunity of putting before his audience certain fundamental considerations which, if carried out, would make the creation of a homogenous democracy in India impossible. His convictions are based on the theocratic nature of Islamic polity. Before considering these, it may be well to present the reader with an expression of Dr. Iqbal's disillusionment with the modern development, through science and education, of Indian life. This is the cry of his heart:

The rich are making gold from the blood of the labour-
ing poor.

The village tyrant devastates the harvests of the peas-
ants.

Revolution! Revolution! Revolution!

The seeming piety of the Sheikh draws the faithful in
a snare.

The Brahmin has befooled the simple unbelievers.

The kings are playing foul, deception is their dice,
They murder subject nations, the nations are asleep.

Revolution! Revolution! Revolution!

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The father's at his pulpit, the son is in his school,
The one is childish old, the other's spent in youth.

Ye Muslims, I lament the curse of science and of art,
For evil is cheap among us and good is hard to find.

Revolution! Revolution! Revolution!

How bold the false to be in ambush for the true,
The blind bat is making a night-raid on the sun!

The Church of Jesus Christ has nailed him on the Cross.
The Chosen One's exiled from the Kaaba with his Book.

The strength of leopards is at times bestowed upon the
weak.

A flame may now peep out from the bubble's flimsy
globe.

Revolution! Revolution! Revolution!

To-day the age of reforms is upon India, and the Moslem poet is led into the arena of political controversy. Questions such as the constitution, the franchise, electorates and the protection of minorities have become matters of discussion. Listen to him once again as he reminds his people of the principles of Islam:

'The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Moslems, both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity . . . gradually developed into a vast Church organization. Luther was justified in rising in revolt against this organization, though I think he did not realize that his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethic of Jesus

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by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrow systems of ethics. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Moslems and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one; it is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam and its system of life and conduct. . . .¹

The life of Islam, Dr. Iqbal adds, will depend on its centralization within specific territorial limits. Hence he visualizes an India whose spearhead will be an Islamic state consisting of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan. This state he looks upon as being the final destiny of Indian Moslems. Although he does not mention it, his specific proposals could scarcely exclude from this Moslem state the Hindu dynastic state of Kashmir, of which he himself is a native.

Dr. Iqbal and his followers have seen a vision. Who can tell but that this new state, if achieved, might not become the candidate for a restored caliphate, possibly not in a political sense, but one which will give the Islamic world a religious and cultural centre and will be prepared to repeat in its life the glories of Baghdad, or Cordova? With the fullest sympathy, be it remembered,

¹All-India Muslim League, Allahabad Session (1930), Presidential Address by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, p. 3.

CONCLUSION

that in such visions men like Dr. Iqbal have sought a refuge from the process of westernization (economic, political and cultural) which, as they believe, is overtaking Indian life with devastating results.

To the Hindu believer one prescription is given which enjoins on him that when he has completed his duty to posterity, then he shall leave the concerns of this world to meditate on life and the universe. Through these pages an attempt has been made to take the reader through the difficult places of intercultural, interpolitical, intereconomic mingling; the purpose has been to direct the mind to the destinies that await the coming generations. This task has been but imperfectly fulfilled, the writer at present can do no more: yet even as the Hindu, true to his tradition, when he has obtained freedom from the duties imposed on him by society, speculates on the inner meaning of life in relation to the ultimate things, the writer, though not himself professing that faith, may be permitted to reflect on those matters which, liberated from the process of evolution, may be seen in relation to the absolute. Set free from the theocracies, the Indian, Chinese, or Japanese young man of the nineteenth or early twentieth century gloried in his new-found freedom—the autonomy of man. But to-day other servitudes are imposed upon him. Science and economics with their determinisms have laid their hold on the mind. Was then his freedom to be short-lived, merely an illusion of the times? The reply to this question will determine the type of the new society which still awaits creation.

APPENDIX

THE FOLLOWING are extracts from the Treaties of Nanking and Tientsin:

'Treaty of Nanking: Art. X

‘His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to establish at all the Ports which are by the 2nd article of this Treaty to be thrown open for the resort of British merchants, a fair and regular Tariff of Export and Import Customs and other Dues, which Tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information, and the Emperor further engages that when British merchandise shall have once paid at any of the said Ports the regulated Customs and Dues agreeable to the Tariff, to be hereafter fixed, such Merchandise may be conveyed by Chinese Merchants to any province or City in the interior of the Empire of China, on paying a further amount as Transit Duties which shall not exceed per cent on the tariff value of such goods.’¹

'Treaty of Tientsin, Arts. XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII

‘Whereas the Tariff fixed by Article X of the Treaty of Nanking, which was estimated so as to impose on imports and exports a duty at about the rate of five per cent *ad valorem*, has been found, by reason of the fall in value of various articles of merchandise therein enumerated to impose a duty upon these considerably in excess

¹*Readings from Chinese History*, Macnair, p. 169.

of the rate originally assumed, as above, to be a fair rate, it is agreed that the said Tariff shall be revised, and that as soon as the Treaty shall have been signed, application shall be made to the Emperor of China to depute a high officer of the Board of Revenue to meet at Shanghai officers to be deputed on behalf of the British Government, to consider its revision together so that the Tariff as revised may come into operation immediately after the ratification of this Treaty.

‘It is agreed that either of the High Contracting Parties to this Treaty may demand a further revision of the Tariff, and of the Commercial Articles of this Treaty, at the end of ten years; but if no demand be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the Tariff shall remain in force for ten years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

‘Whereas it was agreed in Article X of the Treaty of Nanking, that British imports, having paid the Tariff duties, should be conveyed into the interior free of all further charges, except a transit duty, the amount whereof was not to exceed a certain percentage of tariff value; and whereas, no accurate information having been furnished of the amount of such duty, British merchants have constantly complained that charges are suddenly and arbitrarily imposed by the provincial authorities as transit duties upon produce on its way to the foreign market, and on imports on their way into the interior, to the detriment of trade: it is agreed that within four months from the signing of this Treaty, at all ports now open to British trade, and within a similar period at all ports that may hereafter be opened, the authority appointed to superintend the collection of duties shall be obliged, upon application of the Consul, to declare the

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amount of duties leviable on produce between the place of production and the port of shipment, and upon imports between the Consular port in question and the inland markets named by the Consul; and that a notification thereof shall be published in English and Chinese for general information.

‘But it shall be at the option of any British subject, desiring to convey produce purchased inland to a port, or to convey imports from a port to an inland market, to clear his goods of all transit duties, by payment of a single charge. The amount of this charge shall be leviable on exports at the first barrier they may have to pass, or, on imports, at the ports at which they are landed; and, in payment thereof, a certificate shall be issued which exempts the goods from all further inland charges whatsoever.

‘It is further agreed that the amount of this charge shall be calculated, as nearly as possible, at the rate of two and a half per cent *ad valorem*, and that it shall be fixed for each article at the Conference to be held at Shanghai for the revision of the Tariff.

‘It is distinctly understood that the payment of transit dues, by commutation or otherwise, shall in no way affect the tariff duties on imports or exports, which will continue to be levied separately and in full.’

In this connection we may also quote the relevant section of the Treaty of Yedo (1858) between Great Britain and Japan.

‘Art. XIV

‘At each of the ports open to trade, British subjects shall be at full liberty to import from their own or any other ports, and sell there, and purchase therein, and export to their own or any other ports, all manner of

APPENDIX

merchandise, not contraband, paying the duties thereon, as laid down in the Tariff annexed to the present Treaty, and no other charges whatsoever.

‘With the exception of munitions of war, which shall only be sold to the Japanese Government and foreigners, they may freely buy from Japanese, and sell to them any articles that either may have for sale, without the intervention of any Japanese officers in such purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payments for the same; and all classes of Japanese may purchase, sell, keep or use any articles sold to them by British subjects.’

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
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